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– Arun Anand
Bangladesh’s interim government recently gave its final approval to the draft of ‘July Mass Uprising Protection and Liability Determination Ordinance’ that grants indemnity to those who participated in the 2024 July Uprising that forced Sheikh Hasina to end her 15-year political rule and flee the country. The ordinance, believed to be the interim government’s fulfilment of ‘earlier commitment’ to ensure ‘legal protection’ to July participants, would take the shape of a law soon.
The ordinance provides impunity to participants from ‘activities carried out with the purpose of political resistance’ during 2024 uprising in July and August. Meaning, if criminal cases are slapped any of uprising participants for carrying out ‘political resistance during uprising’, such cases will be withdrawn by the government. Moreover, the ordinance adds that ‘no new cases will be filed’ against them, from now on, for their activities during the uprising.
The events of July-August have various connotations—uprising, revolution, political coup and political resistance. Those who participated in the uprising called it a ‘revolution’ that paved the way for ‘New Bangladesh’ or ‘Second Republic’. This group, composed mostly of student leaders who led the uprising and some later formed the National Citizen’s Party (NCP), has not only framed the uprising as ‘second liberation’ but also introduced a new political discussion where 1971 Liberation was brought back, reinterpreted and even compared with the 2024 uprising.
The 2024 ‘revolution’ has been portrayed by this group as fulfilling what 1971 could not, a liberation that gave Bangladesh its ‘true independence’. The same narrative is also echoed by another faction—the Islamists—for whom 2024 Uprising rolled the red carpet for their resurgence in the political field and now forms the main contending group against Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) in the February 2026 national election.
Collectively, the Awami League is now branded as a ‘fascist’, a justification used by the interim government for banning Awami League’s political activities in May, closing the League’s door to participate in the February 2026 national election.
The interim government, in its official capacity, recognised the July participants as ‘july warriors’ (July Joddha), similar to ‘war heroes’ (Mukti Joddha) of Liberation War. On the first anniversary of the uprising, the interim government unveiled the July Declaration on 5 August 2025, following pressures from Student Against Discrimination (SAD), the main force behind the July Uprising and NCP to give 2024 events a constitutional recognition.
The Declaration, declared to be given a constitutional status, was supposed to be a statement to recognise the July Uprising and its ambitions for ‘Second Republic’. Rather, it became a political fatwa against Awami League and its political past since 1971 (as interpreted by its opponents), an obituary of the 1972 Constitution that is now labelled as ‘Mujibist Constitution’, and legitimising the ‘unconstitutionally’ formed interim government.
There is little doubt about the interim government’s biases towards leaders of the July Uprising. Indeed, it was the student leaders of SAD that invited Muhammad Yunus to come back to Bangladesh and take the role of the chief advisor of the interim government on 8 August 2024.
In return, three of the advisors in the interim government were student leaders of July Uprising. Many in the political circle believe that the interim government that helped the formation of National Citizen’s Party (NCP), a King’s Party, by intentionally delaying the announcement of an election roadmap. The neutrality became exposed when one of the advisors resigned to become the convenor of the NCP, while another resigned only recently to become the NCP’s spokesperson.
Since NCP’s establishment, the interim government displayed its soft corner for the student party, echoing the same political narrative as that of NCP, and even actively taking measures of historical revisionism to erase Awami League and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s legacy.
The recognition of July warriors has not been without controversy either. The gazetted list of about 1,402 warriors declared as ‘national heroes’ are promised tax benefits, welfare and rehabilitation, and now legal protection as per the 14 January ordinance. However, the gazetted lists were accused of including fake claimants, irregularities and political misuse, ironically the accusations slapped against Sheikh Hasina during the early phase of July Uprising when it was in the stage of anti-quota protest.
The ‘July warriors’ also violently clashed with police on the day of signing of the July Charter in October demanding for state recognition of martyr status, in addition to compensation and legal immunity—demands that were ultimately added as Clause 5 of the July Charter.
The latest move to this shenanigan—the July Mass Uprising Protection ordinance—justifies all kinds of acts that happened in July-August, especially violence against minorities and looting of arms from security forces, by indirectly branding these acts as ‘political resistance’. The wave of communal violence witnessed during this time, and continues even today were dismissed by the interim government as ‘political’.
Despite international reports, the interim government insists on these being ‘non-communal’ attacks. With only less than three weeks before 13th national election, over one-third of the polling booths are also marked as ‘risky’, while about 1,3331 of the 5,763 firearms and explosive looted during July Uprising remain missing, posing an alarming risk to security during the election time.
The protection ordinance potentially shields all human rights abuses. Although the interim government clarified that only ‘political resistance’ is to be given legal protection, the tweaking of human rights abuses as ‘political reaction’ leaves little room to comprehend that all these criminal acts will also be treated as ‘political resistance’.
The shameful attempt to equate 2024 July with the 1971 Liberation War, by providing equal status, benefits, memorials, and now legal protection not only downplays Bangladesh’s painful history but also changes the whole political trajectory of the country where political violence will get state protection.
–Aminul Hoque Polash
A recent report in The Washington Post cited a US diplomat working in Bangladesh, claiming Washington wants to build “friendly relations” with Jamaat-e-Islami. The diplomat reportedly made the remarks in a closed-door discussion with a group of Bangladeshi women journalists on 1 December. The newspaper’s report, we are told, was built around an audio recording of that conversation.
In that recording, the diplomat expressed optimism that Jamaat would perform far better in the 12 February election than it has in the past. He even suggested the journalists invite representatives of Jamaat’s student wing to their programmes and events.
When the journalists raised a fear that Jamaat, if empowered, could enforce Sharia law, the diplomat’s response was striking: he said he did not believe Jamaat would implement Sharia. And even if it did, he added, Washington could respond with measures such as tariffs. He was also heard arguing that Jamaat includes many university graduates in leadership and would not take such a decision.
The Washington Post further quoted multiple political analysts suggesting Jamaat could achieve its best result in history in the 12 February vote and might even end up in power.
So, is this report simply the product of an “audio leak” published just 20 days before the interim government’s election? I don’t think so.
First, it stretches belief that Bangladeshi journalists would secretly record a closed conversation with a US diplomat and then pass it to The Washington Post. Second, The Washington Post would almost certainly have cross-checked the audio with the diplomat concerned. If the diplomat had objected, it is hard to imagine the paper moving ahead in this way. My conclusion is blunt: this was published with the diplomat’s planning, or at least with the US embassy’s consent.
Call it what it is: a soft signal. A carefully calibrated message designed to project reassurance about Jamaat and to normalise the idea of Jamaat as a legitimate future governing force.
And then came the echo.
At the same time, two other international outlets, Reuters and Al Jazeera, also published reports about Jamaat-e-Islami. Both pointed towards the possibility of a strong Jamaat showing in the 12 February election. Al Jazeera’s tone, heavy with praise, makes it difficult not to suspect paid campaigning. More tellingly, an Al Jazeera poll recently put Jamaat’s public support at 33.6 per cent, compared with 34.7 per cent for the BNP.
The goal is obvious: to “naturalise” Jamaat’s pathway to power. To make what should shock the public feel ordinary. To convert the unthinkable into the plausible, and the plausible into the inevitable.
