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Bangladesh is facing a deepening democratic crisis as violence, persecution and mob rule increasingly become part of everyday life, raising serious concerns about the credibility of the country’s political transition ahead of national elections scheduled for early 2026. Observers note that the current political environment represents a sharp deterioration in law and order, marked by rising communal tensions, ethnic and religious attacks, suppression of dissent and the growing influence of extremist elements. What was initially presented as a corrective transition toward democratic renewal has instead exposed profound institutional and societal weaknesses.
The crisis traces back to mid-2024, when mass protests and unrest led to the removal of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and the installation of an interim administration led by Chief Advisor Muhammad Yunus. Since then, the political landscape has become increasingly polarised, with bans and restrictions placed on major political parties and their affiliated organisations, significantly narrowing democratic space. Although the interim government has described the forthcoming election as an opportunity to restore democratic legitimacy, critics argue that the necessary conditions for a free and fair vote remain absent. Continued violence, political exclusion and the absence of broad-based participation have cast doubt on whether the electoral process can command public trust.
Human rights groups and civil society organisations report a surge in mob violence, attacks on minority communities, intimidation of journalists and harassment of political opponents. These developments have contributed to an atmosphere of fear and insecurity, undermining citizens’ ability to freely express political views or participate in civic life. Analysts point out that Bangladesh’s democratic institutions have long been fragile, shaped by a history of military rule and authoritarian governance. The current crisis, they warn, risks entrenching a culture of impunity if accountability mechanisms are not restored and the rule of law reinforced.
The unrest has also drawn attention beyond Bangladesh’s borders, with regional observers expressing concern about the implications for stability in South Asia. Calls have grown for stronger protections for minorities, independent media and political activists, as well as for inclusive dialogue among all stakeholders. Critics argue that the interim administration has struggled to curb extremist violence or reassure vulnerable communities, while the absence of transparent decision-making has further weakened confidence in governance. Without urgent reforms, they warn, the normalisation of violence could become a permanent feature of Bangladesh’s political landscape.
As the country moves closer to elections, pressure is mounting on authorities to ensure an inclusive, secure and credible democratic process. For many Bangladeshis, the coming months will determine whether the nation can reverse its current trajectory and restore public faith in democratic institutions.
Former Bangladesh prime minister Sheikh Hasina has issued a sharp warning about the state of democracy in Bangladesh, arguing that the country is being governed without legitimate public mandate and that political stability will remain elusive unless inclusive elections are restored. Speaking in a wide-ranging interview, Hasina reflected on the political unrest that led to her departure from office in 2024 and offered a critical assessment of the current interim administration. She said the protests that began as student-led demonstrations were later overtaken by radical elements, resulting in widespread violence, destruction of public property and attacks on law enforcement personnel.
Hasina said her decision to leave the country was taken to prevent further bloodshed as the situation deteriorated. She rejected claims that her government suppressed peaceful dissent, stating that her administration initially allowed protests and sought accountability through judicial mechanisms. The former prime minister was particularly critical of the interim government led by Muhammad Yunus, arguing that it lacks democratic legitimacy because it was not elected by the people. She said banning the Awami League — a party that has won multiple national elections — and detaining its leaders undermines the foundations of democratic governance.
According to Hasina, meaningful political normalisation in Bangladesh requires the lifting of restrictions on political parties, the release of political detainees and the holding of free, fair and inclusive elections. Without these steps, she warned, any future government would struggle to gain domestic or international credibility. Hasina also accused the interim administration of dissolving inquiry processes into the 2024 violence and of empowering extremist groups, alleging that such actions have weakened law and order and endangered minority communities. She expressed concern that the current political climate has discouraged investment and stalled economic momentum built over the past decade.
Defending her own record, Hasina highlighted her role in restoring democratic institutions after periods of military rule and pointed to sustained economic growth, infrastructure development and poverty reduction during her tenure. She maintained that democratic governance requires both strong institutions and the participation of all major political forces. On foreign policy, Hasina cautioned against major strategic realignments by a government without an electoral mandate, arguing that long-term national interests should reflect the will of the people rather than interim political arrangements.
Her remarks come as Bangladesh prepares for national elections amid heightened political polarisation and questions over inclusivity. Observers note that the exclusion of major political parties could undermine voter confidence and deepen instability. As debates over Bangladesh’s democratic future intensify, Hasina’s comments underscore the central question facing the country: whether political order can be restored without broad public participation and electoral legitimacy.
What began as a hopeful chapter for free expression in Bangladesh has turned into a growing crisis for journalists and independent media, according to analysts, human rights groups, and press organisations. When Nobel Laureate Dr. Muhammad Yunus assumed leadership of Bangladesh’s interim government in August 2024 following the fall of the Sheikh Hasina administration, many inside and outside the country saw it as a potential reset for democratic freedoms—particularly for a media landscape long constrained by legal and political pressures.
However, in the 16 months since, journalists report that those early expectations have largely given way to disillusionment. Rather than broadening space for dissenting voices, critics say the government has presided over increasing intimidation, legal harassment, and violent actions against the press.
A report released on World Press Freedom Day 2025 painted a stark picture of deteriorating conditions: within eight months of Yunus taking office, at least 640 journalists were targeted, including assaults, fabricated criminal charges, and financial scrutiny—particularly through state agencies.
Independent press organisations say the situation continues to worsen as Bangladesh approaches its February 2026 national elections. Journalists in Dhaka and beyond now describe death threats, online surveillance, and stalking as the “new normal” for reporters covering politics and governance.
Compounding these concerns, a U.S. press freedom group formally urged Yunus’s government to release journalists imprisoned on questionable murder charges, noting that some detained reporters are held in harsh conditions without credible evidence of wrongdoing.
Beyond individual threats, media institutions themselves have faced violence and destruction. In December, offices of major newspapers—including Prothom Alo and The Daily Star—were vandalised and set alight in mob attacks. Leaders of the Bangladesh Editors’ Council said some elements within the interim government appeared to have allowed or failed to prevent these attacks.
