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Bangladesh is facing a deepening democratic crisis as violence, persecution and mob rule increasingly become part of everyday life, raising serious concerns about the credibility of the country’s political transition ahead of national elections scheduled for early 2026. Observers note that the current political environment represents a sharp deterioration in law and order, marked by rising communal tensions, ethnic and religious attacks, suppression of dissent and the growing influence of extremist elements. What was initially presented as a corrective transition toward democratic renewal has instead exposed profound institutional and societal weaknesses.
The crisis traces back to mid-2024, when mass protests and unrest led to the removal of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and the installation of an interim administration led by Chief Advisor Muhammad Yunus. Since then, the political landscape has become increasingly polarised, with bans and restrictions placed on major political parties and their affiliated organisations, significantly narrowing democratic space. Although the interim government has described the forthcoming election as an opportunity to restore democratic legitimacy, critics argue that the necessary conditions for a free and fair vote remain absent. Continued violence, political exclusion and the absence of broad-based participation have cast doubt on whether the electoral process can command public trust.
Human rights groups and civil society organisations report a surge in mob violence, attacks on minority communities, intimidation of journalists and harassment of political opponents. These developments have contributed to an atmosphere of fear and insecurity, undermining citizens’ ability to freely express political views or participate in civic life. Analysts point out that Bangladesh’s democratic institutions have long been fragile, shaped by a history of military rule and authoritarian governance. The current crisis, they warn, risks entrenching a culture of impunity if accountability mechanisms are not restored and the rule of law reinforced.
The unrest has also drawn attention beyond Bangladesh’s borders, with regional observers expressing concern about the implications for stability in South Asia. Calls have grown for stronger protections for minorities, independent media and political activists, as well as for inclusive dialogue among all stakeholders. Critics argue that the interim administration has struggled to curb extremist violence or reassure vulnerable communities, while the absence of transparent decision-making has further weakened confidence in governance. Without urgent reforms, they warn, the normalisation of violence could become a permanent feature of Bangladesh’s political landscape.
As the country moves closer to elections, pressure is mounting on authorities to ensure an inclusive, secure and credible democratic process. For many Bangladeshis, the coming months will determine whether the nation can reverse its current trajectory and restore public faith in democratic institutions.
Former Bangladesh prime minister Sheikh Hasina has issued a sharp warning about the state of democracy in Bangladesh, arguing that the country is being governed without legitimate public mandate and that political stability will remain elusive unless inclusive elections are restored. Speaking in a wide-ranging interview, Hasina reflected on the political unrest that led to her departure from office in 2024 and offered a critical assessment of the current interim administration. She said the protests that began as student-led demonstrations were later overtaken by radical elements, resulting in widespread violence, destruction of public property and attacks on law enforcement personnel.
Hasina said her decision to leave the country was taken to prevent further bloodshed as the situation deteriorated. She rejected claims that her government suppressed peaceful dissent, stating that her administration initially allowed protests and sought accountability through judicial mechanisms. The former prime minister was particularly critical of the interim government led by Muhammad Yunus, arguing that it lacks democratic legitimacy because it was not elected by the people. She said banning the Awami League — a party that has won multiple national elections — and detaining its leaders undermines the foundations of democratic governance.
According to Hasina, meaningful political normalisation in Bangladesh requires the lifting of restrictions on political parties, the release of political detainees and the holding of free, fair and inclusive elections. Without these steps, she warned, any future government would struggle to gain domestic or international credibility. Hasina also accused the interim administration of dissolving inquiry processes into the 2024 violence and of empowering extremist groups, alleging that such actions have weakened law and order and endangered minority communities. She expressed concern that the current political climate has discouraged investment and stalled economic momentum built over the past decade.
Defending her own record, Hasina highlighted her role in restoring democratic institutions after periods of military rule and pointed to sustained economic growth, infrastructure development and poverty reduction during her tenure. She maintained that democratic governance requires both strong institutions and the participation of all major political forces. On foreign policy, Hasina cautioned against major strategic realignments by a government without an electoral mandate, arguing that long-term national interests should reflect the will of the people rather than interim political arrangements.
Her remarks come as Bangladesh prepares for national elections amid heightened political polarisation and questions over inclusivity. Observers note that the exclusion of major political parties could undermine voter confidence and deepen instability. As debates over Bangladesh’s democratic future intensify, Hasina’s comments underscore the central question facing the country: whether political order can be restored without broad public participation and electoral legitimacy.
What began as a hopeful chapter for free expression in Bangladesh has turned into a growing crisis for journalists and independent media, according to analysts, human rights groups, and press organisations. When Nobel Laureate Dr. Muhammad Yunus assumed leadership of Bangladesh’s interim government in August 2024 following the fall of the Sheikh Hasina administration, many inside and outside the country saw it as a potential reset for democratic freedoms—particularly for a media landscape long constrained by legal and political pressures.
However, in the 16 months since, journalists report that those early expectations have largely given way to disillusionment. Rather than broadening space for dissenting voices, critics say the government has presided over increasing intimidation, legal harassment, and violent actions against the press.
A report released on World Press Freedom Day 2025 painted a stark picture of deteriorating conditions: within eight months of Yunus taking office, at least 640 journalists were targeted, including assaults, fabricated criminal charges, and financial scrutiny—particularly through state agencies.
Independent press organisations say the situation continues to worsen as Bangladesh approaches its February 2026 national elections. Journalists in Dhaka and beyond now describe death threats, online surveillance, and stalking as the “new normal” for reporters covering politics and governance.
Compounding these concerns, a U.S. press freedom group formally urged Yunus’s government to release journalists imprisoned on questionable murder charges, noting that some detained reporters are held in harsh conditions without credible evidence of wrongdoing.
Beyond individual threats, media institutions themselves have faced violence and destruction. In December, offices of major newspapers—including Prothom Alo and The Daily Star—were vandalised and set alight in mob attacks. Leaders of the Bangladesh Editors’ Council said some elements within the interim government appeared to have allowed or failed to prevent these attacks.
These incidents have sown fear among journalists and civil society activists, many of whom say state forces have been slow or unwilling to protect media workers during outbreaks of mob violence.
Analysts note that draconian legal instruments, including laws framed around “digital safety,” remain in force and are used to muzzle critical reporting—a stark contrast with earlier promises by Yunus to reform such measures.
Observers point to a broader pattern in which courts and administrative bodies have become avenues for silencing dissent, with journalists facing lengthy investigations, travel bans, frozen bank accounts, and professional blacklisting.
Despite these troubling trends, civil society groups continue to push for meaningful media reform and stronger protections for journalists. Advocates say that safeguarding free expression will be essential not just for press freedom, but for the credibility of Bangladesh’s democratic process as the country heads toward a pivotal election.
Recent attacks on Hindu minorities in Bangladesh — including arson, lynchings and threats tied to unverified blasphemy claims — have reignited debate over whether such violence is sporadic or part of a deeper, structural pattern rooted in decades of social, legal and political trends. Rights groups, community leaders and researchers point to a series of recurring incidents that suggest longstanding vulnerabilities for Hindus in the Muslim‑majority nation. The most recent high‑profile case involved the lynching of a Hindu garment worker in late 2025, when coworkers accused him of blasphemy without substantiated evidence. The fatal mob attack sparked protests, diplomatic concern and renewed scrutiny of how religious minorities are treated during periods of political turmoil and social tension. Advocates and analysts argue that these events are not isolated but reflect broader historical patterns of communal violence and discrimination that have periodically erupted, especially during political transitions or when allegations of religious offence circulate in local communities.
In multiple incidents throughout 2025, attackers targeted homes and properties of Hindu families, sometimes issuing threats and warning banners alleging “anti‑Islamic activities.” In one case in the Chattogram region, attackers set fire to a Hindu household after issuing threatening notices in the area, forcing the family to flee for safety. Rights observers describe such episodes as more than random criminality and stress how religious prejudice can escalate quickly into mass violence in poorly policed settings. Historical data underline that Hindu communities in Bangladesh have faced waves of violence over decades, with documented attacks during and after the country’s independence in 1971, repeated post‑election unrest in the early 2000s, and communal tensions tied to religious controversies. Analysts note that violence has not been limited to physical assaults; reports also include destruction of temples, displacement of families and persistent fears of marginalisation among minorities.
Scholars and demographers highlight long‑term demographic changes that have reduced the Hindu share of Bangladesh’s population over several decades, driven in part by economic distress, social discrimination and repeated waves of communal unrest. Some academic estimates suggest that millions of Hindus left the country between the 1960s and early 2010s because of persecution and insecurity, contributing to a steady decline in the community’s proportion of the total population. Legal and constitutional developments have also played a role. Bangladesh’s declaration of Islam as the state religion in the late 20th century, along with historical property laws that disproportionately affected Hindu owners, are cited by commentators as factors that reinforced the community’s political and economic marginalisation.
The Bangladeshi interim government and security officials have at times rejected characterisations of systematic persecution, framing recent incidents as politically motivated conflicts or isolated criminal acts rather than evidence of broader communal targeting. Officials contend that police and judicial processes are addressing violent cases and that overall social harmony remains a priority. This narrative contrasts with accounts from some rights groups and international observers who see patterns of violence that disproportionately affect Hindus during periods of political instability or heightened social tension.
The issue has also strained diplomatic ties, with protests in neighbouring India calling for protection of Hindu minorities and strong remarks from Indian officials about the safety of communities across the border. Some political activists and civic groups in the region argue that recurring violence against Hindus threatens not only individual safety but also cultural heritage and pluralistic values. At the same time, voices within Bangladesh call for greater protection of minority rights, improved law enforcement responses and constructive dialogue to prevent future outbreaks of violence.
Analysts emphasise that understanding the nature of violence — whether episodic or structural — requires consideration of both recent events and long‑term historical dynamics. While immediate triggers for attacks often involve local disputes or unfounded religious accusations, the frequency and distribution of such incidents over decades suggest persistent vulnerabilities rooted in legal frameworks, social attitudes and political transitions. As Bangladesh prepares for national elections and continued social change, the debate over whether violence against Hindus is an anomaly or part of enduring structural pressures is likely to remain central to discussions on minority rights, national identity and democratic development.
Questions over press freedom in Bangladesh have resurfaced amid allegations that the interim government led by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus has failed to ensure an independent and secure environment for journalists, despite pledges of democratic reform.
According to critics and media observers, journalists in Bangladesh continue to face intimidation, legal pressure and harassment, raising concerns that freedom of expression remains constrained under the current administration. The claims suggest that the media environment has not seen the expected improvement following the political transition of 2024.
Journalists and press freedom advocates allege that reporters critical of the government have been subjected to arrests, questioning and legal cases, creating a climate of fear within newsrooms. Several journalists have reported receiving threats, while others say they are increasingly resorting to self-censorship to avoid retaliation. Media organisations argue that the use of legal provisions against journalists has continued under the interim government, undermining assurances that press freedom would be protected during the transition period.
Local journalist bodies have expressed alarm over attacks on media offices and individuals, claiming that insufficient action has been taken against those responsible. They warn that the lack of accountability has emboldened hostile elements and weakened trust in the state’s commitment to protecting journalists. Editors and reporters say the environment for independent journalism has become increasingly hostile, with many fearing for their personal safety while carrying out their professional duties.
The debate over media freedom is unfolding against a backdrop of wider political tension in Bangladesh. Critics of the interim government accuse it of suppressing dissenting voices and narrowing democratic space, particularly as the country prepares for national elections expected in early 2026. Opposition figures and civil society groups argue that restricting media freedom risks undermining the credibility of the electoral process and weakening public confidence in democratic institutions.
The Yunus-led interim government has rejected allegations of press repression, maintaining that it respects freedom of speech and that any legal action against journalists is based on due process rather than political motives. Officials have stated that maintaining law and order and preventing misinformation are key priorities during the transition.
International press freedom and human rights groups have urged Bangladesh’s leadership to strengthen safeguards for journalists, review laws that may be misused to silence criticism, and ensure that media professionals can work without fear or interference. As Bangladesh moves closer to a crucial election year, the state of media freedom is likely to remain under close domestic and international scrutiny, serving as a key measure of the country’s democratic health.
-(Dr Sreoshi Sinha, Senior Fellow, Centre for Joint Warfare Studies
& Abu Obaidha Arin, University of
Delhi.)
The persecution of journalists by the state is a grim reality across many authoritarian regimes—from Taliban-ruled Afghanistan to Myanmar, Belarus, Turkiye, and the Philippines. In such contexts, the press—often deemed the “fourth pillar of democracy”—is treated not as a watchdog, but as a threat. Bangladesh is also echoing this global trend. After the fall of the Sheikh Hasina government on August 5, 2024, many viewed the rise of Nobel Laureate Dr Muhammad Yunus as a turning point. Backed by student protests and public sentiment, his appointment as Chief Adviser cum Prime Minister of the interim government was seen as a symbolic “second liberation,” especially for the country’s long-suffocated media. But within months, that promise gave way to disillusionment. Despite initial pledges to restore freedom of expression and uphold democratic values, Yunus’s administration has presided over a deepening assault on press freedom. Journalists, both in urban and rural areas, are now facing threats, fabricated charges, detentions, and brutal attacks. Old laws like the Digital Security Act— once condemned by Yunus himself—remain in force. New regulations, framed in the name of “digital safety,” risk further gagging the media. More troubling still, the government has failed to announce an election date, turning its “interim” status into a prolonged, unaccountable rule. Institutions meant to safeguard democracy have fallen silent or become enablers of repression. The optimism of August has morphed into fear, as the Yunus regime retools authoritarian tactics under the guise of reform. In one year, the Yunus-led government has systematically undermined media freedom in Bangladesh. And hope has curdled into control, and the dream of a freer, more democratic society is slipping further away with each passing day. Behind the laurels lies a familiar hand of repression.
A Dangerous Time for Free Expression
Freedom of speech, a foundational pillar of democracy, remains under severe threat. Journalists—especially those from minority communities—are facing escalating violence, legal harassment, and coordinated state-backed intimidation. A report released on World Press Freedom Day 2025 paints a bleak picture: within eight months of Dr Yunus taking office, at least 640 journalists were targeted. Of these, 182 faced criminal cases, 206 experienced violence, and 85 were placed under financial scrutiny by the Bangladesh Financial Intelligence Unit. The attacks are not isolated; they are systemic, deliberate, and widespread. From legal persecution to outright physical violence, the Yunus regime has transformed Bangladesh into one of the most dangerous places in Asia to be a journalist. Violence against journalists has become commonplace. In March 2025, two journalists were attacked at Barishal Court, while others were assaulted in Dhaka and outside the Dhaka Reporters’ Unity. The most horrific incident came on March 18, when a woman journalist was gang-raped in Dhaka—a case that drew international outrage, including condemnation from ARTICLE 19 and other watchdogs.
In April, New Age’s Rafia Tamanna and Daily Prantojon’s Sajedul Islam Selim were physically attacked. Offices of news outlets were vandalised. Prothom Alo, a paper accused of being an “agent of India,” saw its Rajshahi office destroyed. These attacks illustrate a dangerous trend: the delegitimisation of critical voices through nationalist propaganda followed by violent suppression. Legal harassment has become a preferred tool to silence dissent. Journalists are being dragged into courtrooms and prisons over flimsy or fabricated charges. Kamruzzaman, a journalist in Satkhira, was sentenced to 10 days in jail by a mobile court for “obstructing government work.” His real crime? Reporting on poor construction work. Rubel Hossain of Dhaka Mail was falsely implicated in a murder case related to student protests. Three prominent journalists—Naem Nizam, Moynal Hossain Chowdhury, and Syed Burhan Kabir—faced arrest warrants under the much-criticised Digital Security Act. Their only fault: publishing content critical of powerful figures.
