Lynched for Belief: The Systemic Persecution of Ahmadi Muslims in Pakistan

On 18 April 2025, a 47-year-old car workshop owner was brutally killed with sticks and bricks as a mob of hundreds stormed his place of worship, while numerous others had to be rescued by police in the city of Karachi, Pakistan. This horrific incident, which should provoke national outrage and deep sorrow, failed to elicit a strong response from civil society or a decisive intervention from the state. The reason lies in the fact that both the victim and the worship site belonged to the Ahmadi Muslim minority— a community that routinely faces violent persecution, systemic political and bureaucratic discrimination, and institutionalised oppression within Pakistan.

Each year, reports by governmental bodies, international human rights organisations, and community advocates document the persistent assaults on Ahmadi Muslims in Pakistan by Islamist factions or radicalised mobs, with no meaningful intervention by the state. In some instances, the state appears overtly complicit in such actions—for example, in March of this year, a 120-year-old Ahmadi place of worship was demolished by police following pressure and complaints from Islamist groups claiming the structure resembled a mosque. To offer a glimpse into the societal persecution faced by this community: Ahmadi Muslim graves are frequently defiled and vandalised, while individuals endure constant harassment, targeted assassinations, mob violence, unofficial commercial boycotts, employment discrimination, and abuse on digital platforms. This is compounded by the alarming frequency of blasphemy accusations levelled against Ahmadi Muslims, for reasons such as possessing the Quran, inscribing Prophet Muhammad’s name on a wedding invitation, or engaging in prayer using language or gestures considered distinctly Islamic.

While opposition to the Ahmadiyya community has existed since its inception in the late 19th century by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad of Qadian in Punjab, the most critical blow to Ahmadi Muslims in Pakistan was delivered through the 1974 constitutional amendment, which officially declared them non-Muslims. Despite sharing the majority of beliefs and practices with mainstream Muslims, Ahmadis diverge in their recognition of Mirza Ahmad as the Mahdi or Messiah, a belief that conflicts with the Islamic doctrine of Khatam-e-Nubuwwat (the finality of Prophet Muhammad). Subsequently, in 1984, General Zia-ul-Haq issued an ordinance prohibiting Ahmadi Muslims from performing Islamic rites or displaying religious symbols associated with Islam, such as erecting domes or minarets on their places of worship. In 1985, he also introduced segregated voter lists based on religious identity, effectively requiring Ahmadi Muslims to renounce their beliefs in order to vote. This marked the onset of a formalised system of legal disenfranchisement and persecution, which continues today. Although the practice of separate electoral rolls was ended in 2002, Ahmadi Muslims were excluded from this reform. The requirement to repudiate their faith has since permeated various aspects of governance, barring them from essential state services such as obtaining a passport. Notably, in October 2022, Punjab’s provincial government mandated the inclusion of a declaration affirming the finality of Prophet Muhammad within the marriage registration form.

The emergence of the far-right Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP), the group whose supporters were involved in the recent attack and killing of an Ahmadi Muslim man in Karachi, has significantly deepened the climate of fear and marginalisation experienced by the community.

The TLP rose to national attention in 2017 when it staged a three-week blockade of a major highway in Islamabad to protest a minor amendment to the electoral oath, which the group perceived as a dilution of the state’s stance against Ahmadi Muslims. The government ultimately conceded to their demand by reinstating the original wording, resulting in the resignation of Law Minister Zahid Hamid. Such is the influence of far-right sentiment that, in 2018, the Imran Khan-led PTI government succumbed to pressure from extremist groups and requested that Princeton professor Atif Mian resign from his role as Economic Adviser solely on account of his Ahmadi Muslim identity.

While the systemic exclusion of Ahmadi Muslims in Pakistan was initiated and continues to be upheld by the state, the deep-seated societal animosity it has fostered has now grown beyond the state’s control. Decades of intentional state policy targeting the community for political gain have inflicted lasting damage on the nation, fostering a society deeply afflicted by radicalism, self-destructive impulses, and toxic intolerance. According to data compiled by the Ahmadiyya community, at least 264 Ahmadi Muslims were killed in targeted attacks, mob violence, and bombings between 1984 and 2018. It is important to note that even Pakistan’s first and only Nobel Laureate, Abdus Salam, was not spared from the effects of this pervasive hostility—his gravestone was defaced to erase the word ‘Muslim’ due to his Ahmadi Muslim identity.