These incidents have sown fear among journalists and civil society activists, many of whom say state forces have been slow or unwilling to protect media workers during outbreaks of mob violence.
Analysts note that draconian legal instruments, including laws framed around “digital safety,” remain in force and are used to muzzle critical reporting—a stark contrast with earlier promises by Yunus to reform such measures.
Observers point to a broader pattern in which courts and administrative bodies have become avenues for silencing dissent, with journalists facing lengthy investigations, travel bans, frozen bank accounts, and professional blacklisting.
Despite these troubling trends, civil society groups continue to push for meaningful media reform and stronger protections for journalists. Advocates say that safeguarding free expression will be essential not just for press freedom, but for the credibility of Bangladesh’s democratic process as the country heads toward a pivotal election.
Recent attacks on Hindu minorities in Bangladesh — including arson, lynchings and threats tied to unverified blasphemy claims — have reignited debate over whether such violence is sporadic or part of a deeper, structural pattern rooted in decades of social, legal and political trends. Rights groups, community leaders and researchers point to a series of recurring incidents that suggest longstanding vulnerabilities for Hindus in the Muslim‑majority nation. The most recent high‑profile case involved the lynching of a Hindu garment worker in late 2025, when coworkers accused him of blasphemy without substantiated evidence. The fatal mob attack sparked protests, diplomatic concern and renewed scrutiny of how religious minorities are treated during periods of political turmoil and social tension. Advocates and analysts argue that these events are not isolated but reflect broader historical patterns of communal violence and discrimination that have periodically erupted, especially during political transitions or when allegations of religious offence circulate in local communities.
In multiple incidents throughout 2025, attackers targeted homes and properties of Hindu families, sometimes issuing threats and warning banners alleging “anti‑Islamic activities.” In one case in the Chattogram region, attackers set fire to a Hindu household after issuing threatening notices in the area, forcing the family to flee for safety. Rights observers describe such episodes as more than random criminality and stress how religious prejudice can escalate quickly into mass violence in poorly policed settings. Historical data underline that Hindu communities in Bangladesh have faced waves of violence over decades, with documented attacks during and after the country’s independence in 1971, repeated post‑election unrest in the early 2000s, and communal tensions tied to religious controversies. Analysts note that violence has not been limited to physical assaults; reports also include destruction of temples, displacement of families and persistent fears of marginalisation among minorities.
Scholars and demographers highlight long‑term demographic changes that have reduced the Hindu share of Bangladesh’s population over several decades, driven in part by economic distress, social discrimination and repeated waves of communal unrest. Some academic estimates suggest that millions of Hindus left the country between the 1960s and early 2010s because of persecution and insecurity, contributing to a steady decline in the community’s proportion of the total population. Legal and constitutional developments have also played a role. Bangladesh’s declaration of Islam as the state religion in the late 20th century, along with historical property laws that disproportionately affected Hindu owners, are cited by commentators as factors that reinforced the community’s political and economic marginalisation.
The Bangladeshi interim government and security officials have at times rejected characterisations of systematic persecution, framing recent incidents as politically motivated conflicts or isolated criminal acts rather than evidence of broader communal targeting. Officials contend that police and judicial processes are addressing violent cases and that overall social harmony remains a priority. This narrative contrasts with accounts from some rights groups and international observers who see patterns of violence that disproportionately affect Hindus during periods of political instability or heightened social tension.
The issue has also strained diplomatic ties, with protests in neighbouring India calling for protection of Hindu minorities and strong remarks from Indian officials about the safety of communities across the border. Some political activists and civic groups in the region argue that recurring violence against Hindus threatens not only individual safety but also cultural heritage and pluralistic values. At the same time, voices within Bangladesh call for greater protection of minority rights, improved law enforcement responses and constructive dialogue to prevent future outbreaks of violence.
Analysts emphasise that understanding the nature of violence — whether episodic or structural — requires consideration of both recent events and long‑term historical dynamics. While immediate triggers for attacks often involve local disputes or unfounded religious accusations, the frequency and distribution of such incidents over decades suggest persistent vulnerabilities rooted in legal frameworks, social attitudes and political transitions. As Bangladesh prepares for national elections and continued social change, the debate over whether violence against Hindus is an anomaly or part of enduring structural pressures is likely to remain central to discussions on minority rights, national identity and democratic development.
Questions over press freedom in Bangladesh have resurfaced amid allegations that the interim government led by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus has failed to ensure an independent and secure environment for journalists, despite pledges of democratic reform.
According to critics and media observers, journalists in Bangladesh continue to face intimidation, legal pressure and harassment, raising concerns that freedom of expression remains constrained under the current administration. The claims suggest that the media environment has not seen the expected improvement following the political transition of 2024.
Journalists and press freedom advocates allege that reporters critical of the government have been subjected to arrests, questioning and legal cases, creating a climate of fear within newsrooms. Several journalists have reported receiving threats, while others say they are increasingly resorting to self-censorship to avoid retaliation. Media organisations argue that the use of legal provisions against journalists has continued under the interim government, undermining assurances that press freedom would be protected during the transition period.
Local journalist bodies have expressed alarm over attacks on media offices and individuals, claiming that insufficient action has been taken against those responsible. They warn that the lack of accountability has emboldened hostile elements and weakened trust in the state’s commitment to protecting journalists. Editors and reporters say the environment for independent journalism has become increasingly hostile, with many fearing for their personal safety while carrying out their professional duties.
The debate over media freedom is unfolding against a backdrop of wider political tension in Bangladesh. Critics of the interim government accuse it of suppressing dissenting voices and narrowing democratic space, particularly as the country prepares for national elections expected in early 2026. Opposition figures and civil society groups argue that restricting media freedom risks undermining the credibility of the electoral process and weakening public confidence in democratic institutions.
The Yunus-led interim government has rejected allegations of press repression, maintaining that it respects freedom of speech and that any legal action against journalists is based on due process rather than political motives. Officials have stated that maintaining law and order and preventing misinformation are key priorities during the transition.