The State vs. Media Institutions
Media institutions haven’t been spared either. An adviser at the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting announced audits targeting “opposition-affiliated” media houses—a move widely viewed as financial intimidation. Deepto TV suspended its news broadcasts following political backlash. ATN Bangla dismissed a reporter for merely raising a sensitive question. In both cases, official denials of state interference were undercut by obvious patterns of state-orchestrated pressure. In a disturbing episode on May 4, journalists at Daily Janakantha protesting unpaid wages were assaulted by goons reportedly linked to the National Citizen Party. This convergence of financial abuse and physical violence has created a stifling environment for critical media. The Yunus government has done little to allay fears about surveillance and data privacy. Instead, it has doubled down with proposed legislation like the Cyber Protection Ordinance 2025 and the Personal Data Protection Ordinance—laws that could further institutionalise censorship and mass surveillance. With travel bans imposed on more than 300 journalists, and bank accounts frozen for over 100 of them, the message is clear: dissent will be crushed not just with batons, but with bureaucracy. Journalists from minority communities are bearing the brunt of the crackdown. Shyamol Dutta, a leading Hindu journalist and editor of Bhorer Kagoj, was jailed after being removed from his post at the National Press Club. Munni Saha, a prominent media personality, is facing several cases and has been detained for questioning. More than 50 minority journalists are reportedly living in fear, with many dismissed from their jobs under opaque circumstances. This pattern reflects not just a press freedom issue, but an assault on the fundamental rights of minority communities.
Targeting Prominent Figures and Media Houses
The arrest of top media professionals like Mozammel Babu, CEO of Ekattor TV, and Syed Ishtiaq Reza, former chief of news at GTV, has shocked the industry. The charges—often murder or conspiracy—lack credibility, pointing to a larger political agenda. In one bizarre move, a complaint filed with the International Crimes Tribunal accused 29 journalists and editors, alongside former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, of spreading “false news to justify genocide.” The charges are outrageous and serve no purpose but to stoke fear and paralyse the press. Even high-profile reporters like Shahnaz Sharmin, known for her fearless on-the-ground reporting, have been named in criminal complaints. Her alleged involvement in the death of a protester is widely seen as a fabricated effort to tarnish her reputation. Dr Yunus’s rise to power was framed as a “second liberation.” His global reputation as a humanitarian and social entrepreneur gave many hope. But the honeymoon was short-lived. The arrest, torture, and surveillance of journalists under his watch signal a complete betrayal of those ideals. Rather than dismantling the oppressive tools of the previous regime, the interim government has inherited and expanded them. Laws are being used as weapons. The courts have turned into instruments of intimidation. And civil liberties—once hoped to be restored—have only deteriorated. Despite the dire situation, there are glimmers of resistance. A Media Reform Commission, proposed by information adviser Nahid Islam, offers a chance for dialogue and reform. But unless these proposals are translated into immediate action—starting with the release of unjustly detained journalists and withdrawal of politically motivated cases— the initiative risks becoming another empty gesture. Civil society must stay vigilant. International watchdogs, human rights organisations, and democratic governments must increase pressure on the Yunus administration. Silence is not neutrality—it is complicity.
The Fight for Truth Must Go On
In the last 12 months, Bangladesh has moved from the promise of change to the peril of authoritarianism. The interim government led by Dr Muhammad Yunus was expected to restore justice, transparency, and democratic values. Instead, it has turned against the very institutions and individuals that form the backbone of a functioning democracy—the free press. The persecution of journalists, the weaponisation of laws, the sidelining of minority voices, and the unending delay of elections paint a grim portrait of a government losing legitimacy by the day. If Yunus does not act swiftly to reverse this trend, he risks eroding not only his reputation but also the democratic foundation of the country. Bangladesh’s journalists are not just chroniclers of events—they are defenders of democracy, truth, and public interest. Silencing them will not silence the truth. It will only delay the reckoning. The time for reform is now—before the darkness of repression becomes permanent
-Dr Sreoshi Sinha(Senior Fellow, Centre for Joint Warfare Studies) & Abu Obaidha Arin (University of
Delhi.)
August 5, 2024, will be remembered as a historic turning point in Bangladesh’s political journey. The fall of the Sheikh Hasina-led Awami League government marked the end of an era—an era deeply intertwined with the legacy of the 1971 Liberation War, the pursuit of transitional justice, and an increasingly authoritarian political framework.
In its place, a fragile and confused new political setup has emerged, led by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus, who, despite his international acclaim, appears ill-equipped to manage the complexities of a fractured nation. Bangladesh today stands at a crossroads—politically unstable, socially fragmented, and economically stalled. Law and order have collapsed, with law enforcement either absent or complicit. Amid this chaos, one of the most disturbing developments has been the reported takeover of the International Crimes Tribunal (ICT) by anti-liberation forces, particularly from right-wing factions. The new ICT leadership appears preoccupied with finding ways to punish Sheikh Hasina and her allies. Even former prosecutors have not been spared—Tureen Afroz, a former prosecutor, was arrested and reportedly tortured in her own home after the fall of the Hasina government.
The tribunal’s primary focus now seems to be targeting members of a specific political party—the Awami League—on accusations related to the mass uprising of 2024 that led to the government’s collapse. This is not merely a political transition. It is a dangerous reversal—a grotesque distortion of justice and history. From Transitional justice to political vendetta The International Crimes Tribunal was established in 2009 with the aim of bringing to justice the perpetrators of war crimes committed during Bangladesh’s struggle for independence. In principle, it was a noble endeavour—a long-overdue acknowledgement of the need for historical accountability. Many war criminals, particularly from Jamaat-e-Islami and the BNP, were prosecuted, with some even sentenced to death. While many ordinary Bangladeshis, especially families of 1971 martyrs, supported the idea of justice, the overt politicisation of the tribunal gradually eroded its legitimacy. But no one could have imagined that the tribunal itself would one day fall into the hands of the very forces it once sought to prosecute. Yet, that is the grim reality today. Jamaat’s spectre returns The resurgence of Jamaat-Shibir elements within the current political framework is deeply alarming—not only because of their past, but because of what it symbolises. It marks the complete reversal of the political narrative that has shaped Bangladesh for the past two decades. Reports now suggest that several individuals with known ties to Jamaat-e-Islami and its student wing, Islami Chhatra Shibir, are now influencing—and in some cases directly managing—the International Crimes Tribunal. It is nothing short of surreal. How can a nation reconcile with the fact that a tribunal once created to hold war criminals accountable is now run, in part, by those accused of committing some of the gravest crimes during the Liberation War? This development is not just a political scandal; it is a national disgrace. It insults the memory of the 3 million who were martyred and the countless women who were raped in 1971. It undermines the very foundation of our national identity.
The Disillusionment of Democracy Muhammad Yunus’s unexpected rise to leadership was initially met with hope—particularly among groups sympathetic to antiBangladesh sentiments, pro-Pakistani elements, and war criminals. With the fall of Sheikh Hasina’s government, many of these groups expressed relief. However, Yunus’s government, largely composed of technocrats and opportunists, lacks both political capital and ideological clarity. It has failed to present a roadmap for economic recovery, social cohesion, or political reconciliation. Law and order have collapsed entirely.
Bangladesh’s former intelligence officer and diplomat Aminul Hoque Polash, in exile since the fall of the Sheikh Hasina regime, has broken his silence on the hidden power structures, financial engineering, and political ambitions surrounding Nobel laureate and the country’s interim leader Muhammad Yunus.
In an exclusive conversation, Polash walks News18 through classified insights, internal documents, and lived experiences inside Bangladesh’s national security system, revealing a side of Yunus the world has never seen before.
Before we get into the details about Dr Yunus, tell us how you ended up in exile.
I never pictured myself sitting in another country, talking about the collapse of the institutions I once served. I spent nearly a decade inside national security and foreign service. My work was simple in principle: follow evidence, protect the state, and protect the people.
Bangladesh today stands on the brink of an unprecedented national catastrophe. Under the guise of reform and accountability, the pro-Islamist regime of Muhammad Yunus has begun dismantling the nation’s most vital institutions – the Armed Forces and the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI). What appears to be a judicial process is, in reality, a political purge aimed at replacing the patriotic guardians of Bangladesh’s sovereignty with a militant, ideologically driven “Islamic Revolutionary Army”. In doing so, the Yunus regime risks transforming Bangladesh from a moderate Muslim democracy into a jihadist state – a South Asian version of Iran or Afghanistan.
As anticipated, the regime in Dhaka, led by Muhammad Yunus has begun implementing its blueprint to create an Islamic Revolutionary Army (IRA) by disbanding the Bangladesh Armed Forces and the country’s primary intelligence agency, the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI).
According to credible media reports, investigators have submitted a chargesheet against 11 army officers, including eight Generals, accusing them of committing “crimes against humanity” – offences carrying the death penalty. The charge sheet also names former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina as the principal accused. Simultaneously, the regime has launched legal measures to permanently outlaw the Awami League, Bangladesh’s oldest and largest political party, in a move clearly engineered to eliminate any chance of an inclusive national election, which Yunus intends to stage in February 2026 under his absolute control.
The accused listed in the chargesheet include: former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, former National Security Advisor Tarique Ahmed Siddique, former DGFI Director General Lt. Gen. (retd) Mohammad Akbar Hossain, former DG Major General (retd) Saiful Abedin, Lt. Gen. (retd) Md Saiful Alam, former DG Lt. Gen. Tabrez Shams Chowdhury, former DG Major General (retd) Hamidul Haque, Major General Towhidul Islam, Major General Sarwar Hossain, Major General Kabir Ahmed, Brigadier General Mahbubur Rahman Siddique, Brigadier General Ahmed Tanvir Majhar Siddique, and Lt. Col. (retd) Makhsurul Haque.
Among them, four are currently in active service. However, under the amended International Crimes Tribunal Act, serving officers accused in such cases are suspended from holding official positions, according to Chief Prosecutor Tajul Islam.
The entire case behind this chargesheet accusing senior military officers originates from a dramatized “documentary film” funded by the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) – an organisation that has, for several years, played an active role in defaming the Bangladesh Army and DGFI.
Unfortunately, during this massive propaganda campaign, both institutions failed to mount an effective counter-narrative. Even after Sheikh Hasina’s ouster, when Yunus and his allies intensified their attacks on DGFI — particularly through claims of detentions inside “Aynaghar”, an imaginary facility invented by a NED-funded, overseas-based media outlet – the disinformation continued unchecked. The so-called “documentary” presented fabricated testimonies from alleged victims, serving as the foundation for the current legal onslaught.
Most importantly, the Bangladesh Armed Forces and DGFI had played a crucial role in the 2024 anti-Hasina protests, which ultimately enabled the US Deep State’s regime-change operation to succeed. More than 14 months after Sheikh Hasina’s removal and the installation of the Yunus regime – a transition initially supported by segments of the military – it has become evident that the ultimate goal of Yunus and his foreign backers is to completely dismantle Bangladesh’s Armed Forces and counterterrorism institutions to pave the way for transforming the country into an Islamist Caliphate.
It was earlier reported that Pakistan’s Army Chief General Asim Munir has been orchestrating this plot to dismantle the Bangladesh Army and DGFI, working in concert with key figures of Jamaat-e-Islami, Ansar Al-Islam (the local franchise of Al-Qaeda), and several high-ranking members of the Yunus regime. Although the current chargesheet targets former DGFI chiefs and counterterrorism officials, credible intelligence sources suggest Islamabad’s ultimate goal is to implicate Army Chief General Waker Uz Zaman, accusing him of “enforced disappearances and unlawful detentions”.
Muhammad Yunus and at least two of his close foreign-linked advisors are believed to be quietly assisting this effort, providing legal and diplomatic cover to neutralise Bangladesh’s last line of defence against Islamist expansionism.
Commenting on this alarming development, noted military analyst M A Hossain stated, “This is possibly the first-ever case in any country where top officials of a national intelligence agency have been prosecuted for defending their nation from terrorism. It defies logic. How can a judiciary target its own security defenders in a case clearly masterminded by Pakistan’s military establishment and its local proxies? The next step, inevitably, will be implicating Army Chief General Waker Uz Zaman – the ultimate command authority – to decapitate the Armed Forces entirely”.
Defence expert Damsana Ranadhiran, a special contributor to Bangladesh’s Blitz media outlet, warned: “This legal ambush targetting Bangladeshi Generals will have dire consequences. It will weaken the military’s command structure and open the door for Pakistan-backed officers to take charge. This is a textbook ISI strategy – a blend of legal warfare, psychological manipulation, and political subversion – identical to what Pakistan executed in Afghanistan and Kashmir”.
Ranadhiran further cautioned that Bangladesh’s sovereignty and regional stability are now at stake.
“Bangladesh did not endure the genocide of 1971 only to be subdued again by Pakistan’s puppeteers and Islamist collaborators. If Pakistan’s designs are not countered immediately through diplomatic, military, and legal means, South Asia may descend into chaos – a region overrun by proxy wars, terror networks, and narcotics-driven insurgencies”.
These fabricated charges against senior military officers are designed to discredit and paralyse the Armed Forces, paving the way for Yunus to replace them with a new paramilitary militia modelled after Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The envisioned Islamic Revolutionary Army (IRA) will be ideologically loyal to the regime rather than to the nation – a hallmark of theocratic authoritarianism.
The motive behind Yunus’s hostility toward the military lies in its potential to resist his project of selling out Bangladesh’s sovereignty for personal and foreign gain. Much like his political idol Hamid Karzai, Yunus seeks to maintain power through foreign patronage rather than public legitimacy.
Analysts estimate his genuine domestic support at no more than five per cent. His crusade against the Awami League, with its 45 million supporters, is part of a larger design to eliminate all political opposition. After banning the Awami League, the regime now aims to suppress smaller parties such as the Jatiya Party and left-leaning groups to cement a one-man rule under the pretext of “national reform”.
Alongside institutional purges, Yunus has unleashed a campaign of terror against journalists, intellectuals, and dissenters. Hundreds have been imprisoned, and at least 266 journalists face fabricated murder charges – making Yunus arguably an even greater oppressor of the press than Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
Meanwhile, the regime is rapidly replacing the national police with an “Auxiliary Police” modeled on Iran’s morality police. Recruited from Hizb ut-Tahrir, Hefazat-e-Islam, and Ansar Al-Islam, this force enforces Taliban-style dress codes and harasses women in traditional Bengali attire. Reports of hijab-clad patrols intimidating citizens are becoming alarmingly common.
For decades, DGFI played a pivotal role in fighting terrorism and militancy, dismantling insurgent networks, and shutting down foreign-backed terrorist training camps – including those of India’s United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA). Its success in keeping Bangladesh free of transnational terrorism made it a target of Islamist extremists and the Pakistani ISI, who now see an opportunity for revenge under the Yunus administration.
Since last year’s Jihadist Coup, Bangladesh has been slipping rapidly toward Islamist rule. Top jihadists – including Ansar Al-Islam leader Jashimuddin Rahmani – were released from prison and now allowed to operate freely. Rahmani has publicly vowed to attack secular voices and bloggers, branding them as “enemies of Islam”. Shockingly, the regime has made no effort to re-arrest such fugitives or curb their militant propaganda.
If this trajectory continues unchecked, Bangladesh may soon cease to exist as the secular republic envisioned by the martyrs of 1971. The systematic destruction of the Armed Forces, intelligence services, and democratic institutions is not merely a domestic tragedy – it is a regional security crisis. South Asia cannot afford another failed state governed by zealots and manipulated by Pakistan’s ISI. The international community, especially India and democratic allies, must recognise that defending Bangladesh’s Armed Forces today is equivalent to defending the last line of resistance against the spread of militant Islamism in South Asia. Silence is complicity – and complicity, in this case, could be catastrophic.