Which brings us to the unavoidable question: can Jamaat really win?
History says no. The highest share of the vote Jamaat ever secured in a normal election was in 1991: 12.13 per cent. In the next three elections, Jamaat’s vote share fell to 8.68 per cent, 4.28 per cent, and 4.7 per cent. In a genuinely competitive election, Jamaat is not a double-digit party.
But Bangladesh is not heading into a normal election. An unelected, illegitimate interim administration is preparing a managed vote while keeping the country’s largest political party, the Awami League, effectively outside the electoral process. In that distorted arena, behind-the-scenes engineering is underway to seat Jamaat on the throne. The diplomat’s “leak”, the favourable international coverage, and the publication of flattering polls are not isolated incidents. They are the components of a single operation.
If anyone doubts the direction of travel, they should remember what happened after 5 August. In his first public remarks after that date, the army chief repeatedly addressed Jamaat’s leader with reverential language, calling him “Ameer-e-Jamaat”. From that moment onwards, Jamaat has exerted an outsized, near-monopolistic influence over Bangladesh’s political field.
Yes, Khaleda Zia’s illness, Tarique Rahman’s possible return, and even the prospect of Khaleda Zia’s death have periodically given the BNP a breeze at its back. But the reel and string of the political kite are now held elsewhere. Jamaat controls the tempo.
And it did not happen in a vacuum. The Awami League has been driven off the streets through mob violence, persecution, repression and judicial harassment. With its principal rival forced away from political life, Jamaat has been able to present itself not merely as a participant, but as an authority.
Now look at the state itself.
Every major organ of power, it is argued, is being brought under Jamaat’s influence. Within the military, “Islamisation” is being used as a cover for Jamaatisation. Fifteen decorated army officers are reportedly jailed on allegations connected to the disappearance of Abdullah Hil Azmi, the son of Ghulam Azam, widely regarded as a leading figure among the razakars. Yet it remains unclear whether Azmi was even abducted at all.
The judiciary, too, is described as falling almost entirely under Jamaat’s control. Key administrative positions, especially DCs, SPs, UNOs and OCs, are increasingly occupied by Jamaat-aligned officials.
On campuses, the story repeats itself. Through engineered student union elections, Jamaat’s student organisation, Islami Chhatra Shibir, has established dominance in Dhaka University and other leading public universities. Even vice-chancellor appointments are described as being shaped by Jamaat-friendly influence.
And while this internal consolidation accelerates, external courtship intensifies.
Since August 2024, Jamaat leaders have reportedly held at least four meetings in Washington with US authorities. Their close contact with the US embassy in Bangladesh continues. Meanwhile, the British High Commissioner has held multiple meetings with Jamaat’s ameer, widely reported in the media. Jamaat’s ameer has also visited the United Kingdom recently.
In short, Jamaat has reached a level of favourable conditions never seen since its founding. Not even in Pakistan, the birthplace of its ideological ecosystem.
So why would sections of the Western world want Jamaat? What does the Yunus-led interim administration gain from this? What role is it playing?
The answer offered here is uncompromising: the current interim government has signed multiple agreements with Western powers, particularly the United States, including an NDA arrangement and various trade deals that are described as being against public interest. Some may be public. Much remains opaque. The government wants these agreements protected. It also wants long-term leverage over Bangladesh’s politics and territory.
From a broader geopolitical perspective, Bangladesh’s land matters. It sits at a strategic crossroads. For those intent on consolidating dominance in the Asia-Pacific and simultaneously containing the influence of both China and India, Bangladesh is useful. This is part of a long game.
And if Jamaat, with weak popular legitimacy, can be installed in power, external agendas become easier to execute. The argument is stark: Jamaat, as a party of war criminals and anti-liberation forces, has no natural sense of accountability to Bangladesh’s soil or its people. In exchange for power, it would hand foreign actors a blank cheque.
Now to Dr Yunus.
The claim here is that since taking power, Yunus has already fulfilled his personal ambitions. He has rewarded loyalists with state titles and positions, creating opportunities for them to accumulate money. He has satisfied the demands of the “deep state” that installed him. In doing so, the country’s interests have been sacrificed at every step.
And throughout, Jamaat has offered Yunus unconditional support.
After the election, Yunus’s priority will be survival: a safe exit for himself and his circle. That is tied to securing the future of the student leaders who claim to have been the principal stakeholders of July. In this narrative, Jamaat is stepping in again. The NCP has already aligned with Jamaat. To maintain international lobbying strength, Jamaat will ensure Yunus’s safe exit. It may even install him in the presidency if that serves the arrangement.
So what will the BNP do?
The answer given is grim: very little. Blinded by the hunger for power, the BNP has nodded along as Yunus and his circle pushed forward actions described as hostile to the national interest. Mirza Fakhrul has publicly claimed to see Zia within Yunus. Tarique Rahman has repeatedly been seen praising Yunus. All of it, the argument goes, for a single purpose: to reach power.
But the BNP, it is suggested, failed to understand the real game. At the grassroots, many of its leaders and activists have become disconnected from the public through extortion, land-grabbing and violent intimidation. Even when visible irregularities occurred in student union elections at universities, the BNP’s student wing, Chhatra Dal, either did not protest or could not.
If Jamaat takes power through a staged election on 12 February, the BNP will have no meaningful recourse left.
And the country?
The conclusion is bleak: Bangladeshis should not expect their suffering to end any time soon. Just as a meticulously designed operation removed an elected Awami League government, another meticulous design is now being finalised to seat Jamaat-e-Islami, a party branded by the author as one of war criminals, with the backing of foreign powers.Yunus’s anti-national agreements, it is argued, will be implemented through Jamaat’s hands. Independence, sovereignty and the constitution will be thrown into the dustbin. Secularism, women’s freedom, and minority rights will be locked away in cold storage. The destination is spelled out without ambiguity: Bangladesh will become the Islamic Republic of Bangladesh.
(Disclaimer – Aminul Hoque Polash is a Bangladeshi political activist, researcher, and former government official with experience in national security, diplomacy, and state institutions. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the writer. )
A former Bangladeshi intelligence officer has made sharp allegations against Nobel Peace Prize laureate Muhammad Yunus, claiming that the globally admired figure operates within — and benefits from — a deeply entrenched network of power inside Bangladesh. The remarks have reignited debate over governance, legitimacy, and influence under the country’s interim administration.
Speaking in an interview, the retired official said that while Yunus is widely viewed internationally as a humanitarian and reformer, sections within Bangladesh’s security and political establishment perceived him as the centre of a powerful “system” that quietly shaped state decisions.
Yunus assumed charge as Chief Adviser of Bangladesh’s interim government in August 2024 after mass protests led to the fall of long-serving Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. His appointment was welcomed by many foreign governments and international observers who saw him as a stabilising figure capable of steering the country toward democratic elections.
However, at home, criticism has grown. The former intelligence officer alleged that Yunus’s influence extended well beyond his constitutional role, affecting appointments, policy direction, and institutional functioning in ways that resembled a parallel power structure.
According to the ex-officer, individuals and institutions closely associated with Yunus formed a tightly knit network that exercised influence without public accountability. He claimed this structure blurred the lines between civil society, governance, and state authority, raising concerns about transparency and democratic norms.
