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– Arun Anand
Bangladesh’s interim government recently gave its final approval to the draft of ‘July Mass Uprising Protection and Liability Determination Ordinance’ that grants indemnity to those who participated in the 2024 July Uprising that forced Sheikh Hasina to end her 15-year political rule and flee the country. The ordinance, believed to be the interim government’s fulfilment of ‘earlier commitment’ to ensure ‘legal protection’ to July participants, would take the shape of a law soon.
The ordinance provides impunity to participants from ‘activities carried out with the purpose of political resistance’ during 2024 uprising in July and August. Meaning, if criminal cases are slapped any of uprising participants for carrying out ‘political resistance during uprising’, such cases will be withdrawn by the government. Moreover, the ordinance adds that ‘no new cases will be filed’ against them, from now on, for their activities during the uprising.
The events of July-August have various connotations—uprising, revolution, political coup and political resistance. Those who participated in the uprising called it a ‘revolution’ that paved the way for ‘New Bangladesh’ or ‘Second Republic’. This group, composed mostly of student leaders who led the uprising and some later formed the National Citizen’s Party (NCP), has not only framed the uprising as ‘second liberation’ but also introduced a new political discussion where 1971 Liberation was brought back, reinterpreted and even compared with the 2024 uprising.
The 2024 ‘revolution’ has been portrayed by this group as fulfilling what 1971 could not, a liberation that gave Bangladesh its ‘true independence’. The same narrative is also echoed by another faction—the Islamists—for whom 2024 Uprising rolled the red carpet for their resurgence in the political field and now forms the main contending group against Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) in the February 2026 national election.
Collectively, the Awami League is now branded as a ‘fascist’, a justification used by the interim government for banning Awami League’s political activities in May, closing the League’s door to participate in the February 2026 national election.
The interim government, in its official capacity, recognised the July participants as ‘july warriors’ (July Joddha), similar to ‘war heroes’ (Mukti Joddha) of Liberation War. On the first anniversary of the uprising, the interim government unveiled the July Declaration on 5 August 2025, following pressures from Student Against Discrimination (SAD), the main force behind the July Uprising and NCP to give 2024 events a constitutional recognition.
The Declaration, declared to be given a constitutional status, was supposed to be a statement to recognise the July Uprising and its ambitions for ‘Second Republic’. Rather, it became a political fatwa against Awami League and its political past since 1971 (as interpreted by its opponents), an obituary of the 1972 Constitution that is now labelled as ‘Mujibist Constitution’, and legitimising the ‘unconstitutionally’ formed interim government.
There is little doubt about the interim government’s biases towards leaders of the July Uprising. Indeed, it was the student leaders of SAD that invited Muhammad Yunus to come back to Bangladesh and take the role of the chief advisor of the interim government on 8 August 2024.
In return, three of the advisors in the interim government were student leaders of July Uprising. Many in the political circle believe that the interim government that helped the formation of National Citizen’s Party (NCP), a King’s Party, by intentionally delaying the announcement of an election roadmap. The neutrality became exposed when one of the advisors resigned to become the convenor of the NCP, while another resigned only recently to become the NCP’s spokesperson.
Since NCP’s establishment, the interim government displayed its soft corner for the student party, echoing the same political narrative as that of NCP, and even actively taking measures of historical revisionism to erase Awami League and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s legacy.
The recognition of July warriors has not been without controversy either. The gazetted list of about 1,402 warriors declared as ‘national heroes’ are promised tax benefits, welfare and rehabilitation, and now legal protection as per the 14 January ordinance. However, the gazetted lists were accused of including fake claimants, irregularities and political misuse, ironically the accusations slapped against Sheikh Hasina during the early phase of July Uprising when it was in the stage of anti-quota protest.
The ‘July warriors’ also violently clashed with police on the day of signing of the July Charter in October demanding for state recognition of martyr status, in addition to compensation and legal immunity—demands that were ultimately added as Clause 5 of the July Charter.
The latest move to this shenanigan—the July Mass Uprising Protection ordinance—justifies all kinds of acts that happened in July-August, especially violence against minorities and looting of arms from security forces, by indirectly branding these acts as ‘political resistance’. The wave of communal violence witnessed during this time, and continues even today were dismissed by the interim government as ‘political’.
Despite international reports, the interim government insists on these being ‘non-communal’ attacks. With only less than three weeks before 13th national election, over one-third of the polling booths are also marked as ‘risky’, while about 1,3331 of the 5,763 firearms and explosive looted during July Uprising remain missing, posing an alarming risk to security during the election time.
The protection ordinance potentially shields all human rights abuses. Although the interim government clarified that only ‘political resistance’ is to be given legal protection, the tweaking of human rights abuses as ‘political reaction’ leaves little room to comprehend that all these criminal acts will also be treated as ‘political resistance’.
The shameful attempt to equate 2024 July with the 1971 Liberation War, by providing equal status, benefits, memorials, and now legal protection not only downplays Bangladesh’s painful history but also changes the whole political trajectory of the country where political violence will get state protection.
–Aminul Hoque Polash
A recent report in The Washington Post cited a US diplomat working in Bangladesh, claiming Washington wants to build “friendly relations” with Jamaat-e-Islami. The diplomat reportedly made the remarks in a closed-door discussion with a group of Bangladeshi women journalists on 1 December. The newspaper’s report, we are told, was built around an audio recording of that conversation.
In that recording, the diplomat expressed optimism that Jamaat would perform far better in the 12 February election than it has in the past. He even suggested the journalists invite representatives of Jamaat’s student wing to their programmes and events.
When the journalists raised a fear that Jamaat, if empowered, could enforce Sharia law, the diplomat’s response was striking: he said he did not believe Jamaat would implement Sharia. And even if it did, he added, Washington could respond with measures such as tariffs. He was also heard arguing that Jamaat includes many university graduates in leadership and would not take such a decision.
The Washington Post further quoted multiple political analysts suggesting Jamaat could achieve its best result in history in the 12 February vote and might even end up in power.
So, is this report simply the product of an “audio leak” published just 20 days before the interim government’s election? I don’t think so.
First, it stretches belief that Bangladeshi journalists would secretly record a closed conversation with a US diplomat and then pass it to The Washington Post. Second, The Washington Post would almost certainly have cross-checked the audio with the diplomat concerned. If the diplomat had objected, it is hard to imagine the paper moving ahead in this way. My conclusion is blunt: this was published with the diplomat’s planning, or at least with the US embassy’s consent.
Call it what it is: a soft signal. A carefully calibrated message designed to project reassurance about Jamaat and to normalise the idea of Jamaat as a legitimate future governing force.
And then came the echo.
At the same time, two other international outlets, Reuters and Al Jazeera, also published reports about Jamaat-e-Islami. Both pointed towards the possibility of a strong Jamaat showing in the 12 February election. Al Jazeera’s tone, heavy with praise, makes it difficult not to suspect paid campaigning. More tellingly, an Al Jazeera poll recently put Jamaat’s public support at 33.6 per cent, compared with 34.7 per cent for the BNP.
The goal is obvious: to “naturalise” Jamaat’s pathway to power. To make what should shock the public feel ordinary. To convert the unthinkable into the plausible, and the plausible into the inevitable.
Which brings us to the unavoidable question: can Jamaat really win?
History says no. The highest share of the vote Jamaat ever secured in a normal election was in 1991: 12.13 per cent. In the next three elections, Jamaat’s vote share fell to 8.68 per cent, 4.28 per cent, and 4.7 per cent. In a genuinely competitive election, Jamaat is not a double-digit party.
But Bangladesh is not heading into a normal election. An unelected, illegitimate interim administration is preparing a managed vote while keeping the country’s largest political party, the Awami League, effectively outside the electoral process. In that distorted arena, behind-the-scenes engineering is underway to seat Jamaat on the throne. The diplomat’s “leak”, the favourable international coverage, and the publication of flattering polls are not isolated incidents. They are the components of a single operation.