International press freedom and human rights groups have urged Bangladesh’s leadership to strengthen safeguards for journalists, review laws that may be misused to silence criticism, and ensure that media professionals can work without fear or interference. As Bangladesh moves closer to a crucial election year, the state of media freedom is likely to remain under close domestic and international scrutiny, serving as a key measure of the country’s democratic health.
-(Dr Sreoshi Sinha, Senior Fellow, Centre for Joint Warfare Studies
& Abu Obaidha Arin, University of
Delhi.)
The persecution of journalists by the state is a grim reality across many authoritarian regimes—from Taliban-ruled Afghanistan to Myanmar, Belarus, Turkiye, and the Philippines. In such contexts, the press—often deemed the “fourth pillar of democracy”—is treated not as a watchdog, but as a threat. Bangladesh is also echoing this global trend. After the fall of the Sheikh Hasina government on August 5, 2024, many viewed the rise of Nobel Laureate Dr Muhammad Yunus as a turning point. Backed by student protests and public sentiment, his appointment as Chief Adviser cum Prime Minister of the interim government was seen as a symbolic “second liberation,” especially for the country’s long-suffocated media. But within months, that promise gave way to disillusionment. Despite initial pledges to restore freedom of expression and uphold democratic values, Yunus’s administration has presided over a deepening assault on press freedom. Journalists, both in urban and rural areas, are now facing threats, fabricated charges, detentions, and brutal attacks. Old laws like the Digital Security Act— once condemned by Yunus himself—remain in force. New regulations, framed in the name of “digital safety,” risk further gagging the media. More troubling still, the government has failed to announce an election date, turning its “interim” status into a prolonged, unaccountable rule. Institutions meant to safeguard democracy have fallen silent or become enablers of repression. The optimism of August has morphed into fear, as the Yunus regime retools authoritarian tactics under the guise of reform. In one year, the Yunus-led government has systematically undermined media freedom in Bangladesh. And hope has curdled into control, and the dream of a freer, more democratic society is slipping further away with each passing day. Behind the laurels lies a familiar hand of repression.
A Dangerous Time for Free Expression
Freedom of speech, a foundational pillar of democracy, remains under severe threat. Journalists—especially those from minority communities—are facing escalating violence, legal harassment, and coordinated state-backed intimidation. A report released on World Press Freedom Day 2025 paints a bleak picture: within eight months of Dr Yunus taking office, at least 640 journalists were targeted. Of these, 182 faced criminal cases, 206 experienced violence, and 85 were placed under financial scrutiny by the Bangladesh Financial Intelligence Unit. The attacks are not isolated; they are systemic, deliberate, and widespread. From legal persecution to outright physical violence, the Yunus regime has transformed Bangladesh into one of the most dangerous places in Asia to be a journalist. Violence against journalists has become commonplace. In March 2025, two journalists were attacked at Barishal Court, while others were assaulted in Dhaka and outside the Dhaka Reporters’ Unity. The most horrific incident came on March 18, when a woman journalist was gang-raped in Dhaka—a case that drew international outrage, including condemnation from ARTICLE 19 and other watchdogs.
In April, New Age’s Rafia Tamanna and Daily Prantojon’s Sajedul Islam Selim were physically attacked. Offices of news outlets were vandalised. Prothom Alo, a paper accused of being an “agent of India,” saw its Rajshahi office destroyed. These attacks illustrate a dangerous trend: the delegitimisation of critical voices through nationalist propaganda followed by violent suppression. Legal harassment has become a preferred tool to silence dissent. Journalists are being dragged into courtrooms and prisons over flimsy or fabricated charges. Kamruzzaman, a journalist in Satkhira, was sentenced to 10 days in jail by a mobile court for “obstructing government work.” His real crime? Reporting on poor construction work. Rubel Hossain of Dhaka Mail was falsely implicated in a murder case related to student protests. Three prominent journalists—Naem Nizam, Moynal Hossain Chowdhury, and Syed Burhan Kabir—faced arrest warrants under the much-criticised Digital Security Act. Their only fault: publishing content critical of powerful figures.
The State vs. Media Institutions
Media institutions haven’t been spared either. An adviser at the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting announced audits targeting “opposition-affiliated” media houses—a move widely viewed as financial intimidation. Deepto TV suspended its news broadcasts following political backlash. ATN Bangla dismissed a reporter for merely raising a sensitive question. In both cases, official denials of state interference were undercut by obvious patterns of state-orchestrated pressure. In a disturbing episode on May 4, journalists at Daily Janakantha protesting unpaid wages were assaulted by goons reportedly linked to the National Citizen Party. This convergence of financial abuse and physical violence has created a stifling environment for critical media. The Yunus government has done little to allay fears about surveillance and data privacy. Instead, it has doubled down with proposed legislation like the Cyber Protection Ordinance 2025 and the Personal Data Protection Ordinance—laws that could further institutionalise censorship and mass surveillance. With travel bans imposed on more than 300 journalists, and bank accounts frozen for over 100 of them, the message is clear: dissent will be crushed not just with batons, but with bureaucracy. Journalists from minority communities are bearing the brunt of the crackdown. Shyamol Dutta, a leading Hindu journalist and editor of Bhorer Kagoj, was jailed after being removed from his post at the National Press Club. Munni Saha, a prominent media personality, is facing several cases and has been detained for questioning. More than 50 minority journalists are reportedly living in fear, with many dismissed from their jobs under opaque circumstances. This pattern reflects not just a press freedom issue, but an assault on the fundamental rights of minority communities.
