Is Islamic extremism making a comeback in Bangladesh?

As Bangladesh stood poised on the cusp of Eid festivities, an ominous pronouncement by Army Chief Waqar Uz-Zaman cast a shadow over the jubilations. With the gravitas befitting his station, he forewarned the nation of an imminent terrorist strike, alluding to intelligence reports that hinted at an insidious conspiracy brewing in the nation’s underbelly. This revelation, however, was neither unheralded nor unprecedented; it merely underscored the prescience of his earlier exhortations, wherein he had urged the polity to desist from internecine strife, cautioning that such acrimonious discord not only debilitates national unity but also imperils the very sovereignty of Bangladesh. His trepidations, as it now transpires, were not misplaced.

Students marching with flag resembling the ISIS in Dhaka, October 2024.
Students marching with flag resembling the ISIS in Dhaka, October 2024.

The eminent New York Times, in a recent exposé, corroborated his forebodings, asserting that Islamist hardliners were emboldened by the nation’s prevailing political lacuna and were making audacious forays into the public domain, unabashedly seeking to resurrect their ideological dominion. Indeed, this resurgence is but a macabre reprise of Bangladesh’s long and troubled entanglement with Islamic extremism, which first took root in the twilight years of the twentieth century.

The radical outfits operating within Bangladesh have, over the decades, drawn sustenance from transnational terrorist syndicates, most notably the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and, more contemporaneously, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Their nefarious machinations, invariably, orbit around a singular and unrelenting objective—the imposition of Islamic rule in Bangladesh, a nation whose constitutional secularism stands in stark opposition to their theocratic aspirations. In pursuit of this ignoble end, their targets have been carefully calibrated: secularists, religious minorities, and any entity or individual whose existence or expression is perceived as inimical to their rigid dogma.

The annals of Bangladesh’s contemporary history bear grim testament to their ruthlessness. From the turn of the millennium, the nation has been buffeted by a series of sanguinary terror attacks, each meticulously orchestrated to instill fear and assert dominion. The apogee of their savagery, perhaps, was the ghastly carnage perpetrated at the Holey Artisan Café in 2016. The grisly hostage crisis that unfurled therein claimed twenty-two lives, the majority of them foreign nationals, and indelibly etched itself into the collective consciousness of the nation. What rendered this atrocity particularly disquieting was its modus operandi, which bore an uncanny resemblance to the tactics deployed by ISIS. This harrowing episode marked the first incontrovertible indication that ISIS’s baleful influence had penetrated Bangladesh’s borders, dispelling any lingering skepticism regarding its reach.

The digital realm has, unsurprisingly, proven to be a fecund battleground for the dissemination of extremist propaganda. With an astuteness that belies their medievalist ideological underpinnings, ISIS operatives have harnessed the far-reaching tentacles of cyberspace, employing indigenous linguistic mediums to indoctrinate and recruit. The dissemination of their pernicious rhetoric in Bangla—a language spoken by nearly 99 percent of Bangladesh’s populace—has served to extend their tentacular grip into the remotest corners of the nation. This calculated exploitation of cyber radicalism has precipitated a perceptible ideological shift among Bangladesh’s homegrown extremist factions, who now increasingly subscribe to the doctrinaire vision of an Islamic Caliphate—a vision assiduously cultivated and propagated by ISIS.

A glaring exemplar of this ideological metamorphosis is the trajectory of the Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT), a militant conglomerate that initially operated under the aegis of al-Qaeda. Formed in 2007, this nefarious syndicate orchestrated a series of targeted assassinations against secular bloggers, writers, and activists between 2013 and 2015. However, in the aftermath of ISIS’s ascension to prominence on the global jihadist stage, ABT unequivocally pledged allegiance to its cause, a testament to the latter’s magnetic pull in radicalizing impressionable minds.

While the erstwhile government had, to a considerable extent, managed to curb the proliferation of violent extremism, the political upheaval engendered by the ouster of Sheikh Hasina in August last year has catalyzed an alarming re-emergence of these insidious forces. In the wake of her departure, a disquieting lawlessness has permeated the polity, affording these extremist factions an unprecedented opportunity to reassert themselves.