If anyone doubts the direction of travel, they should remember what happened after 5 August. In his first public remarks after that date, the army chief repeatedly addressed Jamaat’s leader with reverential language, calling him “Ameer-e-Jamaat”. From that moment onwards, Jamaat has exerted an outsized, near-monopolistic influence over Bangladesh’s political field.
Yes, Khaleda Zia’s illness, Tarique Rahman’s possible return, and even the prospect of Khaleda Zia’s death have periodically given the BNP a breeze at its back. But the reel and string of the political kite are now held elsewhere. Jamaat controls the tempo.
And it did not happen in a vacuum. The Awami League has been driven off the streets through mob violence, persecution, repression and judicial harassment. With its principal rival forced away from political life, Jamaat has been able to present itself not merely as a participant, but as an authority.
Now look at the state itself.
Every major organ of power, it is argued, is being brought under Jamaat’s influence. Within the military, “Islamisation” is being used as a cover for Jamaatisation. Fifteen decorated army officers are reportedly jailed on allegations connected to the disappearance of Abdullah Hil Azmi, the son of Ghulam Azam, widely regarded as a leading figure among the razakars. Yet it remains unclear whether Azmi was even abducted at all.
The judiciary, too, is described as falling almost entirely under Jamaat’s control. Key administrative positions, especially DCs, SPs, UNOs and OCs, are increasingly occupied by Jamaat-aligned officials.
On campuses, the story repeats itself. Through engineered student union elections, Jamaat’s student organisation, Islami Chhatra Shibir, has established dominance in Dhaka University and other leading public universities. Even vice-chancellor appointments are described as being shaped by Jamaat-friendly influence.
And while this internal consolidation accelerates, external courtship intensifies.
Since August 2024, Jamaat leaders have reportedly held at least four meetings in Washington with US authorities. Their close contact with the US embassy in Bangladesh continues. Meanwhile, the British High Commissioner has held multiple meetings with Jamaat’s ameer, widely reported in the media. Jamaat’s ameer has also visited the United Kingdom recently.
In short, Jamaat has reached a level of favourable conditions never seen since its founding. Not even in Pakistan, the birthplace of its ideological ecosystem.
So why would sections of the Western world want Jamaat? What does the Yunus-led interim administration gain from this? What role is it playing?
The answer offered here is uncompromising: the current interim government has signed multiple agreements with Western powers, particularly the United States, including an NDA arrangement and various trade deals that are described as being against public interest. Some may be public. Much remains opaque. The government wants these agreements protected. It also wants long-term leverage over Bangladesh’s politics and territory.
From a broader geopolitical perspective, Bangladesh’s land matters. It sits at a strategic crossroads. For those intent on consolidating dominance in the Asia-Pacific and simultaneously containing the influence of both China and India, Bangladesh is useful. This is part of a long game.
And if Jamaat, with weak popular legitimacy, can be installed in power, external agendas become easier to execute. The argument is stark: Jamaat, as a party of war criminals and anti-liberation forces, has no natural sense of accountability to Bangladesh’s soil or its people. In exchange for power, it would hand foreign actors a blank cheque.
Now to Dr Yunus.
The claim here is that since taking power, Yunus has already fulfilled his personal ambitions. He has rewarded loyalists with state titles and positions, creating opportunities for them to accumulate money. He has satisfied the demands of the “deep state” that installed him. In doing so, the country’s interests have been sacrificed at every step.
And throughout, Jamaat has offered Yunus unconditional support.
After the election, Yunus’s priority will be survival: a safe exit for himself and his circle. That is tied to securing the future of the student leaders who claim to have been the principal stakeholders of July. In this narrative, Jamaat is stepping in again. The NCP has already aligned with Jamaat. To maintain international lobbying strength, Jamaat will ensure Yunus’s safe exit. It may even install him in the presidency if that serves the arrangement.
So what will the BNP do?
The answer given is grim: very little. Blinded by the hunger for power, the BNP has nodded along as Yunus and his circle pushed forward actions described as hostile to the national interest. Mirza Fakhrul has publicly claimed to see Zia within Yunus. Tarique Rahman has repeatedly been seen praising Yunus. All of it, the argument goes, for a single purpose: to reach power.
But the BNP, it is suggested, failed to understand the real game. At the grassroots, many of its leaders and activists have become disconnected from the public through extortion, land-grabbing and violent intimidation. Even when visible irregularities occurred in student union elections at universities, the BNP’s student wing, Chhatra Dal, either did not protest or could not.
If Jamaat takes power through a staged election on 12 February, the BNP will have no meaningful recourse left.
And the country?
The conclusion is bleak: Bangladeshis should not expect their suffering to end any time soon. Just as a meticulously designed operation removed an elected Awami League government, another meticulous design is now being finalised to seat Jamaat-e-Islami, a party branded by the author as one of war criminals, with the backing of foreign powers.Yunus’s anti-national agreements, it is argued, will be implemented through Jamaat’s hands. Independence, sovereignty and the constitution will be thrown into the dustbin. Secularism, women’s freedom, and minority rights will be locked away in cold storage. The destination is spelled out without ambiguity: Bangladesh will become the Islamic Republic of Bangladesh.
(Disclaimer – Aminul Hoque Polash is a Bangladeshi political activist, researcher, and former government official with experience in national security, diplomacy, and state institutions. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the writer. )
-Dr Sreoshi Sinha(Senior Fellow, Centre for Joint Warfare Studies) & Abu Obaidha Arin (University of
Delhi.)
August 5, 2024, will be remembered as a historic turning point in Bangladesh’s political journey. The fall of the Sheikh Hasina-led Awami League government marked the end of an era—an era deeply intertwined with the legacy of the 1971 Liberation War, the pursuit of transitional justice, and an increasingly authoritarian political framework.
In its place, a fragile and confused new political setup has emerged, led by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus, who, despite his international acclaim, appears ill-equipped to manage the complexities of a fractured nation. Bangladesh today stands at a crossroads—politically unstable, socially fragmented, and economically stalled. Law and order have collapsed, with law enforcement either absent or complicit. Amid this chaos, one of the most disturbing developments has been the reported takeover of the International Crimes Tribunal (ICT) by anti-liberation forces, particularly from right-wing factions. The new ICT leadership appears preoccupied with finding ways to punish Sheikh Hasina and her allies. Even former prosecutors have not been spared—Tureen Afroz, a former prosecutor, was arrested and reportedly tortured in her own home after the fall of the Hasina government.
The tribunal’s primary focus now seems to be targeting members of a specific political party—the Awami League—on accusations related to the mass uprising of 2024 that led to the government’s collapse. This is not merely a political transition. It is a dangerous reversal—a grotesque distortion of justice and history. From Transitional justice to political vendetta The International Crimes Tribunal was established in 2009 with the aim of bringing to justice the perpetrators of war crimes committed during Bangladesh’s struggle for independence. In principle, it was a noble endeavour—a long-overdue acknowledgement of the need for historical accountability. Many war criminals, particularly from Jamaat-e-Islami and the BNP, were prosecuted, with some even sentenced to death. While many ordinary Bangladeshis, especially families of 1971 martyrs, supported the idea of justice, the overt politicisation of the tribunal gradually eroded its legitimacy. But no one could have imagined that the tribunal itself would one day fall into the hands of the very forces it once sought to prosecute. Yet, that is the grim reality today. Jamaat’s spectre returns The resurgence of Jamaat-Shibir elements within the current political framework is deeply alarming—not only because of their past, but because of what it symbolises. It marks the complete reversal of the political narrative that has shaped Bangladesh for the past two decades. Reports now suggest that several individuals with known ties to Jamaat-e-Islami and its student wing, Islami Chhatra Shibir, are now influencing—and in some cases directly managing—the International Crimes Tribunal. It is nothing short of surreal. How can a nation reconcile with the fact that a tribunal once created to hold war criminals accountable is now run, in part, by those accused of committing some of the gravest crimes during the Liberation War? This development is not just a political scandal; it is a national disgrace. It insults the memory of the 3 million who were martyred and the countless women who were raped in 1971. It undermines the very foundation of our national identity.