Targeting Prominent Figures and Media Houses
The arrest of top media professionals like Mozammel Babu, CEO of Ekattor TV, and Syed Ishtiaq Reza, former chief of news at GTV, has shocked the industry. The charges—often murder or conspiracy—lack credibility, pointing to a larger political agenda. In one bizarre move, a complaint filed with the International Crimes Tribunal accused 29 journalists and editors, alongside former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, of spreading “false news to justify genocide.” The charges are outrageous and serve no purpose but to stoke fear and paralyse the press. Even high-profile reporters like Shahnaz Sharmin, known for her fearless on-the-ground reporting, have been named in criminal complaints. Her alleged involvement in the death of a protester is widely seen as a fabricated effort to tarnish her reputation. Dr Yunus’s rise to power was framed as a “second liberation.” His global reputation as a humanitarian and social entrepreneur gave many hope. But the honeymoon was short-lived. The arrest, torture, and surveillance of journalists under his watch signal a complete betrayal of those ideals. Rather than dismantling the oppressive tools of the previous regime, the interim government has inherited and expanded them. Laws are being used as weapons. The courts have turned into instruments of intimidation. And civil liberties—once hoped to be restored—have only deteriorated. Despite the dire situation, there are glimmers of resistance. A Media Reform Commission, proposed by information adviser Nahid Islam, offers a chance for dialogue and reform. But unless these proposals are translated into immediate action—starting with the release of unjustly detained journalists and withdrawal of politically motivated cases— the initiative risks becoming another empty gesture. Civil society must stay vigilant. International watchdogs, human rights organisations, and democratic governments must increase pressure on the Yunus administration. Silence is not neutrality—it is complicity.
The Fight for Truth Must Go On
In the last 12 months, Bangladesh has moved from the promise of change to the peril of authoritarianism. The interim government led by Dr Muhammad Yunus was expected to restore justice, transparency, and democratic values. Instead, it has turned against the very institutions and individuals that form the backbone of a functioning democracy—the free press. The persecution of journalists, the weaponisation of laws, the sidelining of minority voices, and the unending delay of elections paint a grim portrait of a government losing legitimacy by the day. If Yunus does not act swiftly to reverse this trend, he risks eroding not only his reputation but also the democratic foundation of the country. Bangladesh’s journalists are not just chroniclers of events—they are defenders of democracy, truth, and public interest. Silencing them will not silence the truth. It will only delay the reckoning. The time for reform is now—before the darkness of repression becomes permanent
-Dr Sreoshi Sinha(Senior Fellow, Centre for Joint Warfare Studies) & Abu Obaidha Arin (University of
Delhi.)
August 5, 2024, will be remembered as a historic turning point in Bangladesh’s political journey. The fall of the Sheikh Hasina-led Awami League government marked the end of an era—an era deeply intertwined with the legacy of the 1971 Liberation War, the pursuit of transitional justice, and an increasingly authoritarian political framework.
In its place, a fragile and confused new political setup has emerged, led by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus, who, despite his international acclaim, appears ill-equipped to manage the complexities of a fractured nation. Bangladesh today stands at a crossroads—politically unstable, socially fragmented, and economically stalled. Law and order have collapsed, with law enforcement either absent or complicit. Amid this chaos, one of the most disturbing developments has been the reported takeover of the International Crimes Tribunal (ICT) by anti-liberation forces, particularly from right-wing factions. The new ICT leadership appears preoccupied with finding ways to punish Sheikh Hasina and her allies. Even former prosecutors have not been spared—Tureen Afroz, a former prosecutor, was arrested and reportedly tortured in her own home after the fall of the Hasina government.
The tribunal’s primary focus now seems to be targeting members of a specific political party—the Awami League—on accusations related to the mass uprising of 2024 that led to the government’s collapse. This is not merely a political transition. It is a dangerous reversal—a grotesque distortion of justice and history. From Transitional justice to political vendetta The International Crimes Tribunal was established in 2009 with the aim of bringing to justice the perpetrators of war crimes committed during Bangladesh’s struggle for independence. In principle, it was a noble endeavour—a long-overdue acknowledgement of the need for historical accountability. Many war criminals, particularly from Jamaat-e-Islami and the BNP, were prosecuted, with some even sentenced to death. While many ordinary Bangladeshis, especially families of 1971 martyrs, supported the idea of justice, the overt politicisation of the tribunal gradually eroded its legitimacy. But no one could have imagined that the tribunal itself would one day fall into the hands of the very forces it once sought to prosecute. Yet, that is the grim reality today. Jamaat’s spectre returns The resurgence of Jamaat-Shibir elements within the current political framework is deeply alarming—not only because of their past, but because of what it symbolises. It marks the complete reversal of the political narrative that has shaped Bangladesh for the past two decades. Reports now suggest that several individuals with known ties to Jamaat-e-Islami and its student wing, Islami Chhatra Shibir, are now influencing—and in some cases directly managing—the International Crimes Tribunal. It is nothing short of surreal. How can a nation reconcile with the fact that a tribunal once created to hold war criminals accountable is now run, in part, by those accused of committing some of the gravest crimes during the Liberation War? This development is not just a political scandal; it is a national disgrace. It insults the memory of the 3 million who were martyred and the countless women who were raped in 1971. It undermines the very foundation of our national identity.
The Disillusionment of Democracy Muhammad Yunus’s unexpected rise to leadership was initially met with hope—particularly among groups sympathetic to antiBangladesh sentiments, pro-Pakistani elements, and war criminals. With the fall of Sheikh Hasina’s government, many of these groups expressed relief. However, Yunus’s government, largely composed of technocrats and opportunists, lacks both political capital and ideological clarity. It has failed to present a roadmap for economic recovery, social cohesion, or political reconciliation. Law and order have collapsed entirely.
Bangladesh’s former intelligence officer and diplomat Aminul Hoque Polash, in exile since the fall of the Sheikh Hasina regime, has broken his silence on the hidden power structures, financial engineering, and political ambitions surrounding Nobel laureate and the country’s interim leader Muhammad Yunus.
In an exclusive conversation, Polash walks News18 through classified insights, internal documents, and lived experiences inside Bangladesh’s national security system, revealing a side of Yunus the world has never seen before.
Before we get into the details about Dr Yunus, tell us how you ended up in exile.
I never pictured myself sitting in another country, talking about the collapse of the institutions I once served. I spent nearly a decade inside national security and foreign service. My work was simple in principle: follow evidence, protect the state, and protect the people.