Critics have also pointed to appointments of individuals perceived to be close to Yunus, arguing that such decisions reinforce the idea of an elite circle guiding governance behind the scenes. Supporters reject this view, saying experienced and credible individuals were brought in to stabilise a fragile state.
The allegations come at a time of continued political tension and sporadic violence across Bangladesh. The killing of a youth activist earlier this year triggered protests and intensified accusations that the interim government has struggled to maintain law and order.
Former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, now living abroad, has accused the Yunus-led administration of allowing instability to spread and failing to protect vulnerable communities. The interim government has denied these charges, stating that investigations into incidents of violence are ongoing and that restoring security remains a priority.
A key point of criticism from Yunus’s opponents is the absence of an electoral mandate. They argue that his international stature gives him disproportionate influence within the country, creating an imbalance between global perception and domestic accountability.
Supporters counter that Yunus was brought in during an extraordinary crisis and that his role is temporary, focused solely on reforms and preparing the ground for free and fair elections.
As Bangladesh moves toward national elections expected in early 2026, debate over the nature of power within the interim government is likely to intensify. The former intelligence officer’s comments have added fuel to an already polarised political environment, highlighting the sharp divide between international admiration for Yunus and domestic skepticism among his critics.
The interim government maintains that its only objective is to stabilise the country and ensure a credible democratic transition. Whether it can bridge the growing trust gap at home remains a central question in the months ahead.
-(Dr Sreoshi Sinha, Senior Fellow, Centre for Joint Warfare Studies
& Abu Obaidha Arin, University of
Delhi.)
The persecution of journalists by the state is a grim reality across many authoritarian regimes—from Taliban-ruled Afghanistan to Myanmar, Belarus, Turkiye, and the Philippines. In such contexts, the press—often deemed the “fourth pillar of democracy”—is treated not as a watchdog, but as a threat. Bangladesh is also echoing this global trend. After the fall of the Sheikh Hasina government on August 5, 2024, many viewed the rise of Nobel Laureate Dr Muhammad Yunus as a turning point. Backed by student protests and public sentiment, his appointment as Chief Adviser cum Prime Minister of the interim government was seen as a symbolic “second liberation,” especially for the country’s long-suffocated media. But within months, that promise gave way to disillusionment. Despite initial pledges to restore freedom of expression and uphold democratic values, Yunus’s administration has presided over a deepening assault on press freedom. Journalists, both in urban and rural areas, are now facing threats, fabricated charges, detentions, and brutal attacks. Old laws like the Digital Security Act— once condemned by Yunus himself—remain in force. New regulations, framed in the name of “digital safety,” risk further gagging the media. More troubling still, the government has failed to announce an election date, turning its “interim” status into a prolonged, unaccountable rule. Institutions meant to safeguard democracy have fallen silent or become enablers of repression. The optimism of August has morphed into fear, as the Yunus regime retools authoritarian tactics under the guise of reform. In one year, the Yunus-led government has systematically undermined media freedom in Bangladesh. And hope has curdled into control, and the dream of a freer, more democratic society is slipping further away with each passing day. Behind the laurels lies a familiar hand of repression.
A Dangerous Time for Free Expression
Freedom of speech, a foundational pillar of democracy, remains under severe threat. Journalists—especially those from minority communities—are facing escalating violence, legal harassment, and coordinated state-backed intimidation. A report released on World Press Freedom Day 2025 paints a bleak picture: within eight months of Dr Yunus taking office, at least 640 journalists were targeted. Of these, 182 faced criminal cases, 206 experienced violence, and 85 were placed under financial scrutiny by the Bangladesh Financial Intelligence Unit. The attacks are not isolated; they are systemic, deliberate, and widespread. From legal persecution to outright physical violence, the Yunus regime has transformed Bangladesh into one of the most dangerous places in Asia to be a journalist. Violence against journalists has become commonplace. In March 2025, two journalists were attacked at Barishal Court, while others were assaulted in Dhaka and outside the Dhaka Reporters’ Unity. The most horrific incident came on March 18, when a woman journalist was gang-raped in Dhaka—a case that drew international outrage, including condemnation from ARTICLE 19 and other watchdogs.
In April, New Age’s Rafia Tamanna and Daily Prantojon’s Sajedul Islam Selim were physically attacked. Offices of news outlets were vandalised. Prothom Alo, a paper accused of being an “agent of India,” saw its Rajshahi office destroyed. These attacks illustrate a dangerous trend: the delegitimisation of critical voices through nationalist propaganda followed by violent suppression. Legal harassment has become a preferred tool to silence dissent. Journalists are being dragged into courtrooms and prisons over flimsy or fabricated charges. Kamruzzaman, a journalist in Satkhira, was sentenced to 10 days in jail by a mobile court for “obstructing government work.” His real crime? Reporting on poor construction work. Rubel Hossain of Dhaka Mail was falsely implicated in a murder case related to student protests. Three prominent journalists—Naem Nizam, Moynal Hossain Chowdhury, and Syed Burhan Kabir—faced arrest warrants under the much-criticised Digital Security Act. Their only fault: publishing content critical of powerful figures.
The State vs. Media Institutions
Media institutions haven’t been spared either. An adviser at the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting announced audits targeting “opposition-affiliated” media houses—a move widely viewed as financial intimidation. Deepto TV suspended its news broadcasts following political backlash. ATN Bangla dismissed a reporter for merely raising a sensitive question. In both cases, official denials of state interference were undercut by obvious patterns of state-orchestrated pressure. In a disturbing episode on May 4, journalists at Daily Janakantha protesting unpaid wages were assaulted by goons reportedly linked to the National Citizen Party. This convergence of financial abuse and physical violence has created a stifling environment for critical media. The Yunus government has done little to allay fears about surveillance and data privacy. Instead, it has doubled down with proposed legislation like the Cyber Protection Ordinance 2025 and the Personal Data Protection Ordinance—laws that could further institutionalise censorship and mass surveillance. With travel bans imposed on more than 300 journalists, and bank accounts frozen for over 100 of them, the message is clear: dissent will be crushed not just with batons, but with bureaucracy. Journalists from minority communities are bearing the brunt of the crackdown. Shyamol Dutta, a leading Hindu journalist and editor of Bhorer Kagoj, was jailed after being removed from his post at the National Press Club. Munni Saha, a prominent media personality, is facing several cases and has been detained for questioning. More than 50 minority journalists are reportedly living in fear, with many dismissed from their jobs under opaque circumstances. This pattern reflects not just a press freedom issue, but an assault on the fundamental rights of minority communities.