The Disillusionment of Democracy Muhammad Yunus’s unexpected rise to leadership was initially met with hope—particularly among groups sympathetic to antiBangladesh sentiments, pro-Pakistani elements, and war criminals. With the fall of Sheikh Hasina’s government, many of these groups expressed relief. However, Yunus’s government, largely composed of technocrats and opportunists, lacks both political capital and ideological clarity. It has failed to present a roadmap for economic recovery, social cohesion, or political reconciliation. Law and order have collapsed entirely.
Bangladesh’s former intelligence officer and diplomat Aminul Hoque Polash, in exile since the fall of the Sheikh Hasina regime, has broken his silence on the hidden power structures, financial engineering, and political ambitions surrounding Nobel laureate and the country’s interim leader Muhammad Yunus.
In an exclusive conversation, Polash walks News18 through classified insights, internal documents, and lived experiences inside Bangladesh’s national security system, revealing a side of Yunus the world has never seen before.
Before we get into the details about Dr Yunus, tell us how you ended up in exile.
I never pictured myself sitting in another country, talking about the collapse of the institutions I once served. I spent nearly a decade inside national security and foreign service. My work was simple in principle: follow evidence, protect the state, and protect the people.
Bangladesh today stands on the brink of an unprecedented national catastrophe. Under the guise of reform and accountability, the pro-Islamist regime of Muhammad Yunus has begun dismantling the nation’s most vital institutions – the Armed Forces and the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI). What appears to be a judicial process is, in reality, a political purge aimed at replacing the patriotic guardians of Bangladesh’s sovereignty with a militant, ideologically driven “Islamic Revolutionary Army”. In doing so, the Yunus regime risks transforming Bangladesh from a moderate Muslim democracy into a jihadist state – a South Asian version of Iran or Afghanistan.
As anticipated, the regime in Dhaka, led by Muhammad Yunus has begun implementing its blueprint to create an Islamic Revolutionary Army (IRA) by disbanding the Bangladesh Armed Forces and the country’s primary intelligence agency, the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI).
According to credible media reports, investigators have submitted a chargesheet against 11 army officers, including eight Generals, accusing them of committing “crimes against humanity” – offences carrying the death penalty. The charge sheet also names former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina as the principal accused. Simultaneously, the regime has launched legal measures to permanently outlaw the Awami League, Bangladesh’s oldest and largest political party, in a move clearly engineered to eliminate any chance of an inclusive national election, which Yunus intends to stage in February 2026 under his absolute control.
The accused listed in the chargesheet include: former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, former National Security Advisor Tarique Ahmed Siddique, former DGFI Director General Lt. Gen. (retd) Mohammad Akbar Hossain, former DG Major General (retd) Saiful Abedin, Lt. Gen. (retd) Md Saiful Alam, former DG Lt. Gen. Tabrez Shams Chowdhury, former DG Major General (retd) Hamidul Haque, Major General Towhidul Islam, Major General Sarwar Hossain, Major General Kabir Ahmed, Brigadier General Mahbubur Rahman Siddique, Brigadier General Ahmed Tanvir Majhar Siddique, and Lt. Col. (retd) Makhsurul Haque.
Among them, four are currently in active service. However, under the amended International Crimes Tribunal Act, serving officers accused in such cases are suspended from holding official positions, according to Chief Prosecutor Tajul Islam.
The entire case behind this chargesheet accusing senior military officers originates from a dramatized “documentary film” funded by the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) – an organisation that has, for several years, played an active role in defaming the Bangladesh Army and DGFI.
Unfortunately, during this massive propaganda campaign, both institutions failed to mount an effective counter-narrative. Even after Sheikh Hasina’s ouster, when Yunus and his allies intensified their attacks on DGFI — particularly through claims of detentions inside “Aynaghar”, an imaginary facility invented by a NED-funded, overseas-based media outlet – the disinformation continued unchecked. The so-called “documentary” presented fabricated testimonies from alleged victims, serving as the foundation for the current legal onslaught.
Most importantly, the Bangladesh Armed Forces and DGFI had played a crucial role in the 2024 anti-Hasina protests, which ultimately enabled the US Deep State’s regime-change operation to succeed. More than 14 months after Sheikh Hasina’s removal and the installation of the Yunus regime – a transition initially supported by segments of the military – it has become evident that the ultimate goal of Yunus and his foreign backers is to completely dismantle Bangladesh’s Armed Forces and counterterrorism institutions to pave the way for transforming the country into an Islamist Caliphate.
It was earlier reported that Pakistan’s Army Chief General Asim Munir has been orchestrating this plot to dismantle the Bangladesh Army and DGFI, working in concert with key figures of Jamaat-e-Islami, Ansar Al-Islam (the local franchise of Al-Qaeda), and several high-ranking members of the Yunus regime. Although the current chargesheet targets former DGFI chiefs and counterterrorism officials, credible intelligence sources suggest Islamabad’s ultimate goal is to implicate Army Chief General Waker Uz Zaman, accusing him of “enforced disappearances and unlawful detentions”.
Muhammad Yunus and at least two of his close foreign-linked advisors are believed to be quietly assisting this effort, providing legal and diplomatic cover to neutralise Bangladesh’s last line of defence against Islamist expansionism.
Commenting on this alarming development, noted military analyst M A Hossain stated, “This is possibly the first-ever case in any country where top officials of a national intelligence agency have been prosecuted for defending their nation from terrorism. It defies logic. How can a judiciary target its own security defenders in a case clearly masterminded by Pakistan’s military establishment and its local proxies? The next step, inevitably, will be implicating Army Chief General Waker Uz Zaman – the ultimate command authority – to decapitate the Armed Forces entirely”.
Defence expert Damsana Ranadhiran, a special contributor to Bangladesh’s Blitz media outlet, warned: “This legal ambush targetting Bangladeshi Generals will have dire consequences. It will weaken the military’s command structure and open the door for Pakistan-backed officers to take charge. This is a textbook ISI strategy – a blend of legal warfare, psychological manipulation, and political subversion – identical to what Pakistan executed in Afghanistan and Kashmir”.
Ranadhiran further cautioned that Bangladesh’s sovereignty and regional stability are now at stake.
“Bangladesh did not endure the genocide of 1971 only to be subdued again by Pakistan’s puppeteers and Islamist collaborators. If Pakistan’s designs are not countered immediately through diplomatic, military, and legal means, South Asia may descend into chaos – a region overrun by proxy wars, terror networks, and narcotics-driven insurgencies”.
These fabricated charges against senior military officers are designed to discredit and paralyse the Armed Forces, paving the way for Yunus to replace them with a new paramilitary militia modelled after Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The envisioned Islamic Revolutionary Army (IRA) will be ideologically loyal to the regime rather than to the nation – a hallmark of theocratic authoritarianism.
The motive behind Yunus’s hostility toward the military lies in its potential to resist his project of selling out Bangladesh’s sovereignty for personal and foreign gain. Much like his political idol Hamid Karzai, Yunus seeks to maintain power through foreign patronage rather than public legitimacy.
Analysts estimate his genuine domestic support at no more than five per cent. His crusade against the Awami League, with its 45 million supporters, is part of a larger design to eliminate all political opposition. After banning the Awami League, the regime now aims to suppress smaller parties such as the Jatiya Party and left-leaning groups to cement a one-man rule under the pretext of “national reform”.
Alongside institutional purges, Yunus has unleashed a campaign of terror against journalists, intellectuals, and dissenters. Hundreds have been imprisoned, and at least 266 journalists face fabricated murder charges – making Yunus arguably an even greater oppressor of the press than Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
Meanwhile, the regime is rapidly replacing the national police with an “Auxiliary Police” modeled on Iran’s morality police. Recruited from Hizb ut-Tahrir, Hefazat-e-Islam, and Ansar Al-Islam, this force enforces Taliban-style dress codes and harasses women in traditional Bengali attire. Reports of hijab-clad patrols intimidating citizens are becoming alarmingly common.