Bangladesh today stands on the brink of an unprecedented national catastrophe. Under the guise of reform and accountability, the pro-Islamist regime of Muhammad Yunus has begun dismantling the nation’s most vital institutions – the Armed Forces and the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI). What appears to be a judicial process is, in reality, a political purge aimed at replacing the patriotic guardians of Bangladesh’s sovereignty with a militant, ideologically driven “Islamic Revolutionary Army”. In doing so, the Yunus regime risks transforming Bangladesh from a moderate Muslim democracy into a jihadist state – a South Asian version of Iran or Afghanistan.
As anticipated, the regime in Dhaka, led by Muhammad Yunus has begun implementing its blueprint to create an Islamic Revolutionary Army (IRA) by disbanding the Bangladesh Armed Forces and the country’s primary intelligence agency, the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI).
According to credible media reports, investigators have submitted a chargesheet against 11 army officers, including eight Generals, accusing them of committing “crimes against humanity” – offences carrying the death penalty. The charge sheet also names former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina as the principal accused. Simultaneously, the regime has launched legal measures to permanently outlaw the Awami League, Bangladesh’s oldest and largest political party, in a move clearly engineered to eliminate any chance of an inclusive national election, which Yunus intends to stage in February 2026 under his absolute control.
The accused listed in the chargesheet include: former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, former National Security Advisor Tarique Ahmed Siddique, former DGFI Director General Lt. Gen. (retd) Mohammad Akbar Hossain, former DG Major General (retd) Saiful Abedin, Lt. Gen. (retd) Md Saiful Alam, former DG Lt. Gen. Tabrez Shams Chowdhury, former DG Major General (retd) Hamidul Haque, Major General Towhidul Islam, Major General Sarwar Hossain, Major General Kabir Ahmed, Brigadier General Mahbubur Rahman Siddique, Brigadier General Ahmed Tanvir Majhar Siddique, and Lt. Col. (retd) Makhsurul Haque.
Among them, four are currently in active service. However, under the amended International Crimes Tribunal Act, serving officers accused in such cases are suspended from holding official positions, according to Chief Prosecutor Tajul Islam.
The entire case behind this chargesheet accusing senior military officers originates from a dramatized “documentary film” funded by the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) – an organisation that has, for several years, played an active role in defaming the Bangladesh Army and DGFI.
Unfortunately, during this massive propaganda campaign, both institutions failed to mount an effective counter-narrative. Even after Sheikh Hasina’s ouster, when Yunus and his allies intensified their attacks on DGFI — particularly through claims of detentions inside “Aynaghar”, an imaginary facility invented by a NED-funded, overseas-based media outlet – the disinformation continued unchecked. The so-called “documentary” presented fabricated testimonies from alleged victims, serving as the foundation for the current legal onslaught.
Most importantly, the Bangladesh Armed Forces and DGFI had played a crucial role in the 2024 anti-Hasina protests, which ultimately enabled the US Deep State’s regime-change operation to succeed. More than 14 months after Sheikh Hasina’s removal and the installation of the Yunus regime – a transition initially supported by segments of the military – it has become evident that the ultimate goal of Yunus and his foreign backers is to completely dismantle Bangladesh’s Armed Forces and counterterrorism institutions to pave the way for transforming the country into an Islamist Caliphate.
It was earlier reported that Pakistan’s Army Chief General Asim Munir has been orchestrating this plot to dismantle the Bangladesh Army and DGFI, working in concert with key figures of Jamaat-e-Islami, Ansar Al-Islam (the local franchise of Al-Qaeda), and several high-ranking members of the Yunus regime. Although the current chargesheet targets former DGFI chiefs and counterterrorism officials, credible intelligence sources suggest Islamabad’s ultimate goal is to implicate Army Chief General Waker Uz Zaman, accusing him of “enforced disappearances and unlawful detentions”.
Muhammad Yunus and at least two of his close foreign-linked advisors are believed to be quietly assisting this effort, providing legal and diplomatic cover to neutralise Bangladesh’s last line of defence against Islamist expansionism.
Commenting on this alarming development, noted military analyst M A Hossain stated, “This is possibly the first-ever case in any country where top officials of a national intelligence agency have been prosecuted for defending their nation from terrorism. It defies logic. How can a judiciary target its own security defenders in a case clearly masterminded by Pakistan’s military establishment and its local proxies? The next step, inevitably, will be implicating Army Chief General Waker Uz Zaman – the ultimate command authority – to decapitate the Armed Forces entirely”.
Defence expert Damsana Ranadhiran, a special contributor to Bangladesh’s Blitz media outlet, warned: “This legal ambush targetting Bangladeshi Generals will have dire consequences. It will weaken the military’s command structure and open the door for Pakistan-backed officers to take charge. This is a textbook ISI strategy – a blend of legal warfare, psychological manipulation, and political subversion – identical to what Pakistan executed in Afghanistan and Kashmir”.
Ranadhiran further cautioned that Bangladesh’s sovereignty and regional stability are now at stake.
“Bangladesh did not endure the genocide of 1971 only to be subdued again by Pakistan’s puppeteers and Islamist collaborators. If Pakistan’s designs are not countered immediately through diplomatic, military, and legal means, South Asia may descend into chaos – a region overrun by proxy wars, terror networks, and narcotics-driven insurgencies”.
These fabricated charges against senior military officers are designed to discredit and paralyse the Armed Forces, paving the way for Yunus to replace them with a new paramilitary militia modelled after Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The envisioned Islamic Revolutionary Army (IRA) will be ideologically loyal to the regime rather than to the nation – a hallmark of theocratic authoritarianism.
The motive behind Yunus’s hostility toward the military lies in its potential to resist his project of selling out Bangladesh’s sovereignty for personal and foreign gain. Much like his political idol Hamid Karzai, Yunus seeks to maintain power through foreign patronage rather than public legitimacy.
Analysts estimate his genuine domestic support at no more than five per cent. His crusade against the Awami League, with its 45 million supporters, is part of a larger design to eliminate all political opposition. After banning the Awami League, the regime now aims to suppress smaller parties such as the Jatiya Party and left-leaning groups to cement a one-man rule under the pretext of “national reform”.