–IANS
Amidst the developments in Bangladesh’s political trajectory, the resurgence of Islamists has been the one catching everyone’s attention. A country with about 90 per cent Muslim population, this surely is not supposed to be alarming. But Bangladesh is no Middle East or Central Asia — wherein religion profoundly shaped their political systems. Religion, albeit a strong influence, has more cultural and symbolic presence than a political one — whereby Bangladesh’s political establishment is influenced by principles of nationalism, socialism, secularism and democracy. Here, cultural and ethnolinguistic identity have historically taken precedence over religious one.
Islamists in Bangladesh seek a complete overhaul of the socio-political-legal system rooted in Islamic values and principles, contrary to the present establishment in Bangladesh. However, Islamists do not comprise a homogenous group, as they take their ideological orientation from different Islamic schools of thought, namely, Hanafi, Deobandi, Barelvi, Salafi and Sufi. Among these, Hanafi and Deobandi exert the most socio-political influence. The Islamists, initially marginalised post Bangladesh’s independence, were rehabilitated under military rule. After restoration of democracy and civilian government in 1990, some created formal political alliances while maintaining grassroot mobilisation in religious institutions and madrasas and entered the electoral field. Others took the path of militancy, launched a series of terror attacks in Bangladesh and re-configured into newer factions after facing state crackdowns and bans, especially under the Awami League government.
The recent unofficial visit of seven Islamic scholars to Afghanistan on Taliban’s invitation needs a careful assessment. The meeting was framed as seven Bangladeshi Islamic scholars observing human rights and women’s rights situation in Afghanistan in face of backlash from the West. However, one cannot overlook the heavy political intent as the meeting also prioritised strengthening ties between Islamic scholars of the two countries, to enhance diplomatic relations in future, beside cooperating on areas like trade, education and healthcare.
Following the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in 2021, Bangladesh government (now dismantled), maintained its distance and refused to give Taliban any diplomatic recognition. Rather, it exercised caution — monitoring and countering the celebratory reactions of Islamists on social media who hailed it as a ‘triumph of Islam’. Even before the takeover, many Bangladeshi Islamist radicals were arrested by security authorities who were caught attempting to join the Taliban in Afghanistan by crossing India.
Why were Bangladesh’s Islamist influenced youth attracted to the Taliban? Because of Bangladesh’s own home-grown extremist groups that emerged in the 1980s-90s, notable being Harkat-ul Jihad Al Islami Bangladesh (HuJIB), and Jamaat-ul-Mujahedeen Bangladesh (JMB), established by fighters who joined the Taliban during Afghan jihad’s fight against Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. After these fighters returned to Bangladesh, they sought to bring the Taliban’s envision into reality—to establish an Islamic rule in Bangladesh, based on Shaira jurisprudence. These groups are also reported to have links with transnational terrorist organisations like al-Qaeda, al-Mujahideen and even Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). The early to mid 2000s was a period of rampant Islamic terror attacks by these groups, primary targets being NGOs and secular and cultural events that they deemed to be ‘un-Islamic’. However, most extremist organisations were checked via strict counterterrorism measures by 2007, although another wave of terrorist attacks surfaced between the period of 2013-2016.
The seven Islamic scholars who attended the meeting with Taliban included Khelafat Majlis chief Mamunul Haque, Nayeb-e-Amir (Pir of Madhupur) of Hefazat-e-Islam Bangladesh Abdul Hamid, Abdul Awal, Abdul Haque, Habibullah Mahmud Qasemi, Monir Hossain Qasemi and Mahbubur Rahman. Both Hefazat and Khelafat belong to the same Deobandi tradition and predominantly trained in Qawmi madrasas, that emphasises in Islamic scholarship independent of state regulated Alia system. In terms of core ideological beliefs, both lay strict emphasis on scriptural orthodoxy, rejection of Barelvi tradition, Sufi practices and Ahmadiya’s inclusion as Muslims and opposition to Western influences, especially on culture and education. In effect, both champions complete Islamisation of socio-cultural life.
Khelafat Majlis, founded in late 1989, emerged during the Bangladesh anti-Ershad movement. An Islamist political party, Khelafat, stated its goal of creating a national governance framework that is based on Qura, Sunnah and early Islamic Caliphates. Therefore, the party’s main target of mobilisation were Islamic scholars and aimed at creating a larger unity between these scholars and general Muslims against the secular system of governance who would push for Khelafat’s Political Islam. Its activities largely confined to anti-secular and blasphemy protests—be it organising a large mass demonstration from Dhaka to Ayodhya demanding for Babri Masjid restoration that was demolished in 1993, protest against installation of “Eternal Flame” at Suhrawardy Udyan, the anti-Taslima movement that led to her exile, the 2017 anti-Statue protest against the installation of the statue of Lady Justice from the Supreme Court premises in Dhaka.
In electoral politics, it had a minimal presence, entering into coalition with both BNP (that it opted out in 2021). Although not involved in overt terror activities, Khelafat’s hardline stance coupled with ideological leniency towards the Taliban were deemed threatening to Bangladesh’s secular principles. Its leaders, including chief Mamunul Haque, were arrested under Digital Security Act and Anti-Terrorism Act under the Awami League government for their participation in protests in anti-secular, anti-blasphemy protests, in alliance with Hefazat-e-Islam.
Unlike Khelafat Majlis, Hefazat-e-Islam is not a political party but an Islamist organisation, drawing on the same ideology and traditions like Khelafat. A coalition of more than 25,000 Qawmi madrasas across Bangladesh, Hefazat emerged in 2010 as a reaction to Awami League government’s Women Development Policy (2009) draft giving women equal inheritance rights. In 2013, Hefazat held a massive rally by blocking roads, commerce and regular activities. Known as the Shapla Chattar siege in Dhaka, Hefazat presented its 13-point demands that included introduction of blasphemy laws, gender segregation in public, declaring Ahmadiyyas as non-Muslims, and curbing every un-Islamic activity, to state a few.
Following Jamaat’s decline in Bangladesh under Awami League’s government, Hefazat’s emergence was seen as the rise of a new radical Islam in Bangladesh and this 2013 siege, a pivotal moment of radical Islamists urban mobilizational efforts directly challenging the secular state authority. Other notable protests are the anti-statue protest of 2017, anti-Modi protest in 2021, the latter turning violent and the death of 17 people. The leaders of Hefazat-e-Islam were meted the same treatment as its ally Khelafat, who provided logistical and ideological support to Hefazat’s programmes.
Following the July Uprising and the establishment of an interim government, both Hefazat-e-Islam and Khelafat Majlis regained their position and marked its active presence in the country. Detained leaders, including Hefazat chief were released, seen as part of the interim government’s reconciliation. However, thanks to both, and its allied Islamic parties, Bangladesh has also been witnessing a series of attacks, especially on the freedom of cultural expression.
Towhidi Janata, a loosely organised group of ‘agitated Muslims’ has been notorious to wreak havoc on events like Book Fair, Lalon Fakir Mela, Basant Utsav and women’s football match. Needless to say, Hefazat and Khelafat provide backing to Towhidi that has also been making headlines recently for increasing attacks on shrines, including the exhumation and burning of body of Nurul Pagla. While these Islamic scholars were in Kabul to meet the Taliban, its leaders and activities back home organised street rallies demanding for implementation of the July Charter and declaring Ahmadiyas to be non-Muslims and a Constitutional reform that is based on Sharia.
Khelafat and Hefazat, although not a terrorist organisation, are ideologically extremist whose beliefs go against Bangladesh’s core national principles. The Taliban meeting surely is their symbolic assertion — of Bangladesh’s Islamists envision of Talibanising the country. This meeting with the Taliban also points to a future normalisation of diplomatic relations between Bangladesh and Taliban’s Afghanistan, as the interim government seems to not object to such an informal meeting. A radicalised Bangladesh under the garb of Islamists pose a serious problem for South Asian neighbours, given these factions’ ideological links not just with Taliban, but also with Pakistan. The Global South, therefore, needs to keep an open eye to such ‘harmless’ meetings.
–IANS
Pakistan’s geopolitics seem to have reached a full circle with the continuous terror of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).Founded in 2007, the TTP is a jihadist militant organisation whose prime target is the Pakistani military. The extremist group envisions creating an Islamic caliphate state based on the Deobandi tradition in Pakistan. Besides, the TTP supported the Taliban’s efforts in Afghanistan. Banned by Pakistan in 2008, TTP is believed to have strong ties with al-Qaeda and Taliban in Afghanistan, and its militant attacks are mostly concentrated in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, bordering Afghanistan.
Following the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in 2021, TTP’s activities resumed, and attacks intensified, adding to Pakistan’s own internal terror attacks. At the same time, Pakistan’s state-sponsored terror groups continue their cross-border terrorism, especially in India. The recent military operation by Pakistan in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa that killed 17 TTP militants disclosed a shocking report: one of the militants killed has been identified as a Bangladeshi national. Bangladesh media reported that the slain militant’s family had no idea of his militant background, who claimed to have moved to Dubai to earn a living. However, as per police intelligence, the Bangladeshi militant moved to Afghanistan.
Pakistani authorities reported to have hounded two or three Bangladeshi militants in their earlier operations, while these men allegedly went to Afghanistan on the pretext of religious work, where they later joined an extremist terrorist organisation. This is, however, not a lone case. In April, a 23-year-old Bangladeshi national, Ahmed Zubair, reported to be a member of Tehreek-e-Taliban, was among the 54 militants killed by Pakistan’s military forces. At least eight Bangladeshi nationals were also reported to have migrated to Afghanistan to join the TTP. The Bangladeshi digital platform also stated that Bangladesh’s own security intelligence remains oblivious to TTP’s outreach in Bangladesh, and if any camps are operating inside the country presently. Again, two individuals—33-year-old Ahmed Faisal and 49-year-old Shamin Mahfuz—were arrested in Bangladesh in July for their alleged TTP links.
It should be noted that Mahfuz is a former leader of Jamaat-ul-Mujahedeen Bangladesh (JMB), and later founded Jama’atul Ansar Fil Hindal Sharqiya in 2019. Both individuals were also previously detained on multiple terrorism charges. From Faisal’s confession, it came to light that most of these Bangladeshi-national militants have moved to Afghanistan either via Saudi Arabia or via Pakistan to join the TTP. Mostly youth, these militants seek to establish an Islamic caliphate worldwide based on the Sharia. During this arrest, it was also learned that four Bangladeshi nationals who joined the TTP were killed on the Afghan-Pakistan border, while 25 more were preparing to leave Bangladesh to join jihad.
The confession also shed light on one Imran Haider, a senior TTP figure, as being the central figure behind the online indoctrination of Bangladeshi youth to recruit them to the TTP. Around the same time, 36 Bangladeshi nationals were reportedly detained in Malaysia for their alleged involvement in a “radical militant movement”. However, Bangladesh’s home advisor downplayed this and denied their extremist links. Since last year, South Asian geopolitics has gone through an unpredictable arc with the fall of Sheikh Hasina in Bangladesh following the July Uprising. On one hand, the interim government in Bangladesh pivoted to Pakistan, boosting bilateral ties—including trade, education, defence and intelligence sharing, while maintaining a deliberate distance with India, Bangladesh’s oldest and long-standing regional partner.
On the other hand, Bangladesh witnessed a rapid surge of Islamist groups, so long sidelined and suppressed via counterterrorism efforts of the Awami League government. Transnational extremist groups like Hizb-ut Tahrir (banned in 2009) made their presence felt in the country, notably for allegedly organising a procession by students in Dhaka under the banner of ‘Conscious Teachers and Students’, demanding the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate system in Bangladesh in October last year and the ‘March to Khilafat’ rally this March. Muhammad Yunus has also appointed individuals associated with Hizb-ut Tahrir in his interim government, sparking controversy in the political scenario.
Moreover, leaders and associates of groups like Hefazat-e-Islam, Ansarulla Bangla Team and Khelafat Majlis—arrested for their extremist links were also released under the interim government, who have now resumed their hate propaganda, to push for the creation of an Islamic state in Bangladesh based on Sharia law. These developments raise concerns about the resurrection of Islamist extremism in Bangladesh, given its history. Those from Bangladesh joined the Taliban to fight against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, returned to their homeland in the 1980s and 90s and established extremist organisations, such as Harkat-ul Jihad Al Islami Bangladesh (HuJIB), and Jamaat-ul-Mujahedeen Bangladesh (JMB).
Needless to say, these groups not only had ideological links with the Taliban but also received logistical support and training from al-Qaeda and Pakistan-based Laskhar-e-Taiba (LeT), and their terror operations in Bangladesh were aimed at creating a Taliban-like establishment in the country. While their activities were crippled due to counterterrorism measures by 2007, Bangladesh remained under periodic terror attacks, witnessing a surge from 2013-2016. The political changes in Bangladesh following Hasina’s deposition further strengthen concerns of Islamist extremists’ comeback in the country, as evident from the above-stated reports.
The recent visit of seven Islamic clerics, including the Khelafat Majlis chief and Nayeb-e-Amir (Pir of Madhupur) of Hefazat-e-Islam, to Afghanistan on the invitation of the Taliban should be viewed with the same caution as the rising trend of militancy in Bangladesh. These groups share the same ideological orientation—Deobandi school of Islam—as that of the Taliban and hailed the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan as a “triumph of Islam”. While not extremist groups themselves, these parties’ ideological inclination to the Taliban and their own hardline stance on socio-cultural-political life signal a possible convergence of interests between these organisations and foreign-linked militant ones. Nevertheless, Bangladesh’s Anti-Terrorism Unit’s additional inspector general claims that there is no militant activity in Bangladesh while simultaneously stating that future militant activity cannot be ruled out either. With the election around the corner and Bangladesh’s fragile state of democracy, this rise of militancy in Bangladesh now poses the greatest security risk, not just for Dhaka but also for South Asia as a whole.One can only hope that Bangladesh’s law enforcement forces to deal with militant trends seriously without having to resort to denial. Otherwise, it would not be long before Bangladesh becomes the second Pakistan.
–IANS
It has been more than a year since the interim government in Bangladesh came into being under the leadership of Muhammad Yunus, and the country has gone through a political reset, both internally as well as in its foreign policy. Internally, the largest political party — the Awami League — and its affiliates are banned, Islamists have revived, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s legacy downplayed and even attacked, and the history of the 1971 Liberation War is up for debate. Post-Sheikh Hasina Bangladesh, hailed as the “new” Bangladesh, has also been wrought with violence of all kinds — communal, ethnic, gender, mob, and political. Inevitably, the country’s law and order is in a constant state of compromise. However, the interim government, whose prime responsibility behind its establishment was to bring the country’s stability back on track, dodged all accountability via two ways — denial and labelling it a “conspiracy” of “outside influence”.
The ostracisation of Awami League was predictable, considering Yunus’s personal animosity with Sheikh Hasina. This year, therefore, witnessed the interim government, using all means — political, judicial and administrative — to witch-hunt League loyalists and activists on one hand and create a political atmosphere where Bangladesh’s apparent newly-earned democracy is one without opposition.
Human Rights Watch, in May, reported that the interim government has risked Bangladesh’s fundamental freedoms via a series of legislative measures. In a recent report, HRW also accused the interim government of abusing the recently amended Anti-Terrorism Act to target and imprison thousands of political opponents, especially the alleged supporters of the now ousted Awami League, on dubious charges to shut down dissent. Indeed, the report rightly pointed this is not the path to democratic transition. Bangladesh’s own rights groups, too, have been critical of the interim government’s highhandedness—following the script of its predecessor that it claims to be so against, as it observed a disturbing rise in violations of human rights and crimes across Bangladesh under the interim government.