Turkey’s Struggle for Democracy: Contextualizing the Ongoing Protests Against Erdogan’s Authoritarian Regime

Following a series of international successes, including the downfall of Bashar al-Assad in Syria and a three-nation tour of Malaysia, Indonesia, and Pakistan in February, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan now faces the most significant political crisis of his career, as thousands of Turks have taken to the streets in opposition to his authoritarian regime.

The protests, which initially began in Istanbul, have rapidly spread to more than 55 of the country’s 81 provinces and show no signs of waning, representing the most substantial challenge to Erdogan and his AKP (Justice and Development Party) since the Gezi Park protests of 2013. While the catalyst for this movement was the arrest and ousting of Istanbul’s mayor, Ekrem Imamoglu, the event has merely unleashed the long-standing frustration among Turks with Erdogan’s policies of democratic erosion and economic mismanagement.

Ekrem Imamoglu assumed the position of Mayor of Istanbul in 2019 and has since been re-elected twice, a testament to his exceptional popularity. He is the prominent figure of the centre-left, pro-secularist CHP (Republican People’s Party), Turkey’s leading opposition party, which has gradually strengthened its influence in the country’s political landscape in recent years. Most notably, the CHP dealt a blow to the AKP by securing victories in 35 out of 81 provinces in the March 2024 municipal elections, including Turkey’s largest metropolitan economic centres, Istanbul and Ankara. The catalyst for the current wave of protests occurred on March 19, when Imamoglu was arrested on charges of corruption in municipal affairs and alleged connections to the banned Kurdish militant group PKK, accusing him of aiding terrorism. However, the latter accusation was dismissed by the court during initial hearings. On March 23, he was subsequently removed from his mayoral position, sparking public outrage over the perceived political nature of the move. It is also significant that a day before his arrest, Istanbul University annulled Imamoglu’s degree, citing irregularities. This decision was widely seen as politically motivated, given that a university degree is a requirement to run for the presidency in Turkey, and Imamoglu was poised to be Erdogan’s main challenger in the 2028 elections. Even as he expressed his intention to contest the annulment in court, Imamoglu remarked, “I have no faith that fair decisions will come out,” highlighting the judiciary’s compromised state under Erdogan’s rule.

Since Recep Tayyip Erdogan assumed leadership of Turkey in 2003 as Prime Minister, and more forcefully after becoming President in 2013, he has pursued a relentless agenda of power consolidation, deeply infiltrating institutions and eroding the checks and balances inherent in a democratic political system. Attempting to reshape Turkey along the lines of ‘neo-Ottomanism,’ Erdogan’s rule has been marked by conservative, populist policies and an increasing centralisation of authority. This was most notably evident during the 2017 constitutional referendum, which Erdogan narrowly won, fundamentally replacing the parliamentary democracy system with an executive presidency. Over the years, Turkey has experienced a rapid slide into authoritarianism, acquiring a notorious reputation for imprisoning an alarming number of political prisoners, human rights activists, journalists, and other dissenters. The 2023 report by the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) ranks Turkey as the 10th worst jailer of journalists globally. In addition to the dire state of political freedoms, Erdogan’s recent years in power have been marked by an ongoing economic crisis, characterised by hyperinflation, a decline in foreign investment, and growing fiscal deficits. These factors have led to a significant deterioration in living standards across the country, accompanied by a sharp rise in poverty and unemployment.

The ongoing anti-regime protests have, unfortunately but predictably, been met with a severe state crackdown, which has involved the use of water cannons, tear gas, plastic pellets, and pepper spray. Over 2,000 individuals have been detained since the demonstrations began, including those who posted on social media condemning the arrest of Istanbul’s mayor, as well as journalists simply covering the protests, with one BBC correspondent even being deported from the country. On April 6, the leader of the CHP, Ozgur Ozel, pledged to continue the protests, demanding the release of Imamoglu, who has been nominated as the party’s presidential candidate, and calling for early elections by November of this year. While the CHP is providing political direction to the protests, it is primarily the youth of Turkey who have been at the forefront of challenging Erdogan’s autocratic rule and advocating for democratic and secular reforms. Furthermore, the protests have seen a convergence of diverse social and political groups, including students, leftists, pro-Kurdish factions, and even nationalists traditionally aligned with the AKP, such as the ultranationalist ‘Grey Wolves’. Given Erdogan’s firm control over the state apparatus, both repressive and ideological, in Althusserian terms, it will be exceedingly difficult for the protesters to force him to relinquish any ground. Nonetheless, this moment represents a significant setback for Erdogan’s regime and has galvanised the Turkish populace to fight for their long-suppressed freedoms and economic welfare.