Of particular concern is the resurgence of Hizb ut-Tahrir Bangladesh, an organization that has long been proscribed in the country due to its seditious proclivities. Notorious for its abortive coup attempt in 2011, this transnational jihadist outfit has ideological congruence with ISIS and has now re-emerged with newfound fervor. The immediacy of its resurgence—mere days after Hasina’s deposition—raises perturbing questions about the efficacy of state mechanisms in preempting such resuscitations. In recent months, its adherents have mounted vociferous demonstrations, brazenly demanding the rescission of the ban imposed upon them and clamoring for the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate in Bangladesh. The most conspicuous manifestation of this effrontery was the ‘March for Khilafat’ protest in Dhaka, an event that saw a congregation of ‘Conscious Teachers and Students’ bearing flags uncannily reminiscent of ISIS’s insignia and chanting incendiary slogans. That such a spectacle transpired within the nation’s capital—drawing participation from sections of the educated elite—ought to serve as a dire warning of the extent to which cyber radicalism has permeated urban echelons.

This resurgence of Islamist militancy is not merely an ephemeral phenomenon; it constitutes a structural threat to Bangladesh’s democratic fabric. The re-emergence of Hizb ut-Tahrir, which remains proscribed in thirteen nations, should serve as a cautionary tale. The situation is further exacerbated by the unsettling decision of the interim government, helmed by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus, to release several individuals previously convicted of terrorism-related offenses. Such a move, particularly against the backdrop of a deteriorating law and order situation, rampant mob violence, and escalating cases of sexual aggression, augments the prevailing atmosphere of apprehension.

The interim government’s apparent apathy towards this burgeoning menace has not gone unnoticed, least of all by the military establishment. Army Chief Waqar Uz-Zaman’s palpable discontent is emblematic of the growing dissonance between the state apparatus and the armed forces, particularly as Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) purportedly amplifies its covert operations on Bangladeshi soil. Should this inertia persist, the Army Chief’s cautionary pronouncement may well transmute into a catastrophic reality—one that Bangladesh may find itself ill-equipped to surmount.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Escalating Rift Between Bangladesh Military and Interim Government

Bangladesh remains in a state of perpetual uncertainty, as reports surface of an escalating rift between the Muhammad Yunus-led Interim Government and the country’s military establishment. Amidst allegations of coup attempts aimed at dislodging Army Chief General Waker-Uz-Zaman from his leadership, the chasm between the two factions has become increasingly conspicuous. Contentious disputes have emerged over critical matters, including the nation’s deteriorating law and order situation and the timeline for forthcoming elections. The Yunus administration, however, exhibits a palpable reluctance to facilitate timely electoral proceedings, thereby fuelling concerns that it might be seeking to prolong its unconstitutional grip on power.

Bangladesh Chief Advisor Md. Yunus (Left) and Army Chief General Waker-uz-Zaman (Right)
Bangladesh Chief Advisor Md. Yunus (Left) and Army Chief General Waker-uz-Zaman (Right)

Deepening discord has emerged between the military establishment and the Interim Government, precipitated by the country’s deteriorating security environment and the pervasive political instability aggravated by internecine strife among rival factions. On the law-and-order front, the country has witnessed a sustained wave of arson attacks over the past several months, targeting Awami League leadership and cadre besides minority Hindus. The arsonist mobs, predominantly led by groups aligned with the Students Against Discrimination (SAD) movement and Islamists, have been brazenly targeting even sites of national significance. Among the most egregious incidents was the desecration of Dhanmondi 32, the family residence of the nation’s founding father, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, which serves as Bangabandhu Memorial Museum. It may be recalled that SAD played a critical role in the anti-government agitation that culminated in the ousting of Sheikh Hasina from power in August 2024, and has ever since maintained strong influence over the governance affairs of the country through the interim administration of Muhammad Yunus, with a number of its members serving as the advisors, that is de facto ministers of the government.