In its efforts to suppress the Awami League and positing itself opposite to everything it stood for, the interim government resorted to keeping a cold distance from its neighbour, India. Calling it a ‘balanced geopolitics’, the Yunus-led interim government and its supporters, including political leaders, manufactured a new narrative—that India is an ‘ally’ of Sheikh Hasina and the Awami League. Through shameless misconstruing of Indo-Bangladesh diplomatic relations, anti-Hasina forces are now competing against each other to appear as the guardians safeguarding Bangladesh’s democracy, one that the country’s so long lacked due to Hasina’s pro-India foreign policy tilt. While political parties, especially opponents of the Awami League, have always used anti-India rhetoric as their election campaign, the same by the interim government reflects its ultimate defence mechanism when faced with accountability.
The Chief Advisor ventured to create a fearmongering attitude among Bangladeshis that India’s ‘hegemony’ is the reason behind its own present political crisis. Oftentimes, especially when the inefficiency of law enforcement forces has been questioned, as in the case of the February Bulldozer Procession of 32 Dhanmondi, the interim government put the blame on “external forces” for its internal crisis. His close associates, along with other advisors of the interim government, too, made provocative remarks targeting India’s border security. Communal attacks have witnessed a surge in Bangladesh since the fall of Hasina. When India raised concern about this worrying trend, the interim government quickly dismissed it as political attacks, and not communal, and even called the reports “exaggerated”. It echoed the same about reports of communal attacks by the Bangladesh Hindu Buddhist Christian Unity Council, calling it “misleading” and “false”.
In a recent interview with a US journalist, Yunus took yet another anti-India jibe, calling anti-Hindu violence in Bangladesh “fake news”, one that is a “speciality of India”, whereby Bangladesh remains a “beacon of religious harmony”. This is notwithstanding the US Religious Freedom report that revealed the state of minorities in Bangladesh to be concerning.
Given the collective failure in providing security to Hindus during the celebration of their biggest religious festival, Durga Puja, last year, the same concerns were raised when the media reported a few cases of idol vandalism days before the onset of Puja this year. This year, the home advisor warned to take tough action against those involved in 793 Durga Puja pavilions for allegedly “hurting religious sentiments” and blamed the “neighbouring country” for having a connection behind the falsehood surrounding Durga Puja. Such statements by an advisor were noted to encourage communal violence and persecution of minority populations, minority Hindus being always under the radar of proving their nationalism. This year, at least 49 untoward incidents have taken place at puja mandaps across Bangladesh has been reported during Durga Puja.
The recent ethnic violence in Khagrachhari in Chittagong Hill Tracts, another pressing issue in Bangladesh, showed the systemic nature of violence in the hills, whereby miscreants continue to enjoy a culture of impunity under the interim government. Here too, the government was quick to put the blame on ‘fascist groups’ sheltered in the neighbouring country, who are being allowed to create conditions to destabilise Bangladesh. New Delhi’s response was calling a spade a spade—dismissing the allegation as bizarre and pointing to the interim government’s tendency to shift blame elsewhere to camouflage its own inefficiency in maintaining law and order.
To cover up its failure, despite a year in power, the interim government has been shifting the blame game on India. This is not only an insult to the conscience of Bangladeshis but also to their very democratic aspiration. Through the manufactured narrative of “conspiracy of external force to destabilise Bangladesh”, the interim government is deliberately delaying the democratic transition that its people are desperately awaiting.
Even though India has made it clear that it awaits a smooth, inclusive, just democratic transition in Bangladesh, where New Delhi is willing to work with any government that comes to power (as bilateral relations should be), the interim government is repeatedly resorting to arrogant statements to hold onto the chair. One can only hope for the national election to resolve this deliberate deadlock by the interim government, so that bilateral ties reach new heights in the near future.
–IANS
Bangladesh’s ultimate goal of forming an Islamic Revolutionary Army goes beyond internal consolidation and aims to position the country as a strategic outpost for transnational jihadist operations – serving Pakistan’s geopolitical interests and silencing secular voices, a report cited on Wednesday. It mentioned that by forging alliances with Islamist elements and portraying them as “grassroots defenders”, the regime led by Muhammad Yunus seeks to weaken the Bangladesh Army – the last standing national institution capable of resisting radical influence.
“A grave and coordinated conspiracy is unfolding within Bangladesh. Behind the façade of political rhetoric and ‘anti-discrimination’ activism, the regime of Muhammad Yunus has embarked on a project that could ignite the most serious security crisis in South Asia since the rise of the Taliban,” a report in leading Bangladeshi outlet ‘Blitz’ has detailed. Citing multiple sources – including regime insiders, social media disclosures, and intelligence leaks- the report indicated that an Islamic Revolutionary Army (IRA) is being formed to supplant the Bangladesh Army with an ideologically driven militia loyal to Yunus and his Islamist allies.
“This so-called ‘Islamic Revolutionary Army’ is not a mere political stunt or student enthusiasm. It represents a dangerous convergence of radical Islamism, foreign intelligence collusion, and calculated efforts to militarise civilian networks. The consequences, if unchecked, could transform Bangladesh from a moderate Muslim democracy into a launchpad for jihadist expansion across South Asia,” it stressed. According to the report, in a stunning revelation on his social media platform earlier this week, Asif Mahmud Shojib Bhuyain – “an influential as well as controversial” advisor to the Yunus regime – publicly announced the recruitment and training of 8,850 individuals across seven training centres in Bangladesh.
He outlined the programme, stating that trainees would undergo martial arts, judo, taekwondo, and firearms instruction. Hours after the post, the screenshots went viral before disappearing. Citing sources within Dhaka, the report confirmed that this marked only the first phase of a larger plan with five successive batches of 8,850 recruits each set to complete training by January 2026. “The recruitment process reportedly includes written, viva, and physical tests — all overseen by retired Bangladeshi officers with strong pro-Pakistan leanings, alongside covert representatives of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and Turkey’s Milli İstihbarat Teskilati (MIT),” it highlighted.
“Bangladesh’s civil society, its remaining independent journalists, and the patriotic factions within the military must act before it is too late. Once a revolutionary army rooted in ideology replaces a professional army bound by the constitution, Bangladesh will no longer be a sovereign republic – it will be a caliphate in disguise,” the report noted.
–IANS
– Arun Anand
The interim government, which has been in power for over a year, is now grappling with a credibility crisis as political parties question its neutrality and its ability to ensure free and fair elections in the upcoming national polls scheduled for February.
Formed under the leadership of Muhammad Yunus following Sheikh Hasina’s ouster last year, the interim administration was projected as a corrective force meant to dismantle the remnants of authoritarianism in the country. Its key responsibilities were to restore stability, implement crucial reforms, and oversee a transparent democratic transition. Yet, it has failed on all these fronts. The initial perception of the interim government as a righteous alternative has eroded, exposing an even deeper democratic deficit than before.
Recently, six international human rights organisations have addressed a letter to Muhammad Yunus, the interim government’s chief advisor, urging his government to take concrete measures to prevent further human rights violations and to advance reforms process to uphold the country’s human rights. Two pressing issues addressed in the letter deserve our attention, for these highlight the failures of the interim government—the arbitrary arrests and detentions of journalists and politically motivated attacks on Awami League members.
Press freedom has been a longstanding concern in Bangladesh, partly due to the country being under prolonged military rule and the failure to reforming media even after restoration of civilian government in 1990. It is well established that press faced unprecedented censorship previously whereby any criticism against the government in power has been stifled. While the media in Bangladesh hoped to see a new dawn of freedom after 2024 July Uprising, the reality, however, remains concerning. In an eerily similar way like its predecessor, the interim government continues to target journalists in Bangladesh, via harassment, intimidation, physical attack (including murder) and detention.
Labelling any voice of dissent and criticism as “collaborators of fascist Awami League government” has become the interim government’s most used tool of repressing media freedom. The mob attack on speakers inside Dhaka Reporters’ Unity, and detention of 16, including journalist Monjurul Alam Panna under anti-Terrorism Act has been widely criticised as Bangladesh’s growing culture of intimidation and impunity since the past year.
According to the World Freedom Index, Bangladesh’s press freedom was classified as “very serious”, noting that over 130 journalists have been subjected to ‘unfounded judicial proceedings’, especially on charges of ‘crimes against humanity’ and ‘murder’. As per Rights and Risks Analysis Group (RRAG) report, in the first eight months of Yunus-led interim government, about 640 journalists have been targeted, which includes 182 journalists being filed under criminal cases, 206 journalists being filed under acts of violence, and cancellation of press accreditation of 167 journalists.
The first half of this year witnessed 266 journalists being implicated in cases related to July Uprising, and about 50 media organisations in the country being impacted on the same accusation. Dhaka-based Human Rights Support Society (HRSS) also reported the ‘alarming’ human rights situation in Bangladesh, noting that 340 journalists have been victims of murder. Human Rights Watch in its October report, too, accused the interim government of abusing recent amended Anti-Terrorism Act to target political opponents, including academics and journalists, and stuff them in prisons.
Bangladeshi Journalists in International Media (BJIM) also claimed that attacks on journalists reported in different districts allegedly involve local miscreants and even law enforcement agencies while the administration has taken no visible steps yet. The declining state of press freedom in Bangladesh remains a challenge to the country’s democratic transition.
For the interim government, the journalists are not the only opponents slapped with terrorism charges. The main target of its wrath has been members and loyalists of the Awami League.
Post-Hasina Bangladesh witnessed a paradigm shift of its historical narrative—from Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s legacy to the history of Liberation War itself. Moreover, moments after Hasina fled Bangladesh, the country succumbed to a compromised law and order situation, where mobocracy emerged as new normal. Instead of restoring stability, the interim government exhausted all its efforts in ostracizing Awami League. From army, judiciary and police force, educational institutions, all League loyalists were first replaced or forced to resign.
The government also became a bystander to the surge in mob attacks on those alleged to be League loyalists (including, the religious minorities), justifying these attacks as “political”. Every act of vandalism, including the despicable demolition of 32 Dhanmondi, was also labelled as “act of provocation” by outsiders. Instead of arresting the perpetrators, the interim government launched Operation Devil Hunt, arresting as many as 18,384 people across Bangladesh, mostly those affiliated with the Awami League and Chhatra and Jubo League.
This witch-hunt started much before Awami League was officially banned this May following the amendment of Anti-Terrorism Law. The ban received criticisms from international rights organisations—Human Rights Watch, United Nations and Amnesty International—as a partisan act that risk repressing political pluralism which also undermine the country’s reform process.
The Human Rights Watch deputy Asia director accused the interim government of being more stuck on juggling an unreformed security sector, violent religious hardliners and political groups seeking vengeance on Hasina supporters than protecting the rights of Bangladeshis. The report also noted the interim government’s pattern of mass arrests and arbitrary detention of hundreds of League supporters misusing its amended Anti-Terrorism Law, slapping them with baseless charges and denying the detainees with proper medical care and bail.
The Freedom House reported that while the interim government lifted restrictions on major political parties that opposed the Awami League, restrictions increased on former ruling party. Leaders of Awami League were arrested on alleged crimes based on skewed evidence. The ban on the party, the cancellation of its party registration at the Election Commission along with the continues witch-hunting on League and its allies via amendment of legislative measures have not only hindered the activities of Awami League but also identified as the interim government undermining fundamental freedoms.
Notwithstanding Yunus and his other adviser’s persistent denial of worrying human rights track, rights organisations—both national as well as international—have been noting the hypocrisy of following the same ‘fascist’ path against which it was established in the first place. It is now evident that Muhammad Yunus is only using its political powers to seek political vendetta against Awami League and Sheikh Hasina, his old opponents.
Now with just the players change, democracy is taking a backseat, while mobocracy, culture of extortion, religious extremism and political violence—all sustained via the interim government’s human rights violations—are ruling Bangladesh’s political culture. Amidst this, the chances of a free and fair election, a just and inclusive democratic transition feel slim.
The partition of India has been described by historians as a great misfortune of human civilization. In his book ‘Guilty Man of Partition of India’, Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia argues that the leaders responsible for the partition of India were arrogant, conceited and ambitious. South Asia is still reeling from the aftermath of partition. Bengali Muslims, who accepted Pakistan as Muslims, launched a revolution under the leadership of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman to create Bangladesh for their language, culture and identity. At that time, Pakistan was widely supported and assisted by America and China. India, which was defeated by China in 1962, was isolated from China and America after defeating Pakistan in 1965. Pakistan’s military rulers did not spare any brutality to suppress the movement led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Three million Bengalis were martyred in the eight-month movement. Pakistani soldiers raped three hundred thousand Bengali women to change the Bengali language.
In the history of human civilization, no military force in the world has shown such ruthlessness and brutality. Due to the growing movement, India was forced to feed the Bengali refugees. In the 70s, India received the excellent leadership of Indira Gandhi. Indira Gandhi was a skilled player in diplomacy. She mobilized the Indian army to support the Mukti Bahini soldiers. At that difficult juncture in history, America and China did not hesitate to threaten India.
US President Nixon did not just advocate for Pakistan but also sent a warship with nuclear capabilities to the Bay of Bengal. Similarly, China also used the word war to invade India from the Himalayan region. That was a difficult situation for Indira Gandhi. She traveled to the Soviet Union and succeeded in signing a peace treaty with the Soviet Union in 1971. According to the terms of the treaty, the clause on the invasion of India stated that Soviet Russia would fight alongside India. Due to the aftermath of the peace treaty with Soviet Russia, American pressure and Chinese threats became self-evident. In other words, Indira Gandhi succeeded in becoming the midwife of Bangladesh. Bangladesh was born on the basis of culture. The song written by Rabindranath Tagore became the national anthem of Bangladesh.
In Bangladesh, which was built on the concept of a secular and inclusive society, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was martyred along with his family in 1975 after being targeted by extremists. Sheikh Hasina was able to save her life because she was in Germany. Over time, she took refuge in India. After 1975, it seems that the rule was in the hands of extremists for a long time. Bangladeshi society is divided into two parts, the Ashraf and the Atarf. The Ashraf community has a large population and this community seems to support inclusiveness and secularism, while the Atarf seems to stand in favor of Islamization and Sharia law. After 1975, the Jamdani rebellion was again in favor of secularism in 1989. In other words, Bengali nationalism seems to have become strong again and managed to hold power for a long time. However, from 2001 to 2006, extremist forces like the BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami succeeded in making Bangladesh a victim of backwardness.
From 2006 to 2008, the nationalist movement in Bangladesh, especially under the leadership of Sheikh Hasina’s party, became successful. Bangladesh began to draw up a roadmap for modernization. In 2012, the movement took shape, taking the decision to transform Bangladesh’s economy under the leadership of Sheikh Hasina. With the arrival of Sheikh Hasina, there was a major change in foreign policy. Resolving the border issue with India was a major success of Bangladesh’s foreign policy. Due to Sheikh Hasina’s strong leadership, Bangladesh became one of the fastest growing economies in South Asia. By importing raw materials from India, Bangladesh succeeded in making a leap in the textile sector in Europe and America.
Bangladesh was able to benefit more from the heat and heat of globalization and open economy. Bangladesh’s modernization journey was not digestible even by America. Due to the geopolitical structure of Bangladesh, America wanted to keep its footprint in Bangladesh, Saint Martin Island. The American base campus on Saint Martin Island was sponsored by the American goal of observing Chinese activities in Myanmar. Sheikh Hasina did not have American conditions. Against this background, an uprising began in Bangladesh with the alliance of America and Pakistan and the goodwill of China. This uprising turned into an explosion. Sheikh Hasina’s working style was also different. Hasina also abused her power to rein in the radicals and suppress the opposition. On August 5, 2024, Sheikh Hasina managed to escape from Bangladesh and took refuge in India.