Targeting Prominent Figures and Media Houses
The arrest of top media professionals like Mozammel Babu, CEO of Ekattor TV, and Syed Ishtiaq Reza, former chief of news at GTV, has shocked the industry. The charges—often murder or conspiracy—lack credibility, pointing to a larger political agenda. In one bizarre move, a complaint filed with the International Crimes Tribunal accused 29 journalists and editors, alongside former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, of spreading “false news to justify genocide.” The charges are outrageous and serve no purpose but to stoke fear and paralyse the press. Even high-profile reporters like Shahnaz Sharmin, known for her fearless on-the-ground reporting, have been named in criminal complaints. Her alleged involvement in the death of a protester is widely seen as a fabricated effort to tarnish her reputation. Dr Yunus’s rise to power was framed as a “second liberation.” His global reputation as a humanitarian and social entrepreneur gave many hope. But the honeymoon was short-lived. The arrest, torture, and surveillance of journalists under his watch signal a complete betrayal of those ideals. Rather than dismantling the oppressive tools of the previous regime, the interim government has inherited and expanded them. Laws are being used as weapons. The courts have turned into instruments of intimidation. And civil liberties—once hoped to be restored—have only deteriorated. Despite the dire situation, there are glimmers of resistance. A Media Reform Commission, proposed by information adviser Nahid Islam, offers a chance for dialogue and reform. But unless these proposals are translated into immediate action—starting with the release of unjustly detained journalists and withdrawal of politically motivated cases— the initiative risks becoming another empty gesture. Civil society must stay vigilant. International watchdogs, human rights organisations, and democratic governments must increase pressure on the Yunus administration. Silence is not neutrality—it is complicity.
The Fight for Truth Must Go On
In the last 12 months, Bangladesh has moved from the promise of change to the peril of authoritarianism. The interim government led by Dr Muhammad Yunus was expected to restore justice, transparency, and democratic values. Instead, it has turned against the very institutions and individuals that form the backbone of a functioning democracy—the free press. The persecution of journalists, the weaponisation of laws, the sidelining of minority voices, and the unending delay of elections paint a grim portrait of a government losing legitimacy by the day. If Yunus does not act swiftly to reverse this trend, he risks eroding not only his reputation but also the democratic foundation of the country. Bangladesh’s journalists are not just chroniclers of events—they are defenders of democracy, truth, and public interest. Silencing them will not silence the truth. It will only delay the reckoning. The time for reform is now—before the darkness of repression becomes permanent
-Dr Sreoshi Sinha(Senior Fellow, Centre for Joint Warfare Studies) & Abu Obaidha Arin (University of
Delhi.)
August 5, 2024, will be remembered as a historic turning point in Bangladesh’s political journey. The fall of the Sheikh Hasina-led Awami League government marked the end of an era—an era deeply intertwined with the legacy of the 1971 Liberation War, the pursuit of transitional justice, and an increasingly authoritarian political framework.
In its place, a fragile and confused new political setup has emerged, led by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus, who, despite his international acclaim, appears ill-equipped to manage the complexities of a fractured nation. Bangladesh today stands at a crossroads—politically unstable, socially fragmented, and economically stalled. Law and order have collapsed, with law enforcement either absent or complicit. Amid this chaos, one of the most disturbing developments has been the reported takeover of the International Crimes Tribunal (ICT) by anti-liberation forces, particularly from right-wing factions. The new ICT leadership appears preoccupied with finding ways to punish Sheikh Hasina and her allies. Even former prosecutors have not been spared—Tureen Afroz, a former prosecutor, was arrested and reportedly tortured in her own home after the fall of the Hasina government.
The tribunal’s primary focus now seems to be targeting members of a specific political party—the Awami League—on accusations related to the mass uprising of 2024 that led to the government’s collapse. This is not merely a political transition. It is a dangerous reversal—a grotesque distortion of justice and history. From Transitional justice to political vendetta The International Crimes Tribunal was established in 2009 with the aim of bringing to justice the perpetrators of war crimes committed during Bangladesh’s struggle for independence. In principle, it was a noble endeavour—a long-overdue acknowledgement of the need for historical accountability. Many war criminals, particularly from Jamaat-e-Islami and the BNP, were prosecuted, with some even sentenced to death. While many ordinary Bangladeshis, especially families of 1971 martyrs, supported the idea of justice, the overt politicisation of the tribunal gradually eroded its legitimacy. But no one could have imagined that the tribunal itself would one day fall into the hands of the very forces it once sought to prosecute. Yet, that is the grim reality today. Jamaat’s spectre returns The resurgence of Jamaat-Shibir elements within the current political framework is deeply alarming—not only because of their past, but because of what it symbolises. It marks the complete reversal of the political narrative that has shaped Bangladesh for the past two decades. Reports now suggest that several individuals with known ties to Jamaat-e-Islami and its student wing, Islami Chhatra Shibir, are now influencing—and in some cases directly managing—the International Crimes Tribunal. It is nothing short of surreal. How can a nation reconcile with the fact that a tribunal once created to hold war criminals accountable is now run, in part, by those accused of committing some of the gravest crimes during the Liberation War? This development is not just a political scandal; it is a national disgrace. It insults the memory of the 3 million who were martyred and the countless women who were raped in 1971. It undermines the very foundation of our national identity.
The Disillusionment of Democracy Muhammad Yunus’s unexpected rise to leadership was initially met with hope—particularly among groups sympathetic to antiBangladesh sentiments, pro-Pakistani elements, and war criminals. With the fall of Sheikh Hasina’s government, many of these groups expressed relief. However, Yunus’s government, largely composed of technocrats and opportunists, lacks both political capital and ideological clarity. It has failed to present a roadmap for economic recovery, social cohesion, or political reconciliation. Law and order have collapsed entirely.
Bangladesh’s former intelligence officer and diplomat Aminul Hoque Polash, in exile since the fall of the Sheikh Hasina regime, has broken his silence on the hidden power structures, financial engineering, and political ambitions surrounding Nobel laureate and the country’s interim leader Muhammad Yunus.
In an exclusive conversation, Polash walks News18 through classified insights, internal documents, and lived experiences inside Bangladesh’s national security system, revealing a side of Yunus the world has never seen before.
Before we get into the details about Dr Yunus, tell us how you ended up in exile.
I never pictured myself sitting in another country, talking about the collapse of the institutions I once served. I spent nearly a decade inside national security and foreign service. My work was simple in principle: follow evidence, protect the state, and protect the people.
It has been more than a year since the interim government in Bangladesh came into being under the leadership of Muhammad Yunus, and the country has gone through a political reset, both internally as well as in its foreign policy. Internally, the largest political party — the Awami League — and its affiliates are banned, Islamists have revived, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s legacy downplayed and even attacked, and the history of the 1971 Liberation War is up for debate. Post-Sheikh Hasina Bangladesh, hailed as the “new” Bangladesh, has also been wrought with violence of all kinds — communal, ethnic, gender, mob, and political. Inevitably, the country’s law and order is in a constant state of compromise. However, the interim government, whose prime responsibility behind its establishment was to bring the country’s stability back on track, dodged all accountability via two ways — denial and labelling it a “conspiracy” of “outside influence”.
The ostracisation of Awami League was predictable, considering Yunus’s personal animosity with Sheikh Hasina. This year, therefore, witnessed the interim government, using all means — political, judicial and administrative — to witch-hunt League loyalists and activists on one hand and create a political atmosphere where Bangladesh’s apparent newly-earned democracy is one without opposition.
Human Rights Watch, in May, reported that the interim government has risked Bangladesh’s fundamental freedoms via a series of legislative measures. In a recent report, HRW also accused the interim government of abusing the recently amended Anti-Terrorism Act to target and imprison thousands of political opponents, especially the alleged supporters of the now ousted Awami League, on dubious charges to shut down dissent. Indeed, the report rightly pointed this is not the path to democratic transition. Bangladesh’s own rights groups, too, have been critical of the interim government’s highhandedness—following the script of its predecessor that it claims to be so against, as it observed a disturbing rise in violations of human rights and crimes across Bangladesh under the interim government.