Alongside institutional purges, Yunus has unleashed a campaign of terror against journalists, intellectuals, and dissenters. Hundreds have been imprisoned, and at least 266 journalists face fabricated murder charges – making Yunus arguably an even greater oppressor of the press than Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
Meanwhile, the regime is rapidly replacing the national police with an “Auxiliary Police” modeled on Iran’s morality police. Recruited from Hizb ut-Tahrir, Hefazat-e-Islam, and Ansar Al-Islam, this force enforces Taliban-style dress codes and harasses women in traditional Bengali attire. Reports of hijab-clad patrols intimidating citizens are becoming alarmingly common.
For decades, DGFI played a pivotal role in fighting terrorism and militancy, dismantling insurgent networks, and shutting down foreign-backed terrorist training camps – including those of India’s United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA). Its success in keeping Bangladesh free of transnational terrorism made it a target of Islamist extremists and the Pakistani ISI, who now see an opportunity for revenge under the Yunus administration.
Since last year’s Jihadist Coup, Bangladesh has been slipping rapidly toward Islamist rule. Top jihadists – including Ansar Al-Islam leader Jashimuddin Rahmani – were released from prison and now allowed to operate freely. Rahmani has publicly vowed to attack secular voices and bloggers, branding them as “enemies of Islam”. Shockingly, the regime has made no effort to re-arrest such fugitives or curb their militant propaganda.
If this trajectory continues unchecked, Bangladesh may soon cease to exist as the secular republic envisioned by the martyrs of 1971. The systematic destruction of the Armed Forces, intelligence services, and democratic institutions is not merely a domestic tragedy – it is a regional security crisis. South Asia cannot afford another failed state governed by zealots and manipulated by Pakistan’s ISI. The international community, especially India and democratic allies, must recognise that defending Bangladesh’s Armed Forces today is equivalent to defending the last line of resistance against the spread of militant Islamism in South Asia. Silence is complicity – and complicity, in this case, could be catastrophic.
–IANS
Amidst the developments in Bangladesh’s political trajectory, the resurgence of Islamists has been the one catching everyone’s attention. A country with about 90 per cent Muslim population, this surely is not supposed to be alarming. But Bangladesh is no Middle East or Central Asia — wherein religion profoundly shaped their political systems. Religion, albeit a strong influence, has more cultural and symbolic presence than a political one — whereby Bangladesh’s political establishment is influenced by principles of nationalism, socialism, secularism and democracy. Here, cultural and ethnolinguistic identity have historically taken precedence over religious one.
Islamists in Bangladesh seek a complete overhaul of the socio-political-legal system rooted in Islamic values and principles, contrary to the present establishment in Bangladesh. However, Islamists do not comprise a homogenous group, as they take their ideological orientation from different Islamic schools of thought, namely, Hanafi, Deobandi, Barelvi, Salafi and Sufi. Among these, Hanafi and Deobandi exert the most socio-political influence. The Islamists, initially marginalised post Bangladesh’s independence, were rehabilitated under military rule. After restoration of democracy and civilian government in 1990, some created formal political alliances while maintaining grassroot mobilisation in religious institutions and madrasas and entered the electoral field. Others took the path of militancy, launched a series of terror attacks in Bangladesh and re-configured into newer factions after facing state crackdowns and bans, especially under the Awami League government.
The recent unofficial visit of seven Islamic scholars to Afghanistan on Taliban’s invitation needs a careful assessment. The meeting was framed as seven Bangladeshi Islamic scholars observing human rights and women’s rights situation in Afghanistan in face of backlash from the West. However, one cannot overlook the heavy political intent as the meeting also prioritised strengthening ties between Islamic scholars of the two countries, to enhance diplomatic relations in future, beside cooperating on areas like trade, education and healthcare.
Following the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in 2021, Bangladesh government (now dismantled), maintained its distance and refused to give Taliban any diplomatic recognition. Rather, it exercised caution — monitoring and countering the celebratory reactions of Islamists on social media who hailed it as a ‘triumph of Islam’. Even before the takeover, many Bangladeshi Islamist radicals were arrested by security authorities who were caught attempting to join the Taliban in Afghanistan by crossing India.
Why were Bangladesh’s Islamist influenced youth attracted to the Taliban? Because of Bangladesh’s own home-grown extremist groups that emerged in the 1980s-90s, notable being Harkat-ul Jihad Al Islami Bangladesh (HuJIB), and Jamaat-ul-Mujahedeen Bangladesh (JMB), established by fighters who joined the Taliban during Afghan jihad’s fight against Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. After these fighters returned to Bangladesh, they sought to bring the Taliban’s envision into reality—to establish an Islamic rule in Bangladesh, based on Shaira jurisprudence. These groups are also reported to have links with transnational terrorist organisations like al-Qaeda, al-Mujahideen and even Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). The early to mid 2000s was a period of rampant Islamic terror attacks by these groups, primary targets being NGOs and secular and cultural events that they deemed to be ‘un-Islamic’. However, most extremist organisations were checked via strict counterterrorism measures by 2007, although another wave of terrorist attacks surfaced between the period of 2013-2016.
The seven Islamic scholars who attended the meeting with Taliban included Khelafat Majlis chief Mamunul Haque, Nayeb-e-Amir (Pir of Madhupur) of Hefazat-e-Islam Bangladesh Abdul Hamid, Abdul Awal, Abdul Haque, Habibullah Mahmud Qasemi, Monir Hossain Qasemi and Mahbubur Rahman. Both Hefazat and Khelafat belong to the same Deobandi tradition and predominantly trained in Qawmi madrasas, that emphasises in Islamic scholarship independent of state regulated Alia system. In terms of core ideological beliefs, both lay strict emphasis on scriptural orthodoxy, rejection of Barelvi tradition, Sufi practices and Ahmadiya’s inclusion as Muslims and opposition to Western influences, especially on culture and education. In effect, both champions complete Islamisation of socio-cultural life.