During this long period, the Hindu community of Bangladesh became a scapegoat. The Hindu community had the largest investment in Bangladesh’s textiles. After the Hindu community became the target of radicalism, the textile system was completely destroyed. During the leadership of Bangladesh under Nobel Prize winner Mohammad Yunus, the alliance between Bangladesh and Pakistan seems to have fully increased. Recently, a Bangladeshi court has sentenced Sheikh Hasina to death, and Bangladesh seems to have started diplomatic efforts to pressure India to extradite Sheikh Hasina, who has taken refuge in India.
Bangladesh’s security advisor, who is visiting India, has placed Indian security advisor Ajit Doval in Bangladesh’s favor. Although there is an extradition treaty between India and Bangladesh, its articles 6 and 7 state that the extradition treaty will not be applicable to political charges. Despite the deep influence of the Awami League in Bangladesh, there is silence in civil society due to the rampant extremism. Experts believe that the Hindu community will again be targeted by terrorists in the region where Sheikh Hasina was installed as the protector of the one crore Hindu community, which has had a great impact on the lives of the people of Bangladesh. Experts believe that Bangladesh may become like Afghanistan in the region where the chemistry between Bangladesh and Pakistan has dissolved.
In this sense, international powers and human rights activists have appealed to India not to extradite Sheikh Hasina. It does not seem appropriate to extradite Sheikh Hasina on the basis of democratic values. Since Bengali society is strong in terms of civilization, culture and literature, Bangladeshi society has the ability to defeat extremism. It can be estimated that the Awami League will regain power in the region where democracy is established in Bangladesh. In this sense, it does not seem appropriate to stand under any diplomatic pressure, keeping in mind the broader interests of South Asia. Modi should consider the example of Indira Gandhi and pursue a strategic policy with Bangladesh.
Muhammad Yunus, widely recognised as the founder of Bangladesh’s conglomerate Grameen Bank is set to come under the cloud, over ‘revelations’ of decades-old documents by a former intelligence officer, which claims that the microcredit model was actually a university research program and it was subsequently hijacked by the Nobel Laureate and “projected as his own”.
Ex-Bangladeshi intel officer Aminul Hoque Polash claims to have unearthed a series of archival documents from 1976-1983 that fundamentally challenge Muhammad Yunus’s credentials of being the founder of the Grameen Bank, the institution that was instrumental in winning him the Nobel Peace Prize in 2006.
Aminul Hoque Polash served ten years in the National Security Intelligence (NSI) and later as a diplomat, and is currently living in exile. He claims that he was forced to leave the country because of was singled out and targeted for persecution by the Yunus regime.
The documents, he claims, show that the microcredit model was actually a university research project created by junior researchers, and Yunus later hijacked it, and the papers also have his signature.
Notably, the model of Grameen Bank, under which small loans (micro-credit) are disbursed to impoverished families without any collateral, became so popular that it was replicated the world over, including some cities in the US and Europe.
The documents accessed by IANS show that the microcredit project originated at Chittagong University, where Muhammad Yunus served as a professor.
“The Rural Economics Programme (REP) was launched in 1976 with a Ford Foundation grant, and the first micro-lending experiment in Jobra village was an action-research project run by research scholars named Shapan Adnan, Nasiruddin and H.I. Latifee. Yunus was only assigned the task of deep tubewell cooperative management,” it said.
It further claims that the Bangladesh Bank adopted the microfinance model and planned a nationwide rollout before Yunus joined.
Another letter dated June 6, 1983, shows the Ford Foundation writing to Chittagong University Vice-Chancellor, approving grants to the varsity for supporting its rural finance program.
The microcredit model, which initially started as a University program in 1976, eventually turned into a national scheme after being authorised by government ordinance to work as an independent bank.
Yunus became its Project Director and, after the 1983 Grameen Bank Ordinance, assumed the role of Managing Director. By the 1990s, he acquired full control over the institution, which was allegedly developed with public funds.
The former intelligence officer, unrelenting in his attack on the Yunus regime, also goes on to claim that Bangladesh is witnessing a redux of what it saw during the 1970s.
Polash claims that the man who hijacked the famed microfinance model is now trying to usurp the state machinery, after taking over power illegally in 2024, and using it to erase obstacles, reward loyalists, and enrich his network.
“The same man who stole a rural research project now governs an entire country with the same appetite for capture,” he says with an alarming tone.
Citing multiple incidents of impropriety and misconduct, he claimed that prison sentences of criminals are being overturned, corruption cases are being withdrawn, and undue financial benefits are being extended to Grameen companies.
He also holds the Yunus regime accountable for aggressive nepotism in governance, disbursal of licences to his enterprises, tax exemption and other favours being extended to Grameen Bank.
“The same man who stole a rural research project now governs an entire country with the same appetite for capture,” he says in an alarming tone.
–IANS
An investigative report published by Blitz, a leading Bangladesh weekly, has alleged that Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus’s global ‘Grameen’ network has long-standing connections with individuals identified by Western intelligence agencies as financiers of Osama bin Laden and the Al Qaeda network. The report, authored by Blitz editor Salah Uddin Shoaib Choudhury, has called for an international inquiry into Yunus’s transnational financial partnerships.
According to the report, “For years, Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus has been celebrated across the world as a pioneer of microfinance and a champion of the poor. Yet behind this carefully polished global image lies a far darker reality — a web of connections linking Yunus’s sprawling ‘Grameen’ empire to individuals named by Western intelligence agencies as financiers of Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda.”
The report further adds, “In March 2003, The Wall Street Journal published a list of Al Qaeda donors based on CIA information, where the name of Mohammed Abdul Latif Jameel — a Saudi businessman and board member of Grameen-Jameel Microfinance — appeared prominently. The report noted that Jameel was one of the key funders of Osama bin Laden, the notorious mastermind behind the September 11 terrorist attacks.”
Online corporate records describe ‘Grameen-Jameel’ as a social business established in 2007 as a joint venture between the Grameen Foundation and Grow Well Limited, a subsidiary of the Abdul Latif Jameel Group. According to these records, the company’s mission is to “alleviate poverty in the Arab world” through partnerships with microfinance institutions, providing technical and financial support.”
It further adds, “On its LinkedIn page, Grameen-Jameel states that it was established in 2003 and incorporated in 2007 as a joint venture between Grameen Foundation and ALJ Foundation, a subsidiary of the Abdul Latif Jameel Group.”
“The company claims to be the first social business in the Middle East, North Africa (MENA), and Turkey devoted to expanding microfinance. As of December 2013, it facilitated more than USD 65 million in financing, reaching over 2.2 million clients through partner institutions across 10 countries in the MENA region and Turkey.”
According to the report, the company is incorporated in Cyprus and headquartered in Dubai’s International Humanitarian City. Its website is currently inactive, and its Facebook page has been suspiciously deactivated.
“Further strengthening the Grameen-Jameel connection is Zaher Al Munajjed, the Chairman of Grameen-Jameel Microfinance Ltd. Al Munajjed also serves as a senior advisor to Mohammed Abdul Latif Jameel, President of the ALJ Group in Saudi Arabia. With more than 25 years of international business experience, he has played a key role in developing vocational training and microfinance programs. A Harvard Business School alumnus and holder of a Master’s degree in French International Law, Al Munajjed is widely regarded as a major architect of microfinance expansion in the MENA and Turkish regions,” says the Blitz report.
The Jameel family’s controversial past
According to the Blitz report, Yousef Jameel — another prominent figure from the Jameel dynasty — was once notorious in London’s casino circles in the 1980s. According to the Daily Mail, he was widely known as a playboy, later becoming entangled in an international child abduction case.
Adding to the controversies, his name appears in Jeffrey Epstein’s notorious ‘Black Book’, which exposed networks tied to child exploitation and human trafficking. On July 21, 2004, Jameel and others filed an appeal with the British Court of Appeal following the publication of a Sunday Times report titled ‘Car tycoon ‘linked’ to Bin Laden’ on June 8, 2003. The report claimed that Jameel had been sued by the families of the victims of the 9/11 attacks.
On February 3, 2005, Dow Jones & Co., the parent of The Wall Street Journal, filed its own appeal against Yousef Abdul Latif Jameel.
In a landmark ruling on October 11, 2006, the highest court in Britain sided with The Wall Street Journal, affirming the importance of investigative journalism. The ruling highlighted that the article was published as part of a legitimate public-interest inquiry into terror financing.
The court record stated:
“Above the article and headline were photographs of the claimant, Mr Jameel, his company Hartwell PLC, and the Twin Towers burning on 11 September 2001, with the following words: ‘Accused: Yousef Jameel’s family firm bought the British car dealer Hartwell in 1990. Now he is alleged to have helped fund training for the terrorists who carried out the September 11 attacks’.”
Despite these allegations, Jameel has long been regarded as a successful entrepreneur and “generous philanthropist”. He has contributed significant funding to programs at MIT aimed at reducing poverty and improving water and food security. For his philanthropic commitments and contributions to arts and culture in the United Kingdom, Mohammed Abdul Latif Jameel received an honorary knighthood from Queen Elizabeth II. The honour was announced by the British Embassy in Riyadh,” says the Blitz report.
“However, The Guardian later reported that a group of wealthy Saudi businessmen — including individuals close to Jameel — were suing for libel in the High Court over allegations that they may have financed Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda network. They chose London because of its reputation as a claimant-friendly environment for defamation cases,” mentions the Blitz report.
Suspicious connections of Grameen
The Blitz report has also mentioned the allegations linking Grameen entities to the Muslim Brotherhood, raising further concerns about Yunus’s global partnerships.
“Even more disturbing are reports indicating sinister links between Grameen Bank and illegal human organ traders. Individuals unable to repay their loans were allegedly coerced into selling their organs to settle debts,” says the Blitz report.
–IANS
The 2024 July Uprising that ended Sheikh Hasina’s 15-year political tenure transformed Bangladesh’s political landscape. With anti-Hasina forces grabbing power, the political culture shifted and Bangladesh’s foreign policy took a spin as its old friend India came to be seen as an enemy overnight.
Anti-India sentiment was present in Bangladesh even during Hasina’s tenure, especially nurtured by radical Islamists and Pakistan apologists. The reason was heightened bilateral ties reached between India and Bangladesh on multifaceted areas — from cultural diplomacy to reaching understanding on water and land sharing, to new connectivity projects – port, buses and railway – for economic cooperation to greater border security, thanks to joint counter-terrorism measures.
It was also the time Bangladesh’s relations with Pakistan witnessed a thaw as under International Crimes Tribunal, war criminals mostly belonging to Jamaat-e-Islami who collaborated with Pakistan Army during 1971 Liberation War, were given death sentences and life imprisonment on charges of war crimes.
In the domestic sphere, Hasina’s hard dealing of new terrorist offshoots, witnessed during 2013-17, aggravated radical Islamists who openly advocated against Bangladesh being a constitutionally secular state (an ideological stand of Awami League party). All these factors culminated in shaping a new narrative — Hasina “selling” Bangladesh’s democracy to New Delhi.
Soon after the January 2024 election where Sheikh Hasina faced a decisive win, her political opponents doubled down on anti-India propaganda. First, they criticised New Delhi for congratulating Hasina at a time western countries raised concern over Bangladesh’s free and fair election. Then they blamed New Delhi for meddling in Dhaka’s internal affairs, alleging Narendra Modi government to have had a hand behind Hasina’s victory in 12th parliamentary election. All these because New Delhi maintained a non-interventionist approach to any country’s domestic politics, national election being one of them. Thus started the ‘India Out’ campaign in Bangladesh, mirroring Maldives’ drive earlier in 2023. Nevertheless, this did not affect bilateral ties in any way and the campaign soon died because of low popularity.
After Hasina’s deposition, the interim government’s foreign policy recalibration underwent a paradigm shift — moving closer to erstwhile coloniser Pakistan while maintaining a cold distance with New Delhi. The Chief Advisor Muhammad Yunus himself drew attention on many occasions for his provocative speeches antagonising New Delhi — from calling Bangladesh as the only guardian of Bay of Bengal for India’s “landlocked” northeast states during his China visit in March to claiming that New Delhi “disliked” or “disapproved” of student protest in Bangladesh that ousted Hasina and insisting at the UNGA in September that SAARC is nearly defunct because of “politics of one country” (indirectly referring to India).
In this blame game, Yunus conveniently avoided the core issue of SAARC being defunct — the Pakistan-sponsored terrorist attack in India’s Uri that undermined regional cooperation and led to cancellation of 19th SAARC Summit in Islamabad and boycott by neighbouring countries.
India, during the July Uprising, maintained diplomatic communication with Dhaka where it “observed developments closely”. Moreover, New Delhi’s focus during the unrest was to ensure security of Indian nationals, especially students, in Bangladesh and taking measures to avoid any breaches of border security.
It is common knowledge how post-Hasina, Bangladesh splurged into a deep law and order crisis, as violence of all kinds — gender, communal, ethnic, political — engulfed the country.
The consistent security lapse has created deep public distrust towards Bangladesh’s law enforcement forces. The rise in mob violence and rampant acts of vandalism of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s murals went unchecked and unnoticed by the interim government. The demolition of Mujib’s private residence -32 Dhanmondi – in February, however, pulled widespread criticism from both within and outside Bangladesh.
Instead of taking accountability for its lacklustre attitude towards restoring law and order, the interim government pointed the finger at New Delhi, for “giving platform” to Sheikh Hasina to give speeches. In fact, this has been the persistent narrative of the interim government, every time it was questioned of lawlessness within the country, from violence in Gopalganj to Chittagong Hill Tract. The justification was always the same — Sheikh Hasina attempting to destabilise Bangladesh “with foreign help”, hinting at New Delhi.
Recently, Bangladesh registered a protest against India for Hasina’s interviews published in Indian and foreign news outlets, alleging India to allow Hasina to make “hate speeches” that risk destabilising Bangladesh. India has reiterated that Hasina’s speeches are not New Delhi’s diplomatic position but one made in her personal capacity. This is because India is a democracy where the press is not controlled, unlike Bangladesh that is going through a democracy deficit.
Moreover, Dhaka foreign advisor recently called India Foreign Secretary’s remarks on hoping to see a “free, fair and inclusive election” in Bangladesh as “completely unwarranted”, claiming the national election as Dhaka’s “internal matter” and hence “not Delhi’s concern”. Bizarrely, Dhaka has been appreciative of Western countries who too expressed hope to see a free and fair election in Bangladesh. The political climate in Bangladesh has turned more volatile because it has banned Awami League from contesting elections, triggering counter protests by party activists and supporters in the nation. The usual jibe of “foreign force destabilising Bangladesh” continues.
Bilateral ties between India and Bangladesh strained not because New Delhi turned its back but because Dhaka, under the interim government, has been weaponizing anti-India sentiment to hide its inefficiency.
In a recent attack on Awami League office in Gulistan, the video of miscreants vandalising a sculpture depicting Pakistan’s surrender to India during 1971 Liberation War became viral. It showed a man saying that if the image remained intact, League’s allies “might return and claim their roles”. Much like Pakistan, the interim government’s attempt at historical revisionism, especially of India’s role in the 1971 Liberation War, through textbook revision is no secret now.
With Bangladesh’s national election scheduled for February 2026, the National Citizen Party (NCP) has displayed its unwillingness for polls without securing complete impunity for its political coup during last year’s July uprising. The actions and remarks of leaders in the NCP exposed the party’s growing insecurity in the political game.
Its consistent demand for electoral reform — to have national elections based on proportional representation (also favoured by Islamist parties) — reflect its awareness of lack of popular support.