In its efforts to suppress the Awami League and positing itself opposite to everything it stood for, the interim government resorted to keeping a cold distance from its neighbour, India. Calling it a ‘balanced geopolitics’, the Yunus-led interim government and its supporters, including political leaders, manufactured a new narrative—that India is an ‘ally’ of Sheikh Hasina and the Awami League. Through shameless misconstruing of Indo-Bangladesh diplomatic relations, anti-Hasina forces are now competing against each other to appear as the guardians safeguarding Bangladesh’s democracy, one that the country’s so long lacked due to Hasina’s pro-India foreign policy tilt. While political parties, especially opponents of the Awami League, have always used anti-India rhetoric as their election campaign, the same by the interim government reflects its ultimate defence mechanism when faced with accountability.
The Chief Advisor ventured to create a fearmongering attitude among Bangladeshis that India’s ‘hegemony’ is the reason behind its own present political crisis. Oftentimes, especially when the inefficiency of law enforcement forces has been questioned, as in the case of the February Bulldozer Procession of 32 Dhanmondi, the interim government put the blame on “external forces” for its internal crisis. His close associates, along with other advisors of the interim government, too, made provocative remarks targeting India’s border security. Communal attacks have witnessed a surge in Bangladesh since the fall of Hasina. When India raised concern about this worrying trend, the interim government quickly dismissed it as political attacks, and not communal, and even called the reports “exaggerated”. It echoed the same about reports of communal attacks by the Bangladesh Hindu Buddhist Christian Unity Council, calling it “misleading” and “false”.
In a recent interview with a US journalist, Yunus took yet another anti-India jibe, calling anti-Hindu violence in Bangladesh “fake news”, one that is a “speciality of India”, whereby Bangladesh remains a “beacon of religious harmony”. This is notwithstanding the US Religious Freedom report that revealed the state of minorities in Bangladesh to be concerning.
Given the collective failure in providing security to Hindus during the celebration of their biggest religious festival, Durga Puja, last year, the same concerns were raised when the media reported a few cases of idol vandalism days before the onset of Puja this year. This year, the home advisor warned to take tough action against those involved in 793 Durga Puja pavilions for allegedly “hurting religious sentiments” and blamed the “neighbouring country” for having a connection behind the falsehood surrounding Durga Puja. Such statements by an advisor were noted to encourage communal violence and persecution of minority populations, minority Hindus being always under the radar of proving their nationalism. This year, at least 49 untoward incidents have taken place at puja mandaps across Bangladesh has been reported during Durga Puja.
The recent ethnic violence in Khagrachhari in Chittagong Hill Tracts, another pressing issue in Bangladesh, showed the systemic nature of violence in the hills, whereby miscreants continue to enjoy a culture of impunity under the interim government. Here too, the government was quick to put the blame on ‘fascist groups’ sheltered in the neighbouring country, who are being allowed to create conditions to destabilise Bangladesh. New Delhi’s response was calling a spade a spade—dismissing the allegation as bizarre and pointing to the interim government’s tendency to shift blame elsewhere to camouflage its own inefficiency in maintaining law and order.
To cover up its failure, despite a year in power, the interim government has been shifting the blame game on India. This is not only an insult to the conscience of Bangladeshis but also to their very democratic aspiration. Through the manufactured narrative of “conspiracy of external force to destabilise Bangladesh”, the interim government is deliberately delaying the democratic transition that its people are desperately awaiting.
Even though India has made it clear that it awaits a smooth, inclusive, just democratic transition in Bangladesh, where New Delhi is willing to work with any government that comes to power (as bilateral relations should be), the interim government is repeatedly resorting to arrogant statements to hold onto the chair. One can only hope for the national election to resolve this deliberate deadlock by the interim government, so that bilateral ties reach new heights in the near future.
–IANS
– Arun Anand
The interim government, which has been in power for over a year, is now grappling with a credibility crisis as political parties question its neutrality and its ability to ensure free and fair elections in the upcoming national polls scheduled for February.
Formed under the leadership of Muhammad Yunus following Sheikh Hasina’s ouster last year, the interim administration was projected as a corrective force meant to dismantle the remnants of authoritarianism in the country. Its key responsibilities were to restore stability, implement crucial reforms, and oversee a transparent democratic transition. Yet, it has failed on all these fronts. The initial perception of the interim government as a righteous alternative has eroded, exposing an even deeper democratic deficit than before.
Recently, six international human rights organisations have addressed a letter to Muhammad Yunus, the interim government’s chief advisor, urging his government to take concrete measures to prevent further human rights violations and to advance reforms process to uphold the country’s human rights. Two pressing issues addressed in the letter deserve our attention, for these highlight the failures of the interim government—the arbitrary arrests and detentions of journalists and politically motivated attacks on Awami League members.
Press freedom has been a longstanding concern in Bangladesh, partly due to the country being under prolonged military rule and the failure to reforming media even after restoration of civilian government in 1990. It is well established that press faced unprecedented censorship previously whereby any criticism against the government in power has been stifled. While the media in Bangladesh hoped to see a new dawn of freedom after 2024 July Uprising, the reality, however, remains concerning. In an eerily similar way like its predecessor, the interim government continues to target journalists in Bangladesh, via harassment, intimidation, physical attack (including murder) and detention.
Labelling any voice of dissent and criticism as “collaborators of fascist Awami League government” has become the interim government’s most used tool of repressing media freedom. The mob attack on speakers inside Dhaka Reporters’ Unity, and detention of 16, including journalist Monjurul Alam Panna under anti-Terrorism Act has been widely criticised as Bangladesh’s growing culture of intimidation and impunity since the past year.
According to the World Freedom Index, Bangladesh’s press freedom was classified as “very serious”, noting that over 130 journalists have been subjected to ‘unfounded judicial proceedings’, especially on charges of ‘crimes against humanity’ and ‘murder’. As per Rights and Risks Analysis Group (RRAG) report, in the first eight months of Yunus-led interim government, about 640 journalists have been targeted, which includes 182 journalists being filed under criminal cases, 206 journalists being filed under acts of violence, and cancellation of press accreditation of 167 journalists.
The first half of this year witnessed 266 journalists being implicated in cases related to July Uprising, and about 50 media organisations in the country being impacted on the same accusation. Dhaka-based Human Rights Support Society (HRSS) also reported the ‘alarming’ human rights situation in Bangladesh, noting that 340 journalists have been victims of murder. Human Rights Watch in its October report, too, accused the interim government of abusing recent amended Anti-Terrorism Act to target political opponents, including academics and journalists, and stuff them in prisons.
Bangladeshi Journalists in International Media (BJIM) also claimed that attacks on journalists reported in different districts allegedly involve local miscreants and even law enforcement agencies while the administration has taken no visible steps yet. The declining state of press freedom in Bangladesh remains a challenge to the country’s democratic transition.
For the interim government, the journalists are not the only opponents slapped with terrorism charges. The main target of its wrath has been members and loyalists of the Awami League.