For decades, DGFI played a pivotal role in fighting terrorism and militancy, dismantling insurgent networks, and shutting down foreign-backed terrorist training camps – including those of India’s United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA). Its success in keeping Bangladesh free of transnational terrorism made it a target of Islamist extremists and the Pakistani ISI, who now see an opportunity for revenge under the Yunus administration.
Since last year’s Jihadist Coup, Bangladesh has been slipping rapidly toward Islamist rule. Top jihadists – including Ansar Al-Islam leader Jashimuddin Rahmani – were released from prison and now allowed to operate freely. Rahmani has publicly vowed to attack secular voices and bloggers, branding them as “enemies of Islam”. Shockingly, the regime has made no effort to re-arrest such fugitives or curb their militant propaganda.
If this trajectory continues unchecked, Bangladesh may soon cease to exist as the secular republic envisioned by the martyrs of 1971. The systematic destruction of the Armed Forces, intelligence services, and democratic institutions is not merely a domestic tragedy – it is a regional security crisis. South Asia cannot afford another failed state governed by zealots and manipulated by Pakistan’s ISI. The international community, especially India and democratic allies, must recognise that defending Bangladesh’s Armed Forces today is equivalent to defending the last line of resistance against the spread of militant Islamism in South Asia. Silence is complicity – and complicity, in this case, could be catastrophic.
–IANS
Amidst the developments in Bangladesh’s political trajectory, the resurgence of Islamists has been the one catching everyone’s attention. A country with about 90 per cent Muslim population, this surely is not supposed to be alarming. But Bangladesh is no Middle East or Central Asia — wherein religion profoundly shaped their political systems. Religion, albeit a strong influence, has more cultural and symbolic presence than a political one — whereby Bangladesh’s political establishment is influenced by principles of nationalism, socialism, secularism and democracy. Here, cultural and ethnolinguistic identity have historically taken precedence over religious one.
Islamists in Bangladesh seek a complete overhaul of the socio-political-legal system rooted in Islamic values and principles, contrary to the present establishment in Bangladesh. However, Islamists do not comprise a homogenous group, as they take their ideological orientation from different Islamic schools of thought, namely, Hanafi, Deobandi, Barelvi, Salafi and Sufi. Among these, Hanafi and Deobandi exert the most socio-political influence. The Islamists, initially marginalised post Bangladesh’s independence, were rehabilitated under military rule. After restoration of democracy and civilian government in 1990, some created formal political alliances while maintaining grassroot mobilisation in religious institutions and madrasas and entered the electoral field. Others took the path of militancy, launched a series of terror attacks in Bangladesh and re-configured into newer factions after facing state crackdowns and bans, especially under the Awami League government.
The recent unofficial visit of seven Islamic scholars to Afghanistan on Taliban’s invitation needs a careful assessment. The meeting was framed as seven Bangladeshi Islamic scholars observing human rights and women’s rights situation in Afghanistan in face of backlash from the West. However, one cannot overlook the heavy political intent as the meeting also prioritised strengthening ties between Islamic scholars of the two countries, to enhance diplomatic relations in future, beside cooperating on areas like trade, education and healthcare.
Following the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in 2021, Bangladesh government (now dismantled), maintained its distance and refused to give Taliban any diplomatic recognition. Rather, it exercised caution — monitoring and countering the celebratory reactions of Islamists on social media who hailed it as a ‘triumph of Islam’. Even before the takeover, many Bangladeshi Islamist radicals were arrested by security authorities who were caught attempting to join the Taliban in Afghanistan by crossing India.
Why were Bangladesh’s Islamist influenced youth attracted to the Taliban? Because of Bangladesh’s own home-grown extremist groups that emerged in the 1980s-90s, notable being Harkat-ul Jihad Al Islami Bangladesh (HuJIB), and Jamaat-ul-Mujahedeen Bangladesh (JMB), established by fighters who joined the Taliban during Afghan jihad’s fight against Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. After these fighters returned to Bangladesh, they sought to bring the Taliban’s envision into reality—to establish an Islamic rule in Bangladesh, based on Shaira jurisprudence. These groups are also reported to have links with transnational terrorist organisations like al-Qaeda, al-Mujahideen and even Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). The early to mid 2000s was a period of rampant Islamic terror attacks by these groups, primary targets being NGOs and secular and cultural events that they deemed to be ‘un-Islamic’. However, most extremist organisations were checked via strict counterterrorism measures by 2007, although another wave of terrorist attacks surfaced between the period of 2013-2016.
The seven Islamic scholars who attended the meeting with Taliban included Khelafat Majlis chief Mamunul Haque, Nayeb-e-Amir (Pir of Madhupur) of Hefazat-e-Islam Bangladesh Abdul Hamid, Abdul Awal, Abdul Haque, Habibullah Mahmud Qasemi, Monir Hossain Qasemi and Mahbubur Rahman. Both Hefazat and Khelafat belong to the same Deobandi tradition and predominantly trained in Qawmi madrasas, that emphasises in Islamic scholarship independent of state regulated Alia system. In terms of core ideological beliefs, both lay strict emphasis on scriptural orthodoxy, rejection of Barelvi tradition, Sufi practices and Ahmadiya’s inclusion as Muslims and opposition to Western influences, especially on culture and education. In effect, both champions complete Islamisation of socio-cultural life.
Khelafat Majlis, founded in late 1989, emerged during the Bangladesh anti-Ershad movement. An Islamist political party, Khelafat, stated its goal of creating a national governance framework that is based on Qura, Sunnah and early Islamic Caliphates. Therefore, the party’s main target of mobilisation were Islamic scholars and aimed at creating a larger unity between these scholars and general Muslims against the secular system of governance who would push for Khelafat’s Political Islam. Its activities largely confined to anti-secular and blasphemy protests—be it organising a large mass demonstration from Dhaka to Ayodhya demanding for Babri Masjid restoration that was demolished in 1993, protest against installation of “Eternal Flame” at Suhrawardy Udyan, the anti-Taslima movement that led to her exile, the 2017 anti-Statue protest against the installation of the statue of Lady Justice from the Supreme Court premises in Dhaka.
In electoral politics, it had a minimal presence, entering into coalition with both BNP (that it opted out in 2021). Although not involved in overt terror activities, Khelafat’s hardline stance coupled with ideological leniency towards the Taliban were deemed threatening to Bangladesh’s secular principles. Its leaders, including chief Mamunul Haque, were arrested under Digital Security Act and Anti-Terrorism Act under the Awami League government for their participation in protests in anti-secular, anti-blasphemy protests, in alliance with Hefazat-e-Islam.
Unlike Khelafat Majlis, Hefazat-e-Islam is not a political party but an Islamist organisation, drawing on the same ideology and traditions like Khelafat. A coalition of more than 25,000 Qawmi madrasas across Bangladesh, Hefazat emerged in 2010 as a reaction to Awami League government’s Women Development Policy (2009) draft giving women equal inheritance rights. In 2013, Hefazat held a massive rally by blocking roads, commerce and regular activities. Known as the Shapla Chattar siege in Dhaka, Hefazat presented its 13-point demands that included introduction of blasphemy laws, gender segregation in public, declaring Ahmadiyyas as non-Muslims, and curbing every un-Islamic activity, to state a few.
Following Jamaat’s decline in Bangladesh under Awami League’s government, Hefazat’s emergence was seen as the rise of a new radical Islam in Bangladesh and this 2013 siege, a pivotal moment of radical Islamists urban mobilizational efforts directly challenging the secular state authority. Other notable protests are the anti-statue protest of 2017, anti-Modi protest in 2021, the latter turning violent and the death of 17 people. The leaders of Hefazat-e-Islam were meted the same treatment as its ally Khelafat, who provided logistical and ideological support to Hefazat’s programmes.
Following the July Uprising and the establishment of an interim government, both Hefazat-e-Islam and Khelafat Majlis regained their position and marked its active presence in the country. Detained leaders, including Hefazat chief were released, seen as part of the interim government’s reconciliation. However, thanks to both, and its allied Islamic parties, Bangladesh has also been witnessing a series of attacks, especially on the freedom of cultural expression.