The optimism of the July Uprising quickly faded as witnessed in the growing political chaos following the exit of former Bangladesh’s Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina which revealed the country’s democracy deficit.
Now with the Bangladesh Election Commission (EC) denying the ‘shapla’ symbol to NCP, the party’s ego is shattered, as members are threatening to delay the election if they are denied its electoral symbol. NCP is now open to both the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and the radical Islamist party Jamaat-e-Islami for political alliances, notwithstanding the war of words it has been engaging in with both and presenting itself before Bangladesh as the ‘new’ alternative. Truly, NCP’s ‘revolutionary’ emergence has been short-lived and is perhaps now reaching its endgame.
Given the political vacuum as a result of Hasina’s ousting and political ostracisation of Awami League – that remains as Bangladesh’s largest political party – the country witnessed two political developments. This includes the resurgence of Islamists on the political stage and the growing fissures between former allies BNP and Jamaat.
A new political platform was established in September last year known as the Jatiyo Nagorik Committee (National Student Committee), by prominent student leaders of the July Uprising. The intent behind the formation of this platform was to replace the ‘existing fascist political settlement’ with a ‘democratic one’ and become the ideological vanguard of the July Uprising.
The committee felt that only through the establishment of a new political party, the political aspiration of the July Uprising can be achieved. This paved the way for the establishment of a student-led political party — Jatiyo Nagorik Party (National Citizen Party) — that announced its formation on February 28, 2025 with a centrist and pluralist ideological approach that aims to establish a “second republic” in Bangladesh. It also announced its expectation to contest for all 300 seats in the national (Jatiya Sangsad) election.
Just six months within this year, a total of 32 NCP leaders resigned from the party citing internal conflict, misconduct and dissatisfaction with leadership. Moreover, its NCP’s student wing — Bangladesh Gonotantrik Chhatra Sangsad (BGCS) — faced heavy defeats and failed to secure central posts in recent student union elections of Dhaka, Jahangirnagar, Chattogram and Rajshahi University. The surveys on voter preference since early this year also denote the same trend.
A nationwide survey by Innovision Consulting held this March reported that despite appeal among young voters, the voters’ preference for NCP stands at an overall five per cent. Another survey by the BRAC Institute of Governance and Development (BIGD) in July showed only a marginal 2.8 per cent increase from two. The latest People’s Election Pulse Survey in September, preference for NCP stands at 4.9 per cent. Surprisingly, NCP’s main rival, Awami League, despite the ban, continues to enjoy a higher voters’ preference percentage than the NCP as per these surveys.
NCP drew controversies even before its launch. The selection of the initial 10 core members of the NCP was criticised for its lack of inclusivity and lacking a democratic process. Moreover, the inclusion of leaders from the Jatiyo Nagorik Committee having past ties with Jamaat’s student wing Islami Chhatra Shibir in the party created another round of uproar, leading to their voluntary withdrawal. Another controversy followed when a recognised activist of LGBTQ community was reported to secure a position in the party’s central committee, sparking debate and dissatisfaction even among NCP leaders, eventually leading to the member’s exclusion. Quite early on, the new party’s approach to present an alternative as the most inclusive party and its own internal contradictions reflected NCP’s own ideological challenges.
Led by students under the banner of Students Against Discrimination (SAD), the 2024 July Uprising was popularised as Bangladesh’s ‘second liberation’. The movement — largely composed of anti-Hasina forces — championed for an inclusive, plural, just and democratic Bangladesh. Thus, Bangladesh’s political landscape not only changed after August 5 2024, but also initiated a new debate on which direction the country’s politics should head.
The interim government was established on August 8, just days after Hasina fled the country. The main coordinators of the Students Against Discrimination (SAD) invited Muhammad Yunus to head the interim government as the Chief Advisor. Three prominent leaders of SAD — Nahid Islam, Mahfuj Alam and Asif Muhammad — also became advisors in the interim government representing students. Thus, SAD played a significant role in legitimising Yunus’ administration, installing it the responsibility of implementing reforms and conducting a free and fair election.
Amidst anticipation of who will be part of the NCP’s central leadership, Nahid Islam resigned from its advisory position in the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting to become the chief convenor of the party. Islam’s joining the NCP was not viewed favourably by other political parties who accused the interim government of helping for the establishment of a ‘King’s Party’ under its schemes of endless reforms rather than announcing a clear election roadmap. NCP’s formation and the Chief Advisor Yunus’s soft spot for the student political party, also put its own neutrality in question. Political parties like Gono Odhikar Forum and the BNP strongly demanded for resignation of student advisors Mahfuj Alam and Asif Muhammad alleging them as NCP loyalists.
Bangladesh’s political culture rooted violence, corruption and extortion soon caught up to the nation’s newest political alternative. In April, its joint member secretary, Gazi Salauddin Tanvir, was accused of involvement in corruption and misconduct over the appointment of Deputy Commissioners, leading to his removal from NCP. The party’s ‘March to build the country’ rally in July took a violent turn in Gopalganj district when party leaders revealed their real intent — bury Mujibism along with 1972 ‘Mujibbadi’ Constitution.
NCP’s rally in Gopalganj, the birthplace of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman where Awami League continues to maintain a stronghold despite ban, was perceived as a provocative act by locals as words spread the party’s intention to desecrate Mujib’s graveyard leading to a violent clash. The following month, NCP joint coordinator of Chattogram city branch Nizam Uddin’s video of his involvement in extortion to suppress a port-related protest became viral, leading to his suspension. Indeed, the apple didn’t fall far from the tree.
The interim government’s political bias towards NCP became more visible when, following NCP-led street protests in May, it announced a ban on the Awami League thus leading to its registration suspension as a political party in the Election Commission. Before NCP’s protest, the interim government had maintained that it was for ‘Awami League to decide if it wants to participate in the election’, indicating it had no plan to ban the party earlier. It is not just Awami League’s ban, but also attempts at complete historical revisionism — removing public holidays dedicated to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, excluding his title as the ‘Father of the Nation’ by revising the Liberation War Act and removing his picture by redesigning currency notes and portraits from public offices, to name a few — are all calculative steps taken under the strong demands of the NCP.
–IANS
The July 2024 Uprising constituted a watershed moment in the political history of Bangladesh, precipitating significant transformations in both leadership and governance structures. In the aftermath, established political parties, along with newly emergent entities, have asserted themselves actively as opposition forces, predominantly targeting the Awami League. This development has underscored the emergence of a “new Bangladesh,” characterised by its explicit recognition and promotion of individuals and groups that have vigorously opposed the previous ruling party and its associated legacy.
A salient illustration of this shift is observable in the interim government’s concerted efforts to reconfigure collective historical memory regarding the 1971 Liberation War. These initiatives have sought to reconstruct historical narratives in a manner that tends to marginalise or omit the contributions of the Awami League—most notably those of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, who is widely recognised as Bangladesh’s founding father and principal architect of its independence.
With respect to Sheikh Hasina, whose tenure concluded with her removal from office in August 2024, opposition rhetoric has advanced the prevailing assertion that her sustained electoral success was attributable to her close association with India. Immediately following the 2024 electoral outcome, a movement akin to the Maldives’ “India Out” campaign emerged within Bangladesh, advocating for a boycott of Indian commodities and alleging that India had exerted undue influence on Bangladesh’s domestic political processes to sustain Hasina’s prolonged incumbency. Her subsequent exile in New Delhi has further substantiated this discourse, lending greater credence to these claims among her critics.
In the run-up to the forthcoming 13th national election, Bangladesh’s political milieu appears increasingly permeated by anti-India sentiment. Notably, this disposition is manifest not only within opposition parties but is also discernible in the interim government’s policy orientations and public actions.
Following the collapse of Hasina’s administration, the dynamics of India-Bangladesh relations have undergone notable changes. The newly installed interim leadership has adopted a divergent foreign policy trajectory, deliberately creating distance from India. This realignment is exemplified by the imposition of trade restrictions on imports from India. Conversely, the interim administration has deepened its engagement with Pakistan, a state from which Bangladesh achieved independence through the violent conflict of 1971. While some Bangladeshi commentators characterise this rapprochement as a calculated diplomatic manoeuvre, they frequently overlook the fact that substantive shifts in foreign policy have largely been confined to relations with India.
Domestic foreign policy experts have critiqued India’s previous strategy, contending that it disproportionately prioritised relations with the Awami League, thereby “placing all its eggs in one basket.” However, this argument tends to neglect the profound historical and cultural ties between the two nations. India was the second country after Bhutan, to recognise Bangladesh’s sovereignty in 1971, and both states retain strong affinities rooted in common histories, languages, and cultures as former territories of British India. Although it is accurate that India maintained closer relations with the Awami League-led government relative to the BNP coalition—which adopted a more adversarial stance towards India—this does not imply that bilateral relations are determined solely by partisan considerations.
The two countries also share an extensive and porous frontier, which has historically given rise to challenges such as unauthorised migration, cross-border smuggling, and sporadic border disputes—issues that persist in the contemporary context. Following Sheikh Hasina’s departure from Dhaka, Bangladesh experienced significant upheaval, marked by violence against minority populations and a deterioration of law and order. Coverage of these events provoked concern in India, which recalled the influx of millions of refugees during the 1971 conflict. Nevertheless, attempts by Indian authorities to voice their apprehensions were routinely dismissed by the interim government as “fabrications” or “politically motivated narratives.”
Rather than accepting responsibility for shortcomings in maintaining law and order, the interim administration has persistently sought to attribute blame to India. For instance, when the historic Dhanmondi 32 residence of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was subjected to vandalism in February, the authorities, instead of acknowledging deficiencies in their security apparatus, alleged that India was enabling Sheikh Hasina to disseminate her messages from exile. India issued a strong diplomatic protest in response to these assertions, yet the interim leadership in Dhaka continued to evade accountability.
The chief advisor to the interim government has frequently alluded to “external actors” fomenting instability in Bangladesh—implicitly referring to India—while refraining from acknowledging his own administration’s role in the prevailing disorder. This narrative strategy serves to deflect scrutiny from the government’s administrative failures and simultaneously consolidates its anti-India credentials among certain domestic constituencies.
Simultaneously, various political parties, including Islamist factions, have adopted similar anti-India rhetoric in an effort to harness popular support. Islamist groups, some of which were previously marginalised or proscribed, are now openly advocating for the establishment of a Sharia-based constitution and mounting attacks on the country’s secular foundations. The interim government’s persistent silence regarding these developments has allowed such groups to consolidate their influence and propagate their ideological agenda largely unimpeded.
Among the most prominent actors in this landscape is Jamaat-e-Islami, which is currently attempting to present itself as a progressive entity. Nevertheless, it continues to evade responsibility for its contentious role during the 1971 war. This organisation, along with emerging groups such as the National Citizenry Party (NCP), is actively seeking to reinterpret the narrative of the Liberation War. They propagate the erroneous claim that India’s involvement constituted interference in what was an internal Pakistani matter, and suggest that Indian intervention was the primary catalyst for the partition in 1971. Such assertions are not only historically inaccurate but also deeply disrespectful to those who sacrificed their lives for Bangladesh’s independence.
Recently, the NCP attributed responsibility for the Gopalganj unrest to so-called “pro-India” factions with links to the Awami League. This incident exemplifies how anti-India rhetoric is being employed for political advantage. However, such narratives provoke a fundamental question: What incentive would India have to promote instability or disorder in Bangladesh? Given the significant security challenges India already confronts emanating from its western neighbour, Pakistan, it has little desire to see turmoil on its eastern frontier.
Rather than assigning culpability to India, Bangladeshi political leaders ought to address the internal issues that frequently stem from their own policies and decisions. Utilising India as a scapegoat for political expediency may offer short-term benefits in electoral terms, but ultimately proves detrimental to the nation’s long-term interests. The premise that India is behind every crisis in Bangladesh is not only unsubstantiated but also poses potential risks.
India, on its part, continues to express its aspiration for a peaceful, democratic, and secular Bangladesh, and remains prepared to engage with any administration that upholds mutual values and interests. However, substantive cooperation cannot occur if India is persistently perceived solely as an adversary or rival.
As the forthcoming election approaches, Bangladesh faces a decisive juncture. The nation must determine whether it wishes to forge a future founded on truth, collaboration, and democratic values, or remain encumbered by a cycle of scapegoating and historical distortion. A stable and prosperous Bangladesh is in the best interests not only of its own populace, but also of the entire region—including India.
Since the displacement of Bangladesh’s long-standing Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in August 2024, the geopolitical landscape of South Asia has undergone significant transformation. Hasina, who previously served as a strategic ally to India while simultaneously managing diplomatic engagement with China, departed from office leaving a nation grappling with economic adversity and political fragmentation. This context appears to have instigated a reassessment of core tenets of her foreign policy legacy. The trilateral summit held on 19 June in Kunming, China—involving representatives from Pakistan, Bangladesh, and China—has precipitated renewed scrutiny of shifting regional alliances and their ramifications for both regional stability and security, as well as for India’s strategic position. Nevertheless, amid optimistic assessments foregrounding the consolidation of cooperation among these three actors, several pivotal concerns remain under-examined. Notably, these include China’s ostensibly benign yet strategically motivated economic diplomacy and the persistence of proxy terrorism sustained through the China-Pakistan nexus, both of which warrant critical scholarly attention.
The Kunming trilateral discussions, convened in conjunction with the 9th China–South Asia Exposition and the 6th China–South Asia Cooperation Forum, saw the participation of Chinese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Sun Weidong, Pakistani Additional Secretary (Asia-Pacific) Imran Ahmed Siddiqui—with Foreign Secretary Amna Baloch attending virtually—and Bangladeshi Foreign Secretary Md. Ruhul Alam Siddique. The meeting resulted in a joint commitment to advance cooperation in several critical sectors, including industrial and commercial development, maritime affairs, water resource management and climate adaptation, agricultural innovation, and youth engagement. The Chinese delegation’s official statement underscored the guiding principles of “good-neighbourliness, reciprocal trust, equality, openness, inclusivity, and shared progress” as central to the evolving partnership.
Both Pakistan and Bangladesh have increasingly embraced China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), widely interpreted as a strategy by Beijing to establish a strategic perimeter around India. Over the past decade, China has become a leading development partner for Bangladesh, channelling substantial investments into a diverse portfolio of infrastructure projects, encompassing port facilities, power generation, and connectivity enhancements such as highways, bridges, and tunnels. Notable examples include the Padma Bridge Rail Link, the Karnaphuli River Tunnel, the Payra Port Development, and the Dhaka Elevated Expressway. To date, Bangladesh has maintained a cautious stance, avoiding excessive dependence on the People’s Republic of China and thereby sidestepping the so-called ‘debt-trap diplomacy’ that has ensnared countries like Sri Lanka. Nevertheless, under the new leadership, there are indications of a shift away from the previous prioritisation of India in strategic matters, as historically advocated by Hasina and the Awami League, and towards a more receptive posture regarding Chinese involvement. In March of this year, Muhammad Yunus, Chief Adviser to the Interim Government, signalled openness to Chinese participation in the Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project. Additionally, both nations are reportedly negotiating collaboration on the Lalmonirhat Airbase, situated less than 150 kilometres from the Siliguri Corridor. Such developments not only heighten India’s security concerns but also, given the new administration’s strategic miscalculations, risk compromising Bangladesh’s sovereignty—a pattern consistent with established Chinese foreign policy tactics.