Khelafat Majlis, founded in late 1989, emerged during the Bangladesh anti-Ershad movement. An Islamist political party, Khelafat, stated its goal of creating a national governance framework that is based on Qura, Sunnah and early Islamic Caliphates. Therefore, the party’s main target of mobilisation were Islamic scholars and aimed at creating a larger unity between these scholars and general Muslims against the secular system of governance who would push for Khelafat’s Political Islam. Its activities largely confined to anti-secular and blasphemy protests—be it organising a large mass demonstration from Dhaka to Ayodhya demanding for Babri Masjid restoration that was demolished in 1993, protest against installation of “Eternal Flame” at Suhrawardy Udyan, the anti-Taslima movement that led to her exile, the 2017 anti-Statue protest against the installation of the statue of Lady Justice from the Supreme Court premises in Dhaka.
In electoral politics, it had a minimal presence, entering into coalition with both BNP (that it opted out in 2021). Although not involved in overt terror activities, Khelafat’s hardline stance coupled with ideological leniency towards the Taliban were deemed threatening to Bangladesh’s secular principles. Its leaders, including chief Mamunul Haque, were arrested under Digital Security Act and Anti-Terrorism Act under the Awami League government for their participation in protests in anti-secular, anti-blasphemy protests, in alliance with Hefazat-e-Islam.
Unlike Khelafat Majlis, Hefazat-e-Islam is not a political party but an Islamist organisation, drawing on the same ideology and traditions like Khelafat. A coalition of more than 25,000 Qawmi madrasas across Bangladesh, Hefazat emerged in 2010 as a reaction to Awami League government’s Women Development Policy (2009) draft giving women equal inheritance rights. In 2013, Hefazat held a massive rally by blocking roads, commerce and regular activities. Known as the Shapla Chattar siege in Dhaka, Hefazat presented its 13-point demands that included introduction of blasphemy laws, gender segregation in public, declaring Ahmadiyyas as non-Muslims, and curbing every un-Islamic activity, to state a few.
Following Jamaat’s decline in Bangladesh under Awami League’s government, Hefazat’s emergence was seen as the rise of a new radical Islam in Bangladesh and this 2013 siege, a pivotal moment of radical Islamists urban mobilizational efforts directly challenging the secular state authority. Other notable protests are the anti-statue protest of 2017, anti-Modi protest in 2021, the latter turning violent and the death of 17 people. The leaders of Hefazat-e-Islam were meted the same treatment as its ally Khelafat, who provided logistical and ideological support to Hefazat’s programmes.
Following the July Uprising and the establishment of an interim government, both Hefazat-e-Islam and Khelafat Majlis regained their position and marked its active presence in the country. Detained leaders, including Hefazat chief were released, seen as part of the interim government’s reconciliation. However, thanks to both, and its allied Islamic parties, Bangladesh has also been witnessing a series of attacks, especially on the freedom of cultural expression.
Towhidi Janata, a loosely organised group of ‘agitated Muslims’ has been notorious to wreak havoc on events like Book Fair, Lalon Fakir Mela, Basant Utsav and women’s football match. Needless to say, Hefazat and Khelafat provide backing to Towhidi that has also been making headlines recently for increasing attacks on shrines, including the exhumation and burning of body of Nurul Pagla. While these Islamic scholars were in Kabul to meet the Taliban, its leaders and activities back home organised street rallies demanding for implementation of the July Charter and declaring Ahmadiyas to be non-Muslims and a Constitutional reform that is based on Sharia.
Khelafat and Hefazat, although not a terrorist organisation, are ideologically extremist whose beliefs go against Bangladesh’s core national principles. The Taliban meeting surely is their symbolic assertion — of Bangladesh’s Islamists envision of Talibanising the country. This meeting with the Taliban also points to a future normalisation of diplomatic relations between Bangladesh and Taliban’s Afghanistan, as the interim government seems to not object to such an informal meeting. A radicalised Bangladesh under the garb of Islamists pose a serious problem for South Asian neighbours, given these factions’ ideological links not just with Taliban, but also with Pakistan. The Global South, therefore, needs to keep an open eye to such ‘harmless’ meetings.
–IANS
Pakistan’s geopolitics seem to have reached a full circle with the continuous terror of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).Founded in 2007, the TTP is a jihadist militant organisation whose prime target is the Pakistani military. The extremist group envisions creating an Islamic caliphate state based on the Deobandi tradition in Pakistan. Besides, the TTP supported the Taliban’s efforts in Afghanistan. Banned by Pakistan in 2008, TTP is believed to have strong ties with al-Qaeda and Taliban in Afghanistan, and its militant attacks are mostly concentrated in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, bordering Afghanistan.
Following the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in 2021, TTP’s activities resumed, and attacks intensified, adding to Pakistan’s own internal terror attacks. At the same time, Pakistan’s state-sponsored terror groups continue their cross-border terrorism, especially in India. The recent military operation by Pakistan in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa that killed 17 TTP militants disclosed a shocking report: one of the militants killed has been identified as a Bangladeshi national. Bangladesh media reported that the slain militant’s family had no idea of his militant background, who claimed to have moved to Dubai to earn a living. However, as per police intelligence, the Bangladeshi militant moved to Afghanistan.
Pakistani authorities reported to have hounded two or three Bangladeshi militants in their earlier operations, while these men allegedly went to Afghanistan on the pretext of religious work, where they later joined an extremist terrorist organisation. This is, however, not a lone case. In April, a 23-year-old Bangladeshi national, Ahmed Zubair, reported to be a member of Tehreek-e-Taliban, was among the 54 militants killed by Pakistan’s military forces. At least eight Bangladeshi nationals were also reported to have migrated to Afghanistan to join the TTP. The Bangladeshi digital platform also stated that Bangladesh’s own security intelligence remains oblivious to TTP’s outreach in Bangladesh, and if any camps are operating inside the country presently. Again, two individuals—33-year-old Ahmed Faisal and 49-year-old Shamin Mahfuz—were arrested in Bangladesh in July for their alleged TTP links.