Towhidi Janata, a loosely organised group of ‘agitated Muslims’ has been notorious to wreak havoc on events like Book Fair, Lalon Fakir Mela, Basant Utsav and women’s football match. Needless to say, Hefazat and Khelafat provide backing to Towhidi that has also been making headlines recently for increasing attacks on shrines, including the exhumation and burning of body of Nurul Pagla. While these Islamic scholars were in Kabul to meet the Taliban, its leaders and activities back home organised street rallies demanding for implementation of the July Charter and declaring Ahmadiyas to be non-Muslims and a Constitutional reform that is based on Sharia.
Khelafat and Hefazat, although not a terrorist organisation, are ideologically extremist whose beliefs go against Bangladesh’s core national principles. The Taliban meeting surely is their symbolic assertion — of Bangladesh’s Islamists envision of Talibanising the country. This meeting with the Taliban also points to a future normalisation of diplomatic relations between Bangladesh and Taliban’s Afghanistan, as the interim government seems to not object to such an informal meeting. A radicalised Bangladesh under the garb of Islamists pose a serious problem for South Asian neighbours, given these factions’ ideological links not just with Taliban, but also with Pakistan. The Global South, therefore, needs to keep an open eye to such ‘harmless’ meetings.
–IANS
Pakistan’s geopolitics seem to have reached a full circle with the continuous terror of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).Founded in 2007, the TTP is a jihadist militant organisation whose prime target is the Pakistani military. The extremist group envisions creating an Islamic caliphate state based on the Deobandi tradition in Pakistan. Besides, the TTP supported the Taliban’s efforts in Afghanistan. Banned by Pakistan in 2008, TTP is believed to have strong ties with al-Qaeda and Taliban in Afghanistan, and its militant attacks are mostly concentrated in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, bordering Afghanistan.
Following the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in 2021, TTP’s activities resumed, and attacks intensified, adding to Pakistan’s own internal terror attacks. At the same time, Pakistan’s state-sponsored terror groups continue their cross-border terrorism, especially in India. The recent military operation by Pakistan in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa that killed 17 TTP militants disclosed a shocking report: one of the militants killed has been identified as a Bangladeshi national. Bangladesh media reported that the slain militant’s family had no idea of his militant background, who claimed to have moved to Dubai to earn a living. However, as per police intelligence, the Bangladeshi militant moved to Afghanistan.
Pakistani authorities reported to have hounded two or three Bangladeshi militants in their earlier operations, while these men allegedly went to Afghanistan on the pretext of religious work, where they later joined an extremist terrorist organisation. This is, however, not a lone case. In April, a 23-year-old Bangladeshi national, Ahmed Zubair, reported to be a member of Tehreek-e-Taliban, was among the 54 militants killed by Pakistan’s military forces. At least eight Bangladeshi nationals were also reported to have migrated to Afghanistan to join the TTP. The Bangladeshi digital platform also stated that Bangladesh’s own security intelligence remains oblivious to TTP’s outreach in Bangladesh, and if any camps are operating inside the country presently. Again, two individuals—33-year-old Ahmed Faisal and 49-year-old Shamin Mahfuz—were arrested in Bangladesh in July for their alleged TTP links.
It should be noted that Mahfuz is a former leader of Jamaat-ul-Mujahedeen Bangladesh (JMB), and later founded Jama’atul Ansar Fil Hindal Sharqiya in 2019. Both individuals were also previously detained on multiple terrorism charges. From Faisal’s confession, it came to light that most of these Bangladeshi-national militants have moved to Afghanistan either via Saudi Arabia or via Pakistan to join the TTP. Mostly youth, these militants seek to establish an Islamic caliphate worldwide based on the Sharia. During this arrest, it was also learned that four Bangladeshi nationals who joined the TTP were killed on the Afghan-Pakistan border, while 25 more were preparing to leave Bangladesh to join jihad.
The confession also shed light on one Imran Haider, a senior TTP figure, as being the central figure behind the online indoctrination of Bangladeshi youth to recruit them to the TTP. Around the same time, 36 Bangladeshi nationals were reportedly detained in Malaysia for their alleged involvement in a “radical militant movement”. However, Bangladesh’s home advisor downplayed this and denied their extremist links. Since last year, South Asian geopolitics has gone through an unpredictable arc with the fall of Sheikh Hasina in Bangladesh following the July Uprising. On one hand, the interim government in Bangladesh pivoted to Pakistan, boosting bilateral ties—including trade, education, defence and intelligence sharing, while maintaining a deliberate distance with India, Bangladesh’s oldest and long-standing regional partner.
On the other hand, Bangladesh witnessed a rapid surge of Islamist groups, so long sidelined and suppressed via counterterrorism efforts of the Awami League government. Transnational extremist groups like Hizb-ut Tahrir (banned in 2009) made their presence felt in the country, notably for allegedly organising a procession by students in Dhaka under the banner of ‘Conscious Teachers and Students’, demanding the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate system in Bangladesh in October last year and the ‘March to Khilafat’ rally this March. Muhammad Yunus has also appointed individuals associated with Hizb-ut Tahrir in his interim government, sparking controversy in the political scenario.
Moreover, leaders and associates of groups like Hefazat-e-Islam, Ansarulla Bangla Team and Khelafat Majlis—arrested for their extremist links were also released under the interim government, who have now resumed their hate propaganda, to push for the creation of an Islamic state in Bangladesh based on Sharia law. These developments raise concerns about the resurrection of Islamist extremism in Bangladesh, given its history. Those from Bangladesh joined the Taliban to fight against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, returned to their homeland in the 1980s and 90s and established extremist organisations, such as Harkat-ul Jihad Al Islami Bangladesh (HuJIB), and Jamaat-ul-Mujahedeen Bangladesh (JMB).
Needless to say, these groups not only had ideological links with the Taliban but also received logistical support and training from al-Qaeda and Pakistan-based Laskhar-e-Taiba (LeT), and their terror operations in Bangladesh were aimed at creating a Taliban-like establishment in the country. While their activities were crippled due to counterterrorism measures by 2007, Bangladesh remained under periodic terror attacks, witnessing a surge from 2013-2016. The political changes in Bangladesh following Hasina’s deposition further strengthen concerns of Islamist extremists’ comeback in the country, as evident from the above-stated reports.
The recent visit of seven Islamic clerics, including the Khelafat Majlis chief and Nayeb-e-Amir (Pir of Madhupur) of Hefazat-e-Islam, to Afghanistan on the invitation of the Taliban should be viewed with the same caution as the rising trend of militancy in Bangladesh. These groups share the same ideological orientation—Deobandi school of Islam—as that of the Taliban and hailed the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan as a “triumph of Islam”. While not extremist groups themselves, these parties’ ideological inclination to the Taliban and their own hardline stance on socio-cultural-political life signal a possible convergence of interests between these organisations and foreign-linked militant ones. Nevertheless, Bangladesh’s Anti-Terrorism Unit’s additional inspector general claims that there is no militant activity in Bangladesh while simultaneously stating that future militant activity cannot be ruled out either. With the election around the corner and Bangladesh’s fragile state of democracy, this rise of militancy in Bangladesh now poses the greatest security risk, not just for Dhaka but also for South Asia as a whole.One can only hope that Bangladesh’s law enforcement forces to deal with militant trends seriously without having to resort to denial. Otherwise, it would not be long before Bangladesh becomes the second Pakistan.
–IANS
Bangladesh’s ultimate goal of forming an Islamic Revolutionary Army goes beyond internal consolidation and aims to position the country as a strategic outpost for transnational jihadist operations – serving Pakistan’s geopolitical interests and silencing secular voices, a report cited on Wednesday. It mentioned that by forging alliances with Islamist elements and portraying them as “grassroots defenders”, the regime led by Muhammad Yunus seeks to weaken the Bangladesh Army – the last standing national institution capable of resisting radical influence.