Pakistan’s persistent instrumentalisation of proxy militant networks for strategic objectives is well-documented. Prior to Bangladeshi independence in 1971, Pakistan facilitated the sheltering, training, and arming of insurgent factions operating in India’s northeast from East Pakistani (now Bangladeshi) territory. Under Sheikh Hasina’s leadership, Bangladesh implemented decisive counter-terrorism measures, dismantling such groups operating within its borders and extraditing numerous militant leaders to India. Presently, China—as the primary supplier of military equipment to both Pakistan and Bangladesh, while also providing critical economic support to Pakistan—has emerged as an essential enabler for Pakistan’s sustained proxy-terror infrastructure. Documented instances exist where Chinese telecommunications equipment, ostensibly designated for Pakistani military use, has been confiscated from terrorists in Jammu and Kashmir. This empirical evidence underscores a concerning China-Pakistan nexus actively contributing to regional destabilisation through asymmetric warfare tactics.
India’s cautious monitoring of Bangladesh’s diplomatic realignment is contextually justified, given their shared 4,000-kilometre border—the world’s fifth-longest terrestrial boundary—and critical bilateral economic and security interdependencies. This vigilance intensifies as Bangladesh cultivates warmer relations with India’s strategic adversaries, Pakistan and China, particularly following India’s recent experience of another significant terrorist attack in Kashmir with established Pakistani linkages. Bangladesh’s deepening alignment with actors demonstrably associated with economic entrapment strategies or the facilitation of proxy terrorism for geopolitical objectives presents legitimate concerns. Such developments jeopardise not only India’s security calculus but also the broader regional stability and security architecture.
While the evolving regional dynamics warrant close observation, Bangladesh continues to acknowledge the significance of India for its economic, political, and strategic interests. Notably, when China and Pakistan suggested the formation of a trilateral working group, Bangladesh opted to reject the proposal. Moreover, the country’s foreign affairs adviser clarified, a week after the Kunming meeting, that the gathering did not signify an alliance and was not directed against any third party—a statement made in response to queries concerning India. This underscores that, despite the cooling of relations with India since Sheikh Hasina’s removal, Bangladesh remains acutely aware of its profound reliance on its neighbour. In this context, although the trilateral engagement with China and Pakistan marks a shift in diplomatic posture, Bangladesh’s restrained approach indicates that it is not prepared to relinquish its foundational relationship with India. The coming months will prove crucial in determining whether such balancing endures or gives way to a realignment that could potentially alter South Asia’s strategic landscape.
As the international community marked World Refugee Day on 20 June, the spotlight once again turned to the festering Rohingya crisis—a painful reminder of Bangladesh’s humanitarian generosity now burdened by geopolitical consequences. Since Myanmar’s brutal military crackdown in 2017, nearly 600,000 Rohingyas escaped the carnage in Rakhine and found refuge across the border in Bangladesh.
Fast forward seven years, and over 1.2 million Rohingya refugees are crammed into makeshift shelters in Cox’s Bazar, still yearning to return to their homeland with dignity and security—an aspiration that remains elusive.
What began as a noble act of compassion by the former government has morphed into a strategic nightmare. Bangladesh, already stretched thin economically, took the Rohingyas in under humanitarian grounds, building the world’s largest refugee settlement in Cox’s Bazar. But the generosity came with a price. Dhaka’s persistent call for repatriation was meant to be a long-term fix to a short-term crisis. Yet, repatriation remains a diplomatic mirage, complicated further by Myanmar’s internal chaos and the lack of sustained international pressure on Naypyidaw.
The cost of hosting over a million displaced people has proved to be far more than just financial. Bangladesh’s social fabric, national security, and local economies are all feeling the heat. The unceasing flow of refugees has strained border security, while the camps themselves have become breeding grounds for illicit activity. Radical networks have infiltrated the refugee settlements, luring disenfranchised Rohingya youth into drug trafficking, human smuggling, and armed violence. In the past two years alone, nearly 150 violent incidents have been reported within these camps—grim testimony to a growing lawlessness that local authorities are ill-equipped to contain.
The security lapse extends beyond the refugee camps. Bangladesh’s border dynamics have undergone a worrying transformation. The Arakan Army—a powerful ethnic rebel group fighting Myanmar’s junta—has made significant inroads in Rakhine. With the civil war now reaching the doorstep of Bangladesh, the implications are severe. The renewed fighting in Rakhine has triggered a fresh wave of displacement, with over 120,000 more Rohingyas reportedly crossing into Bangladesh in the last 18 months alone.
This comes at a time when donor fatigue has set in. International aid for Rohingya refugees is dwindling, putting immense pressure on Bangladesh’s limited resources. Moreover, the Arakan Army’s aggressive posturing has not spared Bangladesh either. Incidents of Bangladeshi fishermen being abducted near Cox’s Bazar by the Arakan Army have sparked serious concerns about the integrity of Bangladesh’s already porous borders.
In the face of this multifaceted crisis, the current interim administration led by Dr. Muhammad Yunus has taken centre stage. Since assuming office, Yunus has prioritised the Rohingya issue, intensifying diplomatic overtures to garner international backing for repatriation. In February, Yunus addressed a letter to UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, detailing the worsening humanitarian situation and Myanmar’s deteriorating internal order. The UN chief responded with diplomatic optimism, promising support to secure unimpeded humanitarian access in Rakhine and beyond.
The high point of this engagement came in March, when Guterres visited the refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar. During the visit, Yunus and the UN Secretary-General jointly pledged to begin repatriation by the next Eid (this June). It was at this juncture that the idea of a “humanitarian corridor” was floated—allegedly a UN-brokered channel linking Cox’s Bazar to Rakhine to facilitate aid delivery and eventual refugee return.
With the ouster of Sheikh Hasina, Bangladesh has witnessed a disquieting transformation that has sent ripples of concern across its socio-political and cultural landscape. Images and videos of the student-led July uprising—once hailed as a breath of fresh air—now stand juxtaposed against the vandalism of murals and statues of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the Father of the Nation. Religious sites and properties belonging to minorities have come under attack, raising an alarming question: Is Bangladesh facing a Taliban-like takeover, akin to what Afghanistan endured?
Initially, such concerns were dismissed—often mocked—as exaggerated alarmism by optimistic observers who celebrated the so-called ‘second liberation’. Yet, nearly ten months into this ‘new Bangladesh’, the unfolding reality on the ground increasingly vindicates those early apprehensions. The promise of the July uprising, which inspired a youthful generation eager for a free, democratic, just, and pluralistic nation, now seems betrayed by a rapid and disconcerting political and cultural regression. How did Bangladesh veer so sharply from those aspirations after 5 August? The answer lies in the silent complicity of the interim government, which has chosen the path of the Quiet Game.
Two recent incidents illustrate the creeping fundamentalism taking root. In Tangail, the screening of a movie was cancelled following protests from local Islamic groups. In Sylhet and Tangail, tourists celebrating Eid faced disruptions by similar groups. The charges leveled? Alleged promotion of obscenity and vulgarity during the sacred Eid week. These examples, seemingly minor, hint at a larger, more troubling pattern—where Islamic fundamentalist forces are increasingly policing public morality and curtailing freedoms.
This resurgence of religious fundamentalism is not spontaneous; it has been growing steadily since the formation of the interim government tasked with reforms after the removal of Sheikh Hasina’s government. The period has opened up spaces for extremist ideologies, endangering the secular and pluralistic fabric painstakingly woven into Bangladesh’s national identity.
Historical Context: The Roots of Bangladesh’s Secular Identity
Bangladesh’s pluralism and secularism are neither accidental nor superficial constructs. They are deeply rooted in history—particularly the 1971 Liberation War, which was fought to safeguard the Bengali language, culture, and identity against the repressive West Pakistan regime. The war was also a battle against religious fanaticism, symbolized by groups like Jamaat-e-Islami and their armed auxiliaries, who violently opposed Bengali nationalism and targeted the cultural ethos perceived as ‘un-Islamic’.
For Bangladeshis, pride in their unique identity remains paramount—a nation born out of sacrifice to protect its linguistic and cultural heritage. This historic legacy makes the current surge of Islamic fundamentalism not only a political threat but a direct challenge to the very essence of Bangladesh’s founding ethos.
Exploiting the Power Vacuum: Fundamentalists on the March
The political upheaval created by Sheikh Hasina’s ouster has emboldened Islamic fundamentalist groups, most notably Hizb-ut-Tahrir—a banned organisation during the previous government’s tenure. Seizing the opportunity, Hizb-ut-Tahrir has reemerged, publicly demanding the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate in Bangladesh. Islamic political parties are actively negotiating with the interim government to replace the secular 1972 Constitution with Islamic sharia law, effectively turning Bangladesh into an Islamic state.
This agenda is no secret. The hardline groups have taken to the streets with alarming zeal, targeting cultural and social events under the guise of eradicating ‘un-Islamic’ activities. The name “Towhidi Janata” has become synonymous with this wave of moral vigilantism—ubiquitous at festivals, cultural celebrations, and public gatherings, their mission is clear: to suppress cultural expressions that do not conform to their stringent interpretation of Islam.
The Assault on Culture: A War on Pluralism
One cannot overlook the symbolic significance of the cancellations and disruptions. The Lalon Mela—an annual festival honouring Lalon Fakir, a mystic poet who represents the core values of tolerance and cultural diversity—was forcibly cancelled in Narayanganj after threats from Islamic groups. Similarly, festivals celebrating tolerance and pluralism have been obstructed by Hefazat-e-Islam and other hardliners, who denounce the festival’s philosophies as ‘contradictory to Islam.’
The famed Basanta Utsav (Spring Festival) too suffered a similar fate, canceled amid threats. These cancellations are unprecedented in Bangladesh’s history and serve as a stark warning sign for the nation’s cultural health. The Amar Ekushey book fair, an iconic annual literary event commemorating the Language Movement martyrs, faced protests led by Towhidi Janata when a stall displayed books by Taslima Nasrin—a writer demonized by Islamist hardliners for her outspoken secularism and criticism of religious orthodoxy. The ensuing altercation and forced closure of the stall revealed how freedom of expression, especially dissenting voices, might be strangled under an increasingly Islamist regime.
Even Pohela Baishakh, the Bengali New Year and Bangladesh’s largest cultural festival, came under attack. Hardliners branded it as an ‘India-imposed Hindu festival’ and pressured organizers to rename the event from Mangal Shobhajatra to Barshabaran Ananda Shobhajatra, diluting its cultural resonance. Attacks on the Dhaka Eid procession, accusing it of featuring ‘idol-like’ symbols, illustrate an unwillingness to embrace the syncretic nature of Bengali Islamic culture—a culture shared and celebrated by both Muslims and non-Muslims alike.
The hardliners’ ideological narrowness was further exposed during Ramzan, when Jamaat-e-Islami led protests enforcing a daytime shutdown of eateries, disregarding Islamic allowances for exemptions to fasting. Such actions betray an agenda more political than religious, seeking to control social life and suppress diversity.
Gender and Moral Policing: A Targeted Attack on Women
The rise of Islamist fundamentalism is also marked by an intensification of anti-women ideologies. Women’s football tournaments have been vandalized, canceled under threats citing Islamic values. Towhidi Janata has opposed women’s public presence in social venues, harassed women for dress codes, and openly engaged in moral policing. Physical assaults on women for perceived ‘immodesty’ have become disturbingly commonplace, often with implicit or explicit backing from Islamist factions.
Even women’s rights institutions have come under fire, with Islamic parties vocally opposing reports highlighting gender inequalities. This reflects the deep-seated misogyny embedded in the Islamist vision for Bangladesh, which stands in stark contrast to the country’s progressive strides in women’s empowerment over past decades.
The Role of the Interim Government: Silent Enabler
What is most troubling is the interim government’s near-complete silence in the face of these alarming developments. The government has chosen passivity—akin to children playing the ‘Quiet Game’—allowing Islamist hardliners to expand their influence unchecked. Law enforcement agencies have largely failed to intervene, sending a signal of tacit approval or, at best, unwillingness to confront fundamentalist violence.The Yunus-led interim administration’s removal of ‘secularism,’ ‘nationalism,’ and ‘socialism’ from the new state principles marks a deliberate ideological shift. This removal is not merely symbolic; it clears the constitutional path for the ascendancy of Islamic law and governance. Combined with the government’s inaction against fundamentalist incursions into public life, this new political reality is steering Bangladesh toward a Talibanisation under the guise of a ‘second liberation.’
The Cost of ‘Second Liberation’
This ‘second liberation,’ far from delivering freedom and justice, risks enslaving Bangladesh to a form of Islamist authoritarianism reminiscent of Taliban rule in Afghanistan. It threatens to erode the hard-won freedoms of speech, religious tolerance, gender equality, and cultural pluralism that define Bangladesh’s unique identity. If unchecked, this Islamist resurgence will not only undermine the nation’s secular foundation but also reverse decades of social progress and democratic development. The tragedy is that the youthful energy and hopes that fuelled the July uprising may soon be crushed under the boots of religious extremism, and the ideals of the Liberation War may be relegated to distant memory.
Conclusion: A Call to Vigilance and Resistance
The Talibanisation of Bangladesh is neither inevitable nor irreversible. It is a product of political choices, social complacency, and ideological neglect. For Bangladesh to reclaim its pluralistic and democratic future, decisive action must be taken to curb the rise of fundamentalism, protect secularism, and uphold constitutional principles that guarantee freedom for all citizens.
The interim government must abandon its passive stance and actively enforce laws against extremist groups, protect cultural expressions, safeguard women’s rights, and restore the foundational ideals of the nation. Civil society, the youth, and international partners also have critical roles to play in resisting the creeping shadow of Talibanisation and ensuring that Bangladesh’s second liberation truly embodies liberation for all its people, not just a select few.
The interim government has now been in power for nine months, yet Bangladesh remains trapped in a cycle of political turmoil and uncertainty. On one side, political parties are more fragmented than ever before, while on the other, the interim administration continues to struggle with addressing the country’s persistent socio-economic and political challenges.
Although interim government was established with broad consensus among civil society, political leaders, and the military following the mass uprising of 2024, the interim government under Dr Yunus has faced considerable difficulties since its formation. Indeed, much of the disorder that has engulfed the nation since last August can be attributed to the Yunus administration. While there was initial enthusiasm for a reformed Bangladesh, free from its authoritarian legacy, the interim government has largely proven to be a passive administration, repeatedly mired in controversy.
It could be argued that the criticisms directed at the Yunus administration originate from remnants of the deposed Hasina regime. Dr Yunus has secured considerable support from global leaders, thereby legitimising the interim government and receiving strong endorsement primarily from Western countries in its pursuit of reforms and conduct of elections. Nonetheless, domestically, the legislative initiatives intended to implement reforms have encountered opposition not only from some of the very factions that contributed to the establishment of the interim government but also from international human rights organisations. Key legislative measures include the Cyber Protection Ordinance, amendments to the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act, and the Anti-Terrorism Act.
The state of media freedom in Bangladesh remains deeply concerning, with numerous reports of violence, harassment, censorship, and prosecution of journalists and media outlets. Often these outlets are being accused by the interim government as collaborators with the Awami League—contradicting its commitment to uphold press freedom. The introduction of the Cyber Protection Ordinance, which replaced the contentious Cyber Security Act (CSA), quickly sparked apprehension regarding the government’s surveillance practices under the guise of enhancing cyber security. Organisations such as Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB) criticised the ordinance for being approved without adequate public consultation and for retaining CSA’s surveillance provisions, thereby posing a potential threat to media freedom in the future. This development coincided with the interim government’s cancellation of press accreditation for 167 journalists and the filing of charges of “crimes against humanity” against 25 journalists due to their alleged links with the Awami League government, provoking condemnation from human rights groups. Media freedom remains a critical concern, exhibiting patterns reminiscent of the previous administration. The most recent report by the Rights and Risk Analysis Group (RRAG), published on World Press Freedom Day 2025—when Bangladesh ranked 149th out of 180 countries—revealed that in the eight months under Dr Yunus’s interim government, 640 journalists were targeted. The administration’s efforts to suppress media critical of Yunus have involved not only branding them as pro-Awami League but also revoking press accreditations, resorting to violence, and levying criminal charges including money laundering, criminal offences, and terrorism. Consequently, urgent media reforms demand serious and immediate attention.