Post-Hasina Bangladesh witnessed a paradigm shift of its historical narrative—from Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s legacy to the history of Liberation War itself. Moreover, moments after Hasina fled Bangladesh, the country succumbed to a compromised law and order situation, where mobocracy emerged as new normal. Instead of restoring stability, the interim government exhausted all its efforts in ostracizing Awami League. From army, judiciary and police force, educational institutions, all League loyalists were first replaced or forced to resign.
The government also became a bystander to the surge in mob attacks on those alleged to be League loyalists (including, the religious minorities), justifying these attacks as “political”. Every act of vandalism, including the despicable demolition of 32 Dhanmondi, was also labelled as “act of provocation” by outsiders. Instead of arresting the perpetrators, the interim government launched Operation Devil Hunt, arresting as many as 18,384 people across Bangladesh, mostly those affiliated with the Awami League and Chhatra and Jubo League.
This witch-hunt started much before Awami League was officially banned this May following the amendment of Anti-Terrorism Law. The ban received criticisms from international rights organisations—Human Rights Watch, United Nations and Amnesty International—as a partisan act that risk repressing political pluralism which also undermine the country’s reform process.
The Human Rights Watch deputy Asia director accused the interim government of being more stuck on juggling an unreformed security sector, violent religious hardliners and political groups seeking vengeance on Hasina supporters than protecting the rights of Bangladeshis. The report also noted the interim government’s pattern of mass arrests and arbitrary detention of hundreds of League supporters misusing its amended Anti-Terrorism Law, slapping them with baseless charges and denying the detainees with proper medical care and bail.
The Freedom House reported that while the interim government lifted restrictions on major political parties that opposed the Awami League, restrictions increased on former ruling party. Leaders of Awami League were arrested on alleged crimes based on skewed evidence. The ban on the party, the cancellation of its party registration at the Election Commission along with the continues witch-hunting on League and its allies via amendment of legislative measures have not only hindered the activities of Awami League but also identified as the interim government undermining fundamental freedoms.
Notwithstanding Yunus and his other adviser’s persistent denial of worrying human rights track, rights organisations—both national as well as international—have been noting the hypocrisy of following the same ‘fascist’ path against which it was established in the first place. It is now evident that Muhammad Yunus is only using its political powers to seek political vendetta against Awami League and Sheikh Hasina, his old opponents.
Now with just the players change, democracy is taking a backseat, while mobocracy, culture of extortion, religious extremism and political violence—all sustained via the interim government’s human rights violations—are ruling Bangladesh’s political culture. Amidst this, the chances of a free and fair election, a just and inclusive democratic transition feel slim.
The political climate in Bangladesh is charged as parties are gearing up for Jatiya Sangsad election in February, next year. While Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) has officially announced 237 candidates to contest for 300 parliamentary seats in the upcoming election, Jamaat-e-Islami is yet to announce its candidacy as it is contemplating to enter into coalition with other parties.
National Citizen Party (NCP), on the other hand, expressed desire to contest alone in all 300 seats, although stating its openness to coalition with other parties. Amidst this, the announcement of Asif Mahmud, the student advisor of the interim government, to contest in the forthcoming election from a Dhaka constituency, was much awaited. However, this pronouncement unmasks the interim government’s neutrality, long contested by political parties. And thus begins the anticipation — will the upcoming election be free and fair?
Since the beginning of this year, the interim government’s neutrality came under scrutiny as a new political party — the National Citizen Party (NCP) — came into being, a party formed by student leaders of the 2024 July Uprising. Established on 8th August 2024, the interim government included three student advisors — Nahid Islam, Asif Mahmud and Mahfuz Alam — who were also core leaders of the Uprising.
One of them, Nahid Islam, resigned from his advisory position this February to join the NCP as its chief convenor, leading to allegations against the interim government sustaining the establishment of a ‘King’s Party’ instead of fulfilling political parties’ demand of announcing an election roadmap.
Indeed, Chief Advisor Muhammad Yunus has shown partisanship towards the NCP, given that student leaders were the one supporting (and inviting) Yunus to hold this position in the interim government. This is notwithstanding the revelation by Youth, Labour and Sports advisor Asif Mahmud of Bangladesh Army Chief’s reservations about students’ decision of inviting Yunus, in a video of Mahmud shared by NCP chief (South) Hasnat Abdullah back in March.
Much before the formal establishment of the NCP, Muhammad Yunus’s interim government parroted the same narrative as that of student leaders of the July Uprising, taking measures suiting their demands. Nowhere has this been more prominent than in a series of official measures targeted to erase Sheikh Mujibur Rahmas’s legacy, to the extent of stripping him of his title of ‘Father of the Nation’. Taking the hands of these July Uprising leaders, the interim government resorted to historical revisionism of the Liberation War, raising a new political discourse of ‘new Bangladesh’ — where Bangladesh is believed to attain ‘real liberation’ on 5 August 2025, the day Sheikh Hasina was forced to flee the country.
Following NCP’s formation, the interim government has accepted many of its demands, even before the party’s official registration in the Election Commission. The official ban on Awami League in May via amendment of 2009 Anti-Terrorism Act, barring it from contesting in the national election came only after NCP hit the streets. This ban on a party, rather than individuals accused of war crimes, has been claimed as undemocratic by international rights organisations. League’s ban has been NCP’s main goals, one that Yunus conceded to, as evident in his earlier statements where he expressed the decision on Awami League’s participation in election to be left to the League itself.
In line with NCP’s demands, the interim government has paid excessive attention to reforms, while keeping Bangladesh’s democratic transition via election in the backseat. This has led to political parties’ accusing the interim government of giving administrative benefits to people (referring to Nahid Islam) who left the government to form their own party—thus the interim government facilitating the establishment of a ‘King’s Party’ to derail the election. The two student advisors—Asif Mahmud and Mahfuz Alam—of the interim government have also been accused of being ‘NCP loyalists’ around the same time and political parties demanded for their resignation, as they have violated the expected neutrality of the interim government which is to ensure free and fair political democratic transition.
The July Charter is another area where the interim government displayed its tilt towards the student-led party. Only after a threat by NCP to declare the July Charter on their own, the interim government announced the July Declaration on 5 August and gave it constitutional recognition, fulfilling yet another NCP’s agenda. The July National Charter, announced on 17 October, further incorporated many of NCP’s demands—which were opposed by the now largest political party BNP along with other parties. These are—public referendum on reforms included in the July Charter which also includes 48 constitutional reforms and omission of notes of dissent in the implementation process of the July Charter, moves that drew controversy for bypassing legal parliamentary process and undemocratic enforcement, leaving consensus out of the July Charter. The Charter also excluded the basic constitutional principles based on liberation aspirations (nationalism, socialism, democracy and secularism), closely aligning with NCP’s demands whose vision is to put the final nail to the 1972 ‘Mujibist’ Constitution.
It was the implementation process of the July Charter and the finalisation of the election roadmap in October that again raised fresh accusations of the interim government’s neutrality being compromised. Parties, especially BNP and Jamaa, alleged that the Charter implementation process to show political biasness (towards NCP), and pressed for removal of party-affiliated individuals from the interim government (supposed to assume the role of caretaker government before election) hinting at student advisors Mahfuz Alam and Asif Mahmud, who are believed to be NCP loyalists. Following meetings with party representations with the Chief Advisor, raising concerns on neutrality compromising free and fair polls, the top echelon of the government asked the two student advisors to step down.