“A grave and coordinated conspiracy is unfolding within Bangladesh. Behind the façade of political rhetoric and ‘anti-discrimination’ activism, the regime of Muhammad Yunus has embarked on a project that could ignite the most serious security crisis in South Asia since the rise of the Taliban,” a report in leading Bangladeshi outlet ‘Blitz’ has detailed. Citing multiple sources – including regime insiders, social media disclosures, and intelligence leaks- the report indicated that an Islamic Revolutionary Army (IRA) is being formed to supplant the Bangladesh Army with an ideologically driven militia loyal to Yunus and his Islamist allies.
“This so-called ‘Islamic Revolutionary Army’ is not a mere political stunt or student enthusiasm. It represents a dangerous convergence of radical Islamism, foreign intelligence collusion, and calculated efforts to militarise civilian networks. The consequences, if unchecked, could transform Bangladesh from a moderate Muslim democracy into a launchpad for jihadist expansion across South Asia,” it stressed. According to the report, in a stunning revelation on his social media platform earlier this week, Asif Mahmud Shojib Bhuyain – “an influential as well as controversial” advisor to the Yunus regime – publicly announced the recruitment and training of 8,850 individuals across seven training centres in Bangladesh.
He outlined the programme, stating that trainees would undergo martial arts, judo, taekwondo, and firearms instruction. Hours after the post, the screenshots went viral before disappearing. Citing sources within Dhaka, the report confirmed that this marked only the first phase of a larger plan with five successive batches of 8,850 recruits each set to complete training by January 2026. “The recruitment process reportedly includes written, viva, and physical tests — all overseen by retired Bangladeshi officers with strong pro-Pakistan leanings, alongside covert representatives of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and Turkey’s Milli İstihbarat Teskilati (MIT),” it highlighted.
“Bangladesh’s civil society, its remaining independent journalists, and the patriotic factions within the military must act before it is too late. Once a revolutionary army rooted in ideology replaces a professional army bound by the constitution, Bangladesh will no longer be a sovereign republic – it will be a caliphate in disguise,” the report noted.
–IANS
– Arun Anand
The interim government, which has been in power for over a year, is now grappling with a credibility crisis as political parties question its neutrality and its ability to ensure free and fair elections in the upcoming national polls scheduled for February.
Formed under the leadership of Muhammad Yunus following Sheikh Hasina’s ouster last year, the interim administration was projected as a corrective force meant to dismantle the remnants of authoritarianism in the country. Its key responsibilities were to restore stability, implement crucial reforms, and oversee a transparent democratic transition. Yet, it has failed on all these fronts. The initial perception of the interim government as a righteous alternative has eroded, exposing an even deeper democratic deficit than before.
Recently, six international human rights organisations have addressed a letter to Muhammad Yunus, the interim government’s chief advisor, urging his government to take concrete measures to prevent further human rights violations and to advance reforms process to uphold the country’s human rights. Two pressing issues addressed in the letter deserve our attention, for these highlight the failures of the interim government—the arbitrary arrests and detentions of journalists and politically motivated attacks on Awami League members.
Press freedom has been a longstanding concern in Bangladesh, partly due to the country being under prolonged military rule and the failure to reforming media even after restoration of civilian government in 1990. It is well established that press faced unprecedented censorship previously whereby any criticism against the government in power has been stifled. While the media in Bangladesh hoped to see a new dawn of freedom after 2024 July Uprising, the reality, however, remains concerning. In an eerily similar way like its predecessor, the interim government continues to target journalists in Bangladesh, via harassment, intimidation, physical attack (including murder) and detention.
Labelling any voice of dissent and criticism as “collaborators of fascist Awami League government” has become the interim government’s most used tool of repressing media freedom. The mob attack on speakers inside Dhaka Reporters’ Unity, and detention of 16, including journalist Monjurul Alam Panna under anti-Terrorism Act has been widely criticised as Bangladesh’s growing culture of intimidation and impunity since the past year.
According to the World Freedom Index, Bangladesh’s press freedom was classified as “very serious”, noting that over 130 journalists have been subjected to ‘unfounded judicial proceedings’, especially on charges of ‘crimes against humanity’ and ‘murder’. As per Rights and Risks Analysis Group (RRAG) report, in the first eight months of Yunus-led interim government, about 640 journalists have been targeted, which includes 182 journalists being filed under criminal cases, 206 journalists being filed under acts of violence, and cancellation of press accreditation of 167 journalists.
The first half of this year witnessed 266 journalists being implicated in cases related to July Uprising, and about 50 media organisations in the country being impacted on the same accusation. Dhaka-based Human Rights Support Society (HRSS) also reported the ‘alarming’ human rights situation in Bangladesh, noting that 340 journalists have been victims of murder. Human Rights Watch in its October report, too, accused the interim government of abusing recent amended Anti-Terrorism Act to target political opponents, including academics and journalists, and stuff them in prisons.
Bangladeshi Journalists in International Media (BJIM) also claimed that attacks on journalists reported in different districts allegedly involve local miscreants and even law enforcement agencies while the administration has taken no visible steps yet. The declining state of press freedom in Bangladesh remains a challenge to the country’s democratic transition.
For the interim government, the journalists are not the only opponents slapped with terrorism charges. The main target of its wrath has been members and loyalists of the Awami League.
Post-Hasina Bangladesh witnessed a paradigm shift of its historical narrative—from Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s legacy to the history of Liberation War itself. Moreover, moments after Hasina fled Bangladesh, the country succumbed to a compromised law and order situation, where mobocracy emerged as new normal. Instead of restoring stability, the interim government exhausted all its efforts in ostracizing Awami League. From army, judiciary and police force, educational institutions, all League loyalists were first replaced or forced to resign.
The government also became a bystander to the surge in mob attacks on those alleged to be League loyalists (including, the religious minorities), justifying these attacks as “political”. Every act of vandalism, including the despicable demolition of 32 Dhanmondi, was also labelled as “act of provocation” by outsiders. Instead of arresting the perpetrators, the interim government launched Operation Devil Hunt, arresting as many as 18,384 people across Bangladesh, mostly those affiliated with the Awami League and Chhatra and Jubo League.
This witch-hunt started much before Awami League was officially banned this May following the amendment of Anti-Terrorism Law. The ban received criticisms from international rights organisations—Human Rights Watch, United Nations and Amnesty International—as a partisan act that risk repressing political pluralism which also undermine the country’s reform process.
The Human Rights Watch deputy Asia director accused the interim government of being more stuck on juggling an unreformed security sector, violent religious hardliners and political groups seeking vengeance on Hasina supporters than protecting the rights of Bangladeshis. The report also noted the interim government’s pattern of mass arrests and arbitrary detention of hundreds of League supporters misusing its amended Anti-Terrorism Law, slapping them with baseless charges and denying the detainees with proper medical care and bail.
The Freedom House reported that while the interim government lifted restrictions on major political parties that opposed the Awami League, restrictions increased on former ruling party. Leaders of Awami League were arrested on alleged crimes based on skewed evidence. The ban on the party, the cancellation of its party registration at the Election Commission along with the continues witch-hunting on League and its allies via amendment of legislative measures have not only hindered the activities of Awami League but also identified as the interim government undermining fundamental freedoms.
Notwithstanding Yunus and his other adviser’s persistent denial of worrying human rights track, rights organisations—both national as well as international—have been noting the hypocrisy of following the same ‘fascist’ path against which it was established in the first place. It is now evident that Muhammad Yunus is only using its political powers to seek political vendetta against Awami League and Sheikh Hasina, his old opponents.
Now with just the players change, democracy is taking a backseat, while mobocracy, culture of extortion, religious extremism and political violence—all sustained via the interim government’s human rights violations—are ruling Bangladesh’s political culture. Amidst this, the chances of a free and fair election, a just and inclusive democratic transition feel slim.