Additionally, as the SAD movement transitioned into formal politics through the establishment of its own political entity, the Jatiya Nagorik Party (JNP), it has been at loggerheads with other political parties such as the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) over the timeline of the elections and implementation of constitutional reforms in the country. Given its considerable influence within the Interim Government, SAD has persistently advocated for the implementation of constitutional reforms as a precondition for any electoral process. However, the BNP and its allied factions demand the immediate conduct of elections, contending that any institutional reforms should rightfully be the prerogative of a legitimately elected government. In addition, SAD affiliates have violently tackled BNP’s student wing, Jatiotabadi Chatradal, injuring over 150 students in one of the incidents at a Khulna University last month.

Amidst these increasing uncertainties, on his part, the Army Chief has persistently criticized the Interim Government’s incompetence in maintaining law and order and also voiced grave concerns over the surge of Islamist radicalism, cautioning that such developments pose an existential threat to the nation’s stability and territorial integrity. General Zaman issued a grave reprimand to political factions on February 27, warning that their relentless hostilities and factional rivalries could imperil Bangladesh’s hard-won sovereignty. Expressing his frustration with the lingering turmoil of the preceding “seven to eight months,” Zaman cautioned, “If you cannot forget your differences and work together, if you engage in mudslinging and fighting, the independence and sovereignty of this country and nation will be at stake.”

Subsequently, the SAD leadership has increasingly targeted the Army Chief, accusing him of political interference, even threatening anti-military protests across the country. For instance, on March 22, Hasnat Abdullah, SAD convener, claimed that General Zaman was attempting to reintroduce and reinstate Awami League by pushing for the participation of what he called “Refined Awami League,” which would include mostly the second rung leadership of Sheikh Hasina’s party. Hasnat warned that the students’ groups were ready to launch a movement against the military establishment over this kind of “political interference”. Another student leader and an advisor in Yunus administration, Asif Mahmud Bhuiyan, in a video message on March 21, also accused General Zaman of harbouring resentment against Muhammad Yunus by claiming that the Army chief “had reluctantly agreed to appoint” him as the chief adviser of the interim government following the removal of Sheikh Hasina on August 5, 2024.

These provocations assume criticality in light of March 12 revelations that General Zaman thwarted a Pakistan-sponsored and Interim Administration-endorsed intra-Army coup against the military establishment. As per reports, Bangladesh Army’s Quartermaster General (QMG), Lt. Gen. Muhammad Faizur Rahman, a staunch Islamist who is known for his pro-Pakistan Army and Jamat-e-Islami (JeI) proclivities, led the failed coup attempt alongside Principal Staff Officer (PSO) of the Armed Forces Division (AFD), Lt. Gen. S M Kamrul Hassan. Interestingly, both officers have been instrumental in facilitating increased military engagements between the Pakistan Army and their Bangladeshi counterparts, with Lt. Gen. Rahman having recently hosted an Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) delegation in Dhaka, while Lt. Gen. Hassan led a military delegation to Pakistan merely a month prior. Reports further alleged that Chief Advisor Muhammad Yunus and the SAD leadership acquiesced to the plot to remove General Waker, who has resisted overt Islamisation of the state institutions and has maintained pressure on the transitional government against delaying elections.

Following these provocations, General Zaman, as reports indicate, convened a series of high-level meetings with the Army leadership on March 22 to deliberate on the country’s precarious political and security landscape. Though Army dismissed such conjectures describing these meetings as routine for assessing country’s security situation, these developments raised speculations across Bangladesh’s social media sphere, with widespread conjecture that the military establishment might imminently resort to the imposition of emergency measures to quell the prevailing uncertainty. Some reports even claimed that concurrent to these deliberations, Bangladesh Army even mobilised its Savar-based 9th Division, ostensibly towards Dhaka. Such speculations of Army’s potential resort to extraordinary measures to prevent further destabilization underscores the pervasive fear that these developments could spiral into a broader conflict.

As such, these unfolding events serve as a starkly demonstrate the deepening chasm of mistrust between Gen. Waker-Uz-Zaman-led military establishment and the SAD-dominated Interim Government of Muhammad Yunus. General Zaman’s recent warnings regarding the nation’s deteriorating security environment and the risk of civil unrest suggest a growing sense of urgency within the military ranks. Therefore, as the trust deficit between military establishment and the Interim Government widens, the country faces an increasingly perilous trajectory, with the looming threat of political disarray and a descent into outright anarchy.