Both advisors requested more time to reach their decision on resignation. While Mahfuz Alam, Information and Broadcasting advisor, still has not shown any interest in contesting for the upcoming election, local government advisor Asif Mahmud recently announced that he will contest election and will resign from his administrative position before that. While he has not yet revealed if he would contest the election as an independent candidate or via any party (NCP), Mahmud’s late revelation unveils that the interim government never being a neutral administrative body in the first place.
Mahmud also proved his earlier press report true where he opined that “advisors who intend to join politics should resign after election announcement… otherwise the election will be questioned.” With only two months left for national election, the political tense environment in Bangladesh and interim government’s neutrality unmasked confirm that 13th national election will neither be inclusive, nor free and fair.
–IANS
Muhammad Yunus, widely recognised as the founder of Bangladesh’s conglomerate Grameen Bank is set to come under the cloud, over ‘revelations’ of decades-old documents by a former intelligence officer, which claims that the microcredit model was actually a university research program and it was subsequently hijacked by the Nobel Laureate and “projected as his own”.
Ex-Bangladeshi intel officer Aminul Hoque Polash claims to have unearthed a series of archival documents from 1976-1983 that fundamentally challenge Muhammad Yunus’s credentials of being the founder of the Grameen Bank, the institution that was instrumental in winning him the Nobel Peace Prize in 2006.
Aminul Hoque Polash served ten years in the National Security Intelligence (NSI) and later as a diplomat, and is currently living in exile. He claims that he was forced to leave the country because of was singled out and targeted for persecution by the Yunus regime.
The documents, he claims, show that the microcredit model was actually a university research project created by junior researchers, and Yunus later hijacked it, and the papers also have his signature.
Notably, the model of Grameen Bank, under which small loans (micro-credit) are disbursed to impoverished families without any collateral, became so popular that it was replicated the world over, including some cities in the US and Europe.
The documents accessed by IANS show that the microcredit project originated at Chittagong University, where Muhammad Yunus served as a professor.
“The Rural Economics Programme (REP) was launched in 1976 with a Ford Foundation grant, and the first micro-lending experiment in Jobra village was an action-research project run by research scholars named Shapan Adnan, Nasiruddin and H.I. Latifee. Yunus was only assigned the task of deep tubewell cooperative management,” it said.
It further claims that the Bangladesh Bank adopted the microfinance model and planned a nationwide rollout before Yunus joined.
Another letter dated June 6, 1983, shows the Ford Foundation writing to Chittagong University Vice-Chancellor, approving grants to the varsity for supporting its rural finance program.
The microcredit model, which initially started as a University program in 1976, eventually turned into a national scheme after being authorised by government ordinance to work as an independent bank.
Yunus became its Project Director and, after the 1983 Grameen Bank Ordinance, assumed the role of Managing Director. By the 1990s, he acquired full control over the institution, which was allegedly developed with public funds.
The former intelligence officer, unrelenting in his attack on the Yunus regime, also goes on to claim that Bangladesh is witnessing a redux of what it saw during the 1970s.
Polash claims that the man who hijacked the famed microfinance model is now trying to usurp the state machinery, after taking over power illegally in 2024, and using it to erase obstacles, reward loyalists, and enrich his network.
“The same man who stole a rural research project now governs an entire country with the same appetite for capture,” he says with an alarming tone.
Citing multiple incidents of impropriety and misconduct, he claimed that prison sentences of criminals are being overturned, corruption cases are being withdrawn, and undue financial benefits are being extended to Grameen companies.
He also holds the Yunus regime accountable for aggressive nepotism in governance, disbursal of licences to his enterprises, tax exemption and other favours being extended to Grameen Bank.
“The same man who stole a rural research project now governs an entire country with the same appetite for capture,” he says in an alarming tone.
–IANS
An investigative report published by Blitz, a leading Bangladesh weekly, has alleged that Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus’s global ‘Grameen’ network has long-standing connections with individuals identified by Western intelligence agencies as financiers of Osama bin Laden and the Al Qaeda network. The report, authored by Blitz editor Salah Uddin Shoaib Choudhury, has called for an international inquiry into Yunus’s transnational financial partnerships.
According to the report, “For years, Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus has been celebrated across the world as a pioneer of microfinance and a champion of the poor. Yet behind this carefully polished global image lies a far darker reality — a web of connections linking Yunus’s sprawling ‘Grameen’ empire to individuals named by Western intelligence agencies as financiers of Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda.”
The report further adds, “In March 2003, The Wall Street Journal published a list of Al Qaeda donors based on CIA information, where the name of Mohammed Abdul Latif Jameel — a Saudi businessman and board member of Grameen-Jameel Microfinance — appeared prominently. The report noted that Jameel was one of the key funders of Osama bin Laden, the notorious mastermind behind the September 11 terrorist attacks.”
Online corporate records describe ‘Grameen-Jameel’ as a social business established in 2007 as a joint venture between the Grameen Foundation and Grow Well Limited, a subsidiary of the Abdul Latif Jameel Group. According to these records, the company’s mission is to “alleviate poverty in the Arab world” through partnerships with microfinance institutions, providing technical and financial support.”
It further adds, “On its LinkedIn page, Grameen-Jameel states that it was established in 2003 and incorporated in 2007 as a joint venture between Grameen Foundation and ALJ Foundation, a subsidiary of the Abdul Latif Jameel Group.”
“The company claims to be the first social business in the Middle East, North Africa (MENA), and Turkey devoted to expanding microfinance. As of December 2013, it facilitated more than USD 65 million in financing, reaching over 2.2 million clients through partner institutions across 10 countries in the MENA region and Turkey.”
According to the report, the company is incorporated in Cyprus and headquartered in Dubai’s International Humanitarian City. Its website is currently inactive, and its Facebook page has been suspiciously deactivated.
“Further strengthening the Grameen-Jameel connection is Zaher Al Munajjed, the Chairman of Grameen-Jameel Microfinance Ltd. Al Munajjed also serves as a senior advisor to Mohammed Abdul Latif Jameel, President of the ALJ Group in Saudi Arabia. With more than 25 years of international business experience, he has played a key role in developing vocational training and microfinance programs. A Harvard Business School alumnus and holder of a Master’s degree in French International Law, Al Munajjed is widely regarded as a major architect of microfinance expansion in the MENA and Turkish regions,” says the Blitz report.
The Jameel family’s controversial past
According to the Blitz report, Yousef Jameel — another prominent figure from the Jameel dynasty — was once notorious in London’s casino circles in the 1980s. According to the Daily Mail, he was widely known as a playboy, later becoming entangled in an international child abduction case.
Adding to the controversies, his name appears in Jeffrey Epstein’s notorious ‘Black Book’, which exposed networks tied to child exploitation and human trafficking. On July 21, 2004, Jameel and others filed an appeal with the British Court of Appeal following the publication of a Sunday Times report titled ‘Car tycoon ‘linked’ to Bin Laden’ on June 8, 2003. The report claimed that Jameel had been sued by the families of the victims of the 9/11 attacks.
On February 3, 2005, Dow Jones & Co., the parent of The Wall Street Journal, filed its own appeal against Yousef Abdul Latif Jameel.