The partition of India has been described by historians as a great misfortune of human civilization. In his book ‘Guilty Man of Partition of India’, Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia argues that the leaders responsible for the partition of India were arrogant, conceited and ambitious. South Asia is still reeling from the aftermath of partition. Bengali Muslims, who accepted Pakistan as Muslims, launched a revolution under the leadership of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman to create Bangladesh for their language, culture and identity. At that time, Pakistan was widely supported and assisted by America and China. India, which was defeated by China in 1962, was isolated from China and America after defeating Pakistan in 1965. Pakistan’s military rulers did not spare any brutality to suppress the movement led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Three million Bengalis were martyred in the eight-month movement. Pakistani soldiers raped three hundred thousand Bengali women to change the Bengali language.
In the history of human civilization, no military force in the world has shown such ruthlessness and brutality. Due to the growing movement, India was forced to feed the Bengali refugees. In the 70s, India received the excellent leadership of Indira Gandhi. Indira Gandhi was a skilled player in diplomacy. She mobilized the Indian army to support the Mukti Bahini soldiers. At that difficult juncture in history, America and China did not hesitate to threaten India.
US President Nixon did not just advocate for Pakistan but also sent a warship with nuclear capabilities to the Bay of Bengal. Similarly, China also used the word war to invade India from the Himalayan region. That was a difficult situation for Indira Gandhi. She traveled to the Soviet Union and succeeded in signing a peace treaty with the Soviet Union in 1971. According to the terms of the treaty, the clause on the invasion of India stated that Soviet Russia would fight alongside India. Due to the aftermath of the peace treaty with Soviet Russia, American pressure and Chinese threats became self-evident. In other words, Indira Gandhi succeeded in becoming the midwife of Bangladesh. Bangladesh was born on the basis of culture. The song written by Rabindranath Tagore became the national anthem of Bangladesh.
In Bangladesh, which was built on the concept of a secular and inclusive society, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was martyred along with his family in 1975 after being targeted by extremists. Sheikh Hasina was able to save her life because she was in Germany. Over time, she took refuge in India. After 1975, it seems that the rule was in the hands of extremists for a long time. Bangladeshi society is divided into two parts, the Ashraf and the Atarf. The Ashraf community has a large population and this community seems to support inclusiveness and secularism, while the Atarf seems to stand in favor of Islamization and Sharia law. After 1975, the Jamdani rebellion was again in favor of secularism in 1989. In other words, Bengali nationalism seems to have become strong again and managed to hold power for a long time. However, from 2001 to 2006, extremist forces like the BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami succeeded in making Bangladesh a victim of backwardness.
From 2006 to 2008, the nationalist movement in Bangladesh, especially under the leadership of Sheikh Hasina’s party, became successful. Bangladesh began to draw up a roadmap for modernization. In 2012, the movement took shape, taking the decision to transform Bangladesh’s economy under the leadership of Sheikh Hasina. With the arrival of Sheikh Hasina, there was a major change in foreign policy. Resolving the border issue with India was a major success of Bangladesh’s foreign policy. Due to Sheikh Hasina’s strong leadership, Bangladesh became one of the fastest growing economies in South Asia. By importing raw materials from India, Bangladesh succeeded in making a leap in the textile sector in Europe and America.
Bangladesh was able to benefit more from the heat and heat of globalization and open economy. Bangladesh’s modernization journey was not digestible even by America. Due to the geopolitical structure of Bangladesh, America wanted to keep its footprint in Bangladesh, Saint Martin Island. The American base campus on Saint Martin Island was sponsored by the American goal of observing Chinese activities in Myanmar. Sheikh Hasina did not have American conditions. Against this background, an uprising began in Bangladesh with the alliance of America and Pakistan and the goodwill of China. This uprising turned into an explosion. Sheikh Hasina’s working style was also different. Hasina also abused her power to rein in the radicals and suppress the opposition. On August 5, 2024, Sheikh Hasina managed to escape from Bangladesh and took refuge in India.
During this long period, the Hindu community of Bangladesh became a scapegoat. The Hindu community had the largest investment in Bangladesh’s textiles. After the Hindu community became the target of radicalism, the textile system was completely destroyed. During the leadership of Bangladesh under Nobel Prize winner Mohammad Yunus, the alliance between Bangladesh and Pakistan seems to have fully increased. Recently, a Bangladeshi court has sentenced Sheikh Hasina to death, and Bangladesh seems to have started diplomatic efforts to pressure India to extradite Sheikh Hasina, who has taken refuge in India.
Bangladesh’s security advisor, who is visiting India, has placed Indian security advisor Ajit Doval in Bangladesh’s favor. Although there is an extradition treaty between India and Bangladesh, its articles 6 and 7 state that the extradition treaty will not be applicable to political charges. Despite the deep influence of the Awami League in Bangladesh, there is silence in civil society due to the rampant extremism. Experts believe that the Hindu community will again be targeted by terrorists in the region where Sheikh Hasina was installed as the protector of the one crore Hindu community, which has had a great impact on the lives of the people of Bangladesh. Experts believe that Bangladesh may become like Afghanistan in the region where the chemistry between Bangladesh and Pakistan has dissolved.
In this sense, international powers and human rights activists have appealed to India not to extradite Sheikh Hasina. It does not seem appropriate to extradite Sheikh Hasina on the basis of democratic values. Since Bengali society is strong in terms of civilization, culture and literature, Bangladeshi society has the ability to defeat extremism. It can be estimated that the Awami League will regain power in the region where democracy is established in Bangladesh. In this sense, it does not seem appropriate to stand under any diplomatic pressure, keeping in mind the broader interests of South Asia. Modi should consider the example of Indira Gandhi and pursue a strategic policy with Bangladesh.
The political climate in Bangladesh is charged as parties are gearing up for Jatiya Sangsad election in February, next year. While Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) has officially announced 237 candidates to contest for 300 parliamentary seats in the upcoming election, Jamaat-e-Islami is yet to announce its candidacy as it is contemplating to enter into coalition with other parties.
National Citizen Party (NCP), on the other hand, expressed desire to contest alone in all 300 seats, although stating its openness to coalition with other parties. Amidst this, the announcement of Asif Mahmud, the student advisor of the interim government, to contest in the forthcoming election from a Dhaka constituency, was much awaited. However, this pronouncement unmasks the interim government’s neutrality, long contested by political parties. And thus begins the anticipation — will the upcoming election be free and fair?
Since the beginning of this year, the interim government’s neutrality came under scrutiny as a new political party — the National Citizen Party (NCP) — came into being, a party formed by student leaders of the 2024 July Uprising. Established on 8th August 2024, the interim government included three student advisors — Nahid Islam, Asif Mahmud and Mahfuz Alam — who were also core leaders of the Uprising.
One of them, Nahid Islam, resigned from his advisory position this February to join the NCP as its chief convenor, leading to allegations against the interim government sustaining the establishment of a ‘King’s Party’ instead of fulfilling political parties’ demand of announcing an election roadmap.
Indeed, Chief Advisor Muhammad Yunus has shown partisanship towards the NCP, given that student leaders were the one supporting (and inviting) Yunus to hold this position in the interim government. This is notwithstanding the revelation by Youth, Labour and Sports advisor Asif Mahmud of Bangladesh Army Chief’s reservations about students’ decision of inviting Yunus, in a video of Mahmud shared by NCP chief (South) Hasnat Abdullah back in March.
Much before the formal establishment of the NCP, Muhammad Yunus’s interim government parroted the same narrative as that of student leaders of the July Uprising, taking measures suiting their demands. Nowhere has this been more prominent than in a series of official measures targeted to erase Sheikh Mujibur Rahmas’s legacy, to the extent of stripping him of his title of ‘Father of the Nation’. Taking the hands of these July Uprising leaders, the interim government resorted to historical revisionism of the Liberation War, raising a new political discourse of ‘new Bangladesh’ — where Bangladesh is believed to attain ‘real liberation’ on 5 August 2025, the day Sheikh Hasina was forced to flee the country.
Following NCP’s formation, the interim government has accepted many of its demands, even before the party’s official registration in the Election Commission. The official ban on Awami League in May via amendment of 2009 Anti-Terrorism Act, barring it from contesting in the national election came only after NCP hit the streets. This ban on a party, rather than individuals accused of war crimes, has been claimed as undemocratic by international rights organisations. League’s ban has been NCP’s main goals, one that Yunus conceded to, as evident in his earlier statements where he expressed the decision on Awami League’s participation in election to be left to the League itself.