The amendment of the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act through an ordinance extended the powers of investigative offices to conduct searches and seize evidence without prior approval from the tribunal. Additionally, the new ordinance authorised the tribunal to freeze and confiscate the assets of the accused. More recently, a second amendment introduced provisions allowing the trial and punishment of ‘organisations’ for crimes within the tribunal’s jurisdiction. In essence, these amendments enhanced the tribunal’s authority to ban organisations, confiscate their properties, and suspend their registration if found guilty of crimes against humanity. Initially, political parties were included in the ordinance, but this was subsequently removed to avoid political controversy. Nonetheless, these amendments—particularly the second—have attracted significant criticism from human rights organisations such as Human Rights Watch (HRW), which argue that they undermine fundamental human rights. Concerns have been raised that these changes could be exploited as tools for political repression of opposition groups, lacking adequate accountability, thus posing a threat to democratic principles. The ban on the Awami League has only reinforced this scepticism.
On the 11th of this month, the interim government approved the draft ordinance of the Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Act, introducing a new provision to prohibit activities of individuals or ‘entities’ involved in terrorism, thereby granting the government extensive powers to regulate political activities. Just one day earlier, the interim government imposed a ban on the “activities” of the Awami League amid increasing pressure from the Nationalist Communist Party (NCP) and Islamic parties. The ordinance, approved overnight, revised the existing Anti-Terrorism Act of 2009 and was subsequently used on 12 May to officially disband the Awami League, providing a clear indication of arbitrary targeting and suppression without accountability. This action provoked widespread condemnation from foreign governments, international human rights organisations, as well as domestic political leaders and analysts. The systematic targeting of Awami League leaders, activists, and supporters—who have faced mob violence over the past nine months—has sparked concern and criticism over the interim government’s failure to prevent the country’s descent into lawlessness. Instead, through the launch of Operation Devil Hunt aimed at curbing mob attacks, the interim government appeared to be settling political scores by arresting a disproportionate number of League sympathisers. The banning of a political party mirrored the authoritarian tactics of the deposed government, now widely labelled ‘fascist’, fuelling fears of a further erosion of democratic space. Moreover, the interim government’s ordinance on enforced disappearance has also faced criticism for lacking public consultation, accountability measures, and failing to address past abuses.
The interim government’s recent legislative initiatives, presented as reforms, amount to little more than old wine in new bottles. While political parties in Bangladesh remain divided on the issue, international human rights organisations have been unequivocal in their criticism—these measures pose a significant threat to fundamental human freedoms. The interim government’s political vendetta has become increasingly apparent, as has the growing shadow of disapproval cast over the Yunus administration.
Eight months have elapsed since the resounding crescendo of civic unrest reverberated through the streets of Dhaka and beyond—a movement now etched into contemporary Bangladeshi history as the transformative July Uprising of 2024. The student-led revolt, galvanised by a weary citizenry exhausted by fifteen uninterrupted years of Sheikh Hasina’s increasingly authoritarian reign, precipitated the fall of a regime many had come to regard as synonymous with unbridled majoritarianism and the erosion of democratic norms.
To fill the ensuing political vacuum, and ostensibly to shepherd the country through an equitable and peaceful democratic transition—something many Bangladeshis believe has been perennially elusive—a provisional apparatus of governance was constituted. Thus, on the 8th of August 2024, the Interim Government was born, led by none other than the venerable Dr Muhammad Yunus, Nobel Laureate and paragon of ethical capitalism. He assumed the mantle of Chief Advisor, entrusted with the Herculean task of stabilising a beleaguered state, instituting crucial reforms, and, most crucially, preparing the ground for a free and fair general election that would usher Bangladesh from the throes of perceived fascism into the luminous embrace of democratic revival.
Commencing with a retinue of sixteen advisors—a council subsequently expanded to twenty-one to reflect the national appetite for reform and rejuvenation—the interim regime drew cautious optimism both domestically and abroad. Dr Yunus was even featured in Time magazine’s list of the 100 most influential people for his pivotal role in “steering Bangladesh toward democracy following last year’s student-led uprising.” And yet, beneath this veneer of progress, the state of the nation has grown only more labyrinthine, with multiple fault lines deepening. As we stand at the octagonal milestone of this transitional government, it is both timely and imperative to evaluate its performance through several key prisms.
Of Persecution and Prejudice: Minorities under Siege
One of the most tragic ironies of this so-called democratic rebirth has been the abrupt surge in attacks on religious minorities. Far from heralding a new era of inclusivity, the post-Hasina epoch has witnessed a disturbing uptick in communal hostilities—many of which are allegedly orchestrated by groups vehemently opposed to the former regime. Between the 5th and 25th of August alone, over a thousand communal incidents were recorded, including acts of arson, looting, desecration of places of worship, and targeted violence against individuals from religious minorities.
While communal violence is regrettably not a novel phenomenon in Bangladesh’s socio-political landscape, the interim government’s response—or lack thereof—has been particularly dispiriting. Rather than acknowledging the sectarian undertones of these attacks, the authorities have consistently downplayed them as “politically motivated incidents,” even going so far as to label the media’s coverage as “exaggerated”. This obfuscation culminated in October during the sacred Durga Puja celebrations, when a spate of violent attacks against Hindus drew national and international opprobrium. The interim government’s rather sheepish declaration of “collective failure” offered scant solace to the victims.
To compound the travesty, when Hindu communities rallied in protest, several of their spiritual leaders were unceremoniously detained on charges of sedition. This chilling sequence of events exposes the interim authority’s alarming refusal to confront what appears to be a systemic pattern of persecution—raising profound concerns about the fate of minorities in the so-called “New Bangladesh.”
Unrest in the Hills: The Forgotten Frontiers
Parallel to the plight of religious minorities is the deteriorating condition of Bangladesh’s ethnic communities, particularly those inhabiting the restive Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT). Since September of last year, the CHT has become a crucible of ethnic tension and conflict, with over 200 documented instances of human rights violations. The alleged complicity of the Bangladesh Army, which is believed to be tacitly supporting the interim regime, adds a sinister dimension to this unfolding crisis.
These violations include unlawful land grabs, destruction of indigenous properties, and systemic harassment by Bengali settlers and law enforcement agencies. Despite repeated calls for action, the interim government has remained conspicuously inert, preferring instead to label the crisis as an “internal administrative matter”—a semantic sleight of hand that serves only to trivialise the gravity of the situation.
While the 1997 Peace Accord promised autonomy and protection to the indigenous populations, its implementation remains elusive. The government’s reluctance to engage indigenous leaders or uphold their cultural and political rights betrays a troubling inclination to placate fundamentalist factions at the expense of pluralism. Recent incidents, such as the abduction of five university students and the rape of an ethnic minority girl, have further inflamed tensions. Yet, Home Advisor Lt Gen (Retd) Md Jahangir Alam Chowdhury blithely claimed that “the hills are more peaceful than ever”—a statement that borders on Orwellian absurdity.
A Mobocracy in the Making
The culture of lawlessness has not restricted itself to minority communities. Indeed, the entire country seems to be held hostage to a rapidly metastasising mob culture. Vigilante groups—emboldened by a palpable sense of impunity—have been marauding through cities and towns, targeting anyone perceived to be an affiliate or sympathiser of the erstwhile Awami League regime. Acts of vandalism and public lynching have become grotesquely normalised, and the interim government has responded with a silence that is deafening.
Perhaps the most symbolic manifestation of this new anarchy was the “Bulldozer Procession” that desecrated 32 Dhanmondi—the erstwhile residence of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Rather than issuing a robust denunciation, the interim regime deflected blame onto the fallen Prime Minister herself, accusing her of provoking the unrest. When voices from civil society rose in protest, the government responded not with contrition but with coercion, launching the ominously titled “Operation Devil Hunt.”
This sweeping initiative purported to neutralise disruptive elements. In reality, it served as a mechanism to incarcerate scores of Awami League loyalists under flimsy pretexts. Far from curbing mob violence, the operation revealed a thinly veiled vendetta masquerading as law enforcement. The Home Advisor’s assertion that “law and order remains satisfactory” is not only disingenuous but dangerously delusional.
Theocratic Tendencies: A Secular State in Peril
Perhaps the most alarming transformation under the interim dispensation has been the creeping ascendancy of religious fundamentalism. Groups like Towhidi Janata, believed to be fronting for the ultra-conservative Hefazat-e-Islam, have taken to the streets with disturbing regularity, disrupting cultural festivals and imposing their puritanical mores upon the public sphere. Events celebrating Lalon Shah, Basanta Utsav, and even Pahela Baishakh have come under attack, derided as “un-Islamic” by these self-styled guardians of morality.
Even more perturbing is the group’s open advocacy for the replacement of Bangladesh’s secular legal framework with an interpretation of Sharia, and, more audaciously, the establishment of a Khilafat—a theocratic caliphate—in place of the current democratic system. The interim government’s reaction? Tepid at best, complicit at worst! There has been a conspicuous absence of any concrete initiative to counteract these regressive forces.
In fact, the government’s acquiescence has emboldened fundamentalist demands, which are now influencing constitutional reform dialogues. Proposals to remove secularism, socialism, and nationalism as foundational tenets of the state are reportedly on the table—an alarming development that threatens to dismantle the very ethos upon which Bangladesh was founded.
An Election Deferred? The Mirage of Democratic Transition
And what of the interim government’s raison d’être—its solemn promise to oversee a timely and transparent general election? Here, too, there is more ambiguity than assurance. Dr Yunus recently floated a tentative window for the polls—between December 2025 and July 2026—following increasing pressure from political quarters. Yet, no definitive electoral roadmap has been divulged.
The Home Advisor’s controversial statement that the people are “requesting” the interim government to remain in power for an additional five years has only intensified suspicion. Is this interim arrangement morphing into a pseudo-permanent regime? Political parties have already begun voicing their discontent, arguing that reforms must follow elections, not precede them. After all, the interim government, lacking constitutional legitimacy, was never intended to substitute a democratically elected dispensation.
A Promise Deferred, a Nation in Flux
After eight months of governance, the interim government finds itself on precarious terrain. Far from guiding Bangladesh towards the promised land of democratic rejuvenation, it has instead presided over an era marked by increased intolerance, emboldened fundamentalism, and institutional inertia. Minority groups are under siege, mob rule festers, and the secular fabric of the nation is unravelling thread by thread.
Without swift course correction, the vision of “Bangladesh 2.0”—a vibrant, pluralistic democracy—risks becoming a mirage in a desert of disillusionment. The interim government must remember that it was borne out of revolution, not resignation. The people did not depose a despot only to be ruled by the shadows of chaos and indecision. The hour is late, the stakes are high, and history shall not be kind to procrastinators.
In December 1970, Pakistan held its first democratic National Assembly elections, in which the Awami League, a political party rooted in East Pakistan, secured a resounding victory. However, rather than accepting the will of the people, the political and military elite of West Pakistan—fuelled by an ingrained prejudice against the Bengali population, whom they viewed as socially and culturally ‘inferior’—chose to suppress their aspirations through brute military force. Their response culminated in Operation Searchlight on 25 March 1971, an unspeakable campaign of terror designed to crush Awami League activists and their supporters. Yet, what began as a targeted crackdown soon escalated into an indiscriminate genocide against the Bengali population, whose only ‘crime’ was their demand to be treated as equal citizens rather than colonial subjects.
The horrors unleashed by the Pakistan Army swept through the streets of Dacca (now Dhaka) and into the remotest villages, leaving in their wake devastation beyond measure. Among the most harrowing atrocities was the systematic sexual violence perpetrated against Bengali women, a tragedy that has been shamefully overlooked in historical discourse. These biranganas—‘war heroines’—bear the deepest scars of Bangladesh’s struggle for independence, their suffering a cruel testament to the price of liberation. Even after 54 years, the wounds of 1971 remain unhealed, exacerbated by Pakistan’s obstinate refusal to acknowledge its army’s genocidal crimes, let alone offer an apology. This shameful denial stands as an enduring stain on history, a stark reminder of justice long denied.
The horrors of war are not confined to the battlefield; they seep insidiously into the very fabric of society, leaving scars far beyond the domain of military conflict. Among the most egregious manifestations of this brutality is sexual violence, a weapon wielded with calculated cruelty to devastate both individuals and communities. In the cataclysmic events of the 1971 Liberation War, the Pakistani military orchestrated a campaign of systematic rape and torture, deploying it as an instrument of both physical subjugation and psychological annihilation. Women’s bodies, long perceived as the repositories of familial and societal honour, became the battleground upon which this barbarity was unleashed.
As Operation Searchlight unfurled its dark shadow over Dhaka, innumerable Bengali women were forcibly taken from their homes and university campuses, their destinies cruelly altered as they were transported to military barracks and confined to what can only be described as ‘rape camps.’ Subjected to relentless violation, many perished at the hands of their tormentors, their suffering rendered invisible in the tide of genocide. A sinister agenda underpinned this depravity—the calculated objective of impregnating Bengali women to dilute ethnic identity, an insidious attempt at demographic engineering. The so-called ‘war babies,’ estimated at around 20,000, were intended as a grotesque means of tethering East Pakistan’s future to the bloodlines of the West. This brutal strategy, steeped in both violence and a grotesque perversion of power, epitomized the depths to which oppression can descend in its ruthless pursuit of domination.
The horrors of the Liberation War of Bangladesh were not confined to the battlefield alone; they seeped into the very fabric of human dignity, as the Pakistan Army weaponised rape to inflict psychological trauma upon the Bengali populace. In a calculated effort to break the spirit of resistance and force submission, women were subjected to unspeakable brutality, often in the presence of their own families. With the complicity of collaborators—the notorious razakars—who abducted and delivered women, particularly from the Hindu community, the army orchestrated sexual violence on an unimaginable scale. The aftermath was as macabre as the crime itself: bodies of slain victims hung from trees, discarded in mass graves, or strewn beneath bridges—chilling symbols of the cost of nationalist aspiration. In this grotesque theatre of terror, rape was not just an instrument of war; it was a calculated strategy to annihilate the will of a people.
The systemic and brutal use of sexual violence as a weapon of war during Bangladesh’s Liberation War remains one of the darkest stains on human conscience. The atrocities committed against an estimated 200,000-400,00 women were not incidental but deliberate—a vile strategy of war designed to terrorise and subjugate a people. However, to reduce Bengali women’s role in 1971 merely to that of victims would be an egregious oversight. Women were not just passive sufferers but active participants in the resistance, standing shoulder to shoulder with the Mukti Bahini. They smuggled arms and intelligence, tended to the wounded, and even bore arms themselves—undaunted warriors in their own right. Their contributions were no less significant than their male counterparts, their sacrifices no less valiant.
It was Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman who sought to dignify these women by calling them ‘Birangana’—a title meant to honour their courage. Yet, in the post-war years, the term became tragically synonymous with shame, society reducing these war heroines to mere victims of rape, as if their suffering was theirs alone to bear. Instead of receiving the gratitude of a free nation, they were met with ostracism, rejection, and silence. Many families refused to accept them back, further condemning them to a life of isolation. The establishment of the War Crimes Tribunal in 2010 was a long-overdue step toward justice, yet the scars of betrayal remain. Pakistan has yet to acknowledge its army’s heinous crimes, and Bangladesh’s collective memory has yet to fully embrace these women as the warriors they were. On the 54th anniversary of Operation Searchlight, let us not only remember Pakistan’s war on women but also recognise the Birangana for their undying fortitude in forging a free Bangladesh.