In a landmark ruling on October 11, 2006, the highest court in Britain sided with The Wall Street Journal, affirming the importance of investigative journalism. The ruling highlighted that the article was published as part of a legitimate public-interest inquiry into terror financing.
The court record stated:
“Above the article and headline were photographs of the claimant, Mr Jameel, his company Hartwell PLC, and the Twin Towers burning on 11 September 2001, with the following words: ‘Accused: Yousef Jameel’s family firm bought the British car dealer Hartwell in 1990. Now he is alleged to have helped fund training for the terrorists who carried out the September 11 attacks’.”
Despite these allegations, Jameel has long been regarded as a successful entrepreneur and “generous philanthropist”. He has contributed significant funding to programs at MIT aimed at reducing poverty and improving water and food security. For his philanthropic commitments and contributions to arts and culture in the United Kingdom, Mohammed Abdul Latif Jameel received an honorary knighthood from Queen Elizabeth II. The honour was announced by the British Embassy in Riyadh,” says the Blitz report.
“However, The Guardian later reported that a group of wealthy Saudi businessmen — including individuals close to Jameel — were suing for libel in the High Court over allegations that they may have financed Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda network. They chose London because of its reputation as a claimant-friendly environment for defamation cases,” mentions the Blitz report.
Suspicious connections of Grameen
The Blitz report has also mentioned the allegations linking Grameen entities to the Muslim Brotherhood, raising further concerns about Yunus’s global partnerships.
“Even more disturbing are reports indicating sinister links between Grameen Bank and illegal human organ traders. Individuals unable to repay their loans were allegedly coerced into selling their organs to settle debts,” says the Blitz report.
–IANS
The 2024 July Uprising that ended Sheikh Hasina’s 15-year political tenure transformed Bangladesh’s political landscape. With anti-Hasina forces grabbing power, the political culture shifted and Bangladesh’s foreign policy took a spin as its old friend India came to be seen as an enemy overnight.
Anti-India sentiment was present in Bangladesh even during Hasina’s tenure, especially nurtured by radical Islamists and Pakistan apologists. The reason was heightened bilateral ties reached between India and Bangladesh on multifaceted areas — from cultural diplomacy to reaching understanding on water and land sharing, to new connectivity projects – port, buses and railway – for economic cooperation to greater border security, thanks to joint counter-terrorism measures.
It was also the time Bangladesh’s relations with Pakistan witnessed a thaw as under International Crimes Tribunal, war criminals mostly belonging to Jamaat-e-Islami who collaborated with Pakistan Army during 1971 Liberation War, were given death sentences and life imprisonment on charges of war crimes.
In the domestic sphere, Hasina’s hard dealing of new terrorist offshoots, witnessed during 2013-17, aggravated radical Islamists who openly advocated against Bangladesh being a constitutionally secular state (an ideological stand of Awami League party). All these factors culminated in shaping a new narrative — Hasina “selling” Bangladesh’s democracy to New Delhi.
Soon after the January 2024 election where Sheikh Hasina faced a decisive win, her political opponents doubled down on anti-India propaganda. First, they criticised New Delhi for congratulating Hasina at a time western countries raised concern over Bangladesh’s free and fair election. Then they blamed New Delhi for meddling in Dhaka’s internal affairs, alleging Narendra Modi government to have had a hand behind Hasina’s victory in 12th parliamentary election. All these because New Delhi maintained a non-interventionist approach to any country’s domestic politics, national election being one of them. Thus started the ‘India Out’ campaign in Bangladesh, mirroring Maldives’ drive earlier in 2023. Nevertheless, this did not affect bilateral ties in any way and the campaign soon died because of low popularity.
After Hasina’s deposition, the interim government’s foreign policy recalibration underwent a paradigm shift — moving closer to erstwhile coloniser Pakistan while maintaining a cold distance with New Delhi. The Chief Advisor Muhammad Yunus himself drew attention on many occasions for his provocative speeches antagonising New Delhi — from calling Bangladesh as the only guardian of Bay of Bengal for India’s “landlocked” northeast states during his China visit in March to claiming that New Delhi “disliked” or “disapproved” of student protest in Bangladesh that ousted Hasina and insisting at the UNGA in September that SAARC is nearly defunct because of “politics of one country” (indirectly referring to India).
In this blame game, Yunus conveniently avoided the core issue of SAARC being defunct — the Pakistan-sponsored terrorist attack in India’s Uri that undermined regional cooperation and led to cancellation of 19th SAARC Summit in Islamabad and boycott by neighbouring countries.
India, during the July Uprising, maintained diplomatic communication with Dhaka where it “observed developments closely”. Moreover, New Delhi’s focus during the unrest was to ensure security of Indian nationals, especially students, in Bangladesh and taking measures to avoid any breaches of border security.
It is common knowledge how post-Hasina, Bangladesh splurged into a deep law and order crisis, as violence of all kinds — gender, communal, ethnic, political — engulfed the country.
The consistent security lapse has created deep public distrust towards Bangladesh’s law enforcement forces. The rise in mob violence and rampant acts of vandalism of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s murals went unchecked and unnoticed by the interim government. The demolition of Mujib’s private residence -32 Dhanmondi – in February, however, pulled widespread criticism from both within and outside Bangladesh.
Instead of taking accountability for its lacklustre attitude towards restoring law and order, the interim government pointed the finger at New Delhi, for “giving platform” to Sheikh Hasina to give speeches. In fact, this has been the persistent narrative of the interim government, every time it was questioned of lawlessness within the country, from violence in Gopalganj to Chittagong Hill Tract. The justification was always the same — Sheikh Hasina attempting to destabilise Bangladesh “with foreign help”, hinting at New Delhi.
Recently, Bangladesh registered a protest against India for Hasina’s interviews published in Indian and foreign news outlets, alleging India to allow Hasina to make “hate speeches” that risk destabilising Bangladesh. India has reiterated that Hasina’s speeches are not New Delhi’s diplomatic position but one made in her personal capacity. This is because India is a democracy where the press is not controlled, unlike Bangladesh that is going through a democracy deficit.
Moreover, Dhaka foreign advisor recently called India Foreign Secretary’s remarks on hoping to see a “free, fair and inclusive election” in Bangladesh as “completely unwarranted”, claiming the national election as Dhaka’s “internal matter” and hence “not Delhi’s concern”. Bizarrely, Dhaka has been appreciative of Western countries who too expressed hope to see a free and fair election in Bangladesh. The political climate in Bangladesh has turned more volatile because it has banned Awami League from contesting elections, triggering counter protests by party activists and supporters in the nation. The usual jibe of “foreign force destabilising Bangladesh” continues.
Bilateral ties between India and Bangladesh strained not because New Delhi turned its back but because Dhaka, under the interim government, has been weaponizing anti-India sentiment to hide its inefficiency.
In a recent attack on Awami League office in Gulistan, the video of miscreants vandalising a sculpture depicting Pakistan’s surrender to India during 1971 Liberation War became viral. It showed a man saying that if the image remained intact, League’s allies “might return and claim their roles”. Much like Pakistan, the interim government’s attempt at historical revisionism, especially of India’s role in the 1971 Liberation War, through textbook revision is no secret now.