In line with NCP’s demands, the interim government has paid excessive attention to reforms, while keeping Bangladesh’s democratic transition via election in the backseat. This has led to political parties’ accusing the interim government of giving administrative benefits to people (referring to Nahid Islam) who left the government to form their own party—thus the interim government facilitating the establishment of a ‘King’s Party’ to derail the election. The two student advisors—Asif Mahmud and Mahfuz Alam—of the interim government have also been accused of being ‘NCP loyalists’ around the same time and political parties demanded for their resignation, as they have violated the expected neutrality of the interim government which is to ensure free and fair political democratic transition.
The July Charter is another area where the interim government displayed its tilt towards the student-led party. Only after a threat by NCP to declare the July Charter on their own, the interim government announced the July Declaration on 5 August and gave it constitutional recognition, fulfilling yet another NCP’s agenda. The July National Charter, announced on 17 October, further incorporated many of NCP’s demands—which were opposed by the now largest political party BNP along with other parties. These are—public referendum on reforms included in the July Charter which also includes 48 constitutional reforms and omission of notes of dissent in the implementation process of the July Charter, moves that drew controversy for bypassing legal parliamentary process and undemocratic enforcement, leaving consensus out of the July Charter. The Charter also excluded the basic constitutional principles based on liberation aspirations (nationalism, socialism, democracy and secularism), closely aligning with NCP’s demands whose vision is to put the final nail to the 1972 ‘Mujibist’ Constitution.
It was the implementation process of the July Charter and the finalisation of the election roadmap in October that again raised fresh accusations of the interim government’s neutrality being compromised. Parties, especially BNP and Jamaa, alleged that the Charter implementation process to show political biasness (towards NCP), and pressed for removal of party-affiliated individuals from the interim government (supposed to assume the role of caretaker government before election) hinting at student advisors Mahfuz Alam and Asif Mahmud, who are believed to be NCP loyalists. Following meetings with party representations with the Chief Advisor, raising concerns on neutrality compromising free and fair polls, the top echelon of the government asked the two student advisors to step down.
Both advisors requested more time to reach their decision on resignation. While Mahfuz Alam, Information and Broadcasting advisor, still has not shown any interest in contesting for the upcoming election, local government advisor Asif Mahmud recently announced that he will contest election and will resign from his administrative position before that. While he has not yet revealed if he would contest the election as an independent candidate or via any party (NCP), Mahmud’s late revelation unveils that the interim government never being a neutral administrative body in the first place.
Mahmud also proved his earlier press report true where he opined that “advisors who intend to join politics should resign after election announcement… otherwise the election will be questioned.” With only two months left for national election, the political tense environment in Bangladesh and interim government’s neutrality unmasked confirm that 13th national election will neither be inclusive, nor free and fair.
–IANS
An investigative report published by Blitz, a leading Bangladesh weekly, has alleged that Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus’s global ‘Grameen’ network has long-standing connections with individuals identified by Western intelligence agencies as financiers of Osama bin Laden and the Al Qaeda network. The report, authored by Blitz editor Salah Uddin Shoaib Choudhury, has called for an international inquiry into Yunus’s transnational financial partnerships.
According to the report, “For years, Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus has been celebrated across the world as a pioneer of microfinance and a champion of the poor. Yet behind this carefully polished global image lies a far darker reality — a web of connections linking Yunus’s sprawling ‘Grameen’ empire to individuals named by Western intelligence agencies as financiers of Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda.”
The report further adds, “In March 2003, The Wall Street Journal published a list of Al Qaeda donors based on CIA information, where the name of Mohammed Abdul Latif Jameel — a Saudi businessman and board member of Grameen-Jameel Microfinance — appeared prominently. The report noted that Jameel was one of the key funders of Osama bin Laden, the notorious mastermind behind the September 11 terrorist attacks.”
Online corporate records describe ‘Grameen-Jameel’ as a social business established in 2007 as a joint venture between the Grameen Foundation and Grow Well Limited, a subsidiary of the Abdul Latif Jameel Group. According to these records, the company’s mission is to “alleviate poverty in the Arab world” through partnerships with microfinance institutions, providing technical and financial support.”
It further adds, “On its LinkedIn page, Grameen-Jameel states that it was established in 2003 and incorporated in 2007 as a joint venture between Grameen Foundation and ALJ Foundation, a subsidiary of the Abdul Latif Jameel Group.”
“The company claims to be the first social business in the Middle East, North Africa (MENA), and Turkey devoted to expanding microfinance. As of December 2013, it facilitated more than USD 65 million in financing, reaching over 2.2 million clients through partner institutions across 10 countries in the MENA region and Turkey.”
According to the report, the company is incorporated in Cyprus and headquartered in Dubai’s International Humanitarian City. Its website is currently inactive, and its Facebook page has been suspiciously deactivated.
“Further strengthening the Grameen-Jameel connection is Zaher Al Munajjed, the Chairman of Grameen-Jameel Microfinance Ltd. Al Munajjed also serves as a senior advisor to Mohammed Abdul Latif Jameel, President of the ALJ Group in Saudi Arabia. With more than 25 years of international business experience, he has played a key role in developing vocational training and microfinance programs. A Harvard Business School alumnus and holder of a Master’s degree in French International Law, Al Munajjed is widely regarded as a major architect of microfinance expansion in the MENA and Turkish regions,” says the Blitz report.
The Jameel family’s controversial past
According to the Blitz report, Yousef Jameel — another prominent figure from the Jameel dynasty — was once notorious in London’s casino circles in the 1980s. According to the Daily Mail, he was widely known as a playboy, later becoming entangled in an international child abduction case.
Adding to the controversies, his name appears in Jeffrey Epstein’s notorious ‘Black Book’, which exposed networks tied to child exploitation and human trafficking. On July 21, 2004, Jameel and others filed an appeal with the British Court of Appeal following the publication of a Sunday Times report titled ‘Car tycoon ‘linked’ to Bin Laden’ on June 8, 2003. The report claimed that Jameel had been sued by the families of the victims of the 9/11 attacks.
On February 3, 2005, Dow Jones & Co., the parent of The Wall Street Journal, filed its own appeal against Yousef Abdul Latif Jameel.
In a landmark ruling on October 11, 2006, the highest court in Britain sided with The Wall Street Journal, affirming the importance of investigative journalism. The ruling highlighted that the article was published as part of a legitimate public-interest inquiry into terror financing.
The court record stated:
“Above the article and headline were photographs of the claimant, Mr Jameel, his company Hartwell PLC, and the Twin Towers burning on 11 September 2001, with the following words: ‘Accused: Yousef Jameel’s family firm bought the British car dealer Hartwell in 1990. Now he is alleged to have helped fund training for the terrorists who carried out the September 11 attacks’.”
Despite these allegations, Jameel has long been regarded as a successful entrepreneur and “generous philanthropist”. He has contributed significant funding to programs at MIT aimed at reducing poverty and improving water and food security. For his philanthropic commitments and contributions to arts and culture in the United Kingdom, Mohammed Abdul Latif Jameel received an honorary knighthood from Queen Elizabeth II. The honour was announced by the British Embassy in Riyadh,” says the Blitz report.
“However, The Guardian later reported that a group of wealthy Saudi businessmen — including individuals close to Jameel — were suing for libel in the High Court over allegations that they may have financed Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda network. They chose London because of its reputation as a claimant-friendly environment for defamation cases,” mentions the Blitz report.
Suspicious connections of Grameen
The Blitz report has also mentioned the allegations linking Grameen entities to the Muslim Brotherhood, raising further concerns about Yunus’s global partnerships.
“Even more disturbing are reports indicating sinister links between Grameen Bank and illegal human organ traders. Individuals unable to repay their loans were allegedly coerced into selling their organs to settle debts,” says the Blitz report.
–IANS