It should be noted that Mahfuz is a former leader of Jamaat-ul-Mujahedeen Bangladesh (JMB), and later founded Jama’atul Ansar Fil Hindal Sharqiya in 2019. Both individuals were also previously detained on multiple terrorism charges. From Faisal’s confession, it came to light that most of these Bangladeshi-national militants have moved to Afghanistan either via Saudi Arabia or via Pakistan to join the TTP. Mostly youth, these militants seek to establish an Islamic caliphate worldwide based on the Sharia. During this arrest, it was also learned that four Bangladeshi nationals who joined the TTP were killed on the Afghan-Pakistan border, while 25 more were preparing to leave Bangladesh to join jihad.
The confession also shed light on one Imran Haider, a senior TTP figure, as being the central figure behind the online indoctrination of Bangladeshi youth to recruit them to the TTP. Around the same time, 36 Bangladeshi nationals were reportedly detained in Malaysia for their alleged involvement in a “radical militant movement”. However, Bangladesh’s home advisor downplayed this and denied their extremist links. Since last year, South Asian geopolitics has gone through an unpredictable arc with the fall of Sheikh Hasina in Bangladesh following the July Uprising. On one hand, the interim government in Bangladesh pivoted to Pakistan, boosting bilateral ties—including trade, education, defence and intelligence sharing, while maintaining a deliberate distance with India, Bangladesh’s oldest and long-standing regional partner.
On the other hand, Bangladesh witnessed a rapid surge of Islamist groups, so long sidelined and suppressed via counterterrorism efforts of the Awami League government. Transnational extremist groups like Hizb-ut Tahrir (banned in 2009) made their presence felt in the country, notably for allegedly organising a procession by students in Dhaka under the banner of ‘Conscious Teachers and Students’, demanding the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate system in Bangladesh in October last year and the ‘March to Khilafat’ rally this March. Muhammad Yunus has also appointed individuals associated with Hizb-ut Tahrir in his interim government, sparking controversy in the political scenario.
Moreover, leaders and associates of groups like Hefazat-e-Islam, Ansarulla Bangla Team and Khelafat Majlis—arrested for their extremist links were also released under the interim government, who have now resumed their hate propaganda, to push for the creation of an Islamic state in Bangladesh based on Sharia law. These developments raise concerns about the resurrection of Islamist extremism in Bangladesh, given its history. Those from Bangladesh joined the Taliban to fight against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, returned to their homeland in the 1980s and 90s and established extremist organisations, such as Harkat-ul Jihad Al Islami Bangladesh (HuJIB), and Jamaat-ul-Mujahedeen Bangladesh (JMB).
Needless to say, these groups not only had ideological links with the Taliban but also received logistical support and training from al-Qaeda and Pakistan-based Laskhar-e-Taiba (LeT), and their terror operations in Bangladesh were aimed at creating a Taliban-like establishment in the country. While their activities were crippled due to counterterrorism measures by 2007, Bangladesh remained under periodic terror attacks, witnessing a surge from 2013-2016. The political changes in Bangladesh following Hasina’s deposition further strengthen concerns of Islamist extremists’ comeback in the country, as evident from the above-stated reports.
The recent visit of seven Islamic clerics, including the Khelafat Majlis chief and Nayeb-e-Amir (Pir of Madhupur) of Hefazat-e-Islam, to Afghanistan on the invitation of the Taliban should be viewed with the same caution as the rising trend of militancy in Bangladesh. These groups share the same ideological orientation—Deobandi school of Islam—as that of the Taliban and hailed the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan as a “triumph of Islam”. While not extremist groups themselves, these parties’ ideological inclination to the Taliban and their own hardline stance on socio-cultural-political life signal a possible convergence of interests between these organisations and foreign-linked militant ones. Nevertheless, Bangladesh’s Anti-Terrorism Unit’s additional inspector general claims that there is no militant activity in Bangladesh while simultaneously stating that future militant activity cannot be ruled out either. With the election around the corner and Bangladesh’s fragile state of democracy, this rise of militancy in Bangladesh now poses the greatest security risk, not just for Dhaka but also for South Asia as a whole.One can only hope that Bangladesh’s law enforcement forces to deal with militant trends seriously without having to resort to denial. Otherwise, it would not be long before Bangladesh becomes the second Pakistan.
–IANS
It has been more than a year since the interim government in Bangladesh came into being under the leadership of Muhammad Yunus, and the country has gone through a political reset, both internally as well as in its foreign policy. Internally, the largest political party — the Awami League — and its affiliates are banned, Islamists have revived, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s legacy downplayed and even attacked, and the history of the 1971 Liberation War is up for debate. Post-Sheikh Hasina Bangladesh, hailed as the “new” Bangladesh, has also been wrought with violence of all kinds — communal, ethnic, gender, mob, and political. Inevitably, the country’s law and order is in a constant state of compromise. However, the interim government, whose prime responsibility behind its establishment was to bring the country’s stability back on track, dodged all accountability via two ways — denial and labelling it a “conspiracy” of “outside influence”.
The ostracisation of Awami League was predictable, considering Yunus’s personal animosity with Sheikh Hasina. This year, therefore, witnessed the interim government, using all means — political, judicial and administrative — to witch-hunt League loyalists and activists on one hand and create a political atmosphere where Bangladesh’s apparent newly-earned democracy is one without opposition.
Human Rights Watch, in May, reported that the interim government has risked Bangladesh’s fundamental freedoms via a series of legislative measures. In a recent report, HRW also accused the interim government of abusing the recently amended Anti-Terrorism Act to target and imprison thousands of political opponents, especially the alleged supporters of the now ousted Awami League, on dubious charges to shut down dissent. Indeed, the report rightly pointed this is not the path to democratic transition. Bangladesh’s own rights groups, too, have been critical of the interim government’s highhandedness—following the script of its predecessor that it claims to be so against, as it observed a disturbing rise in violations of human rights and crimes across Bangladesh under the interim government.
In its efforts to suppress the Awami League and positing itself opposite to everything it stood for, the interim government resorted to keeping a cold distance from its neighbour, India. Calling it a ‘balanced geopolitics’, the Yunus-led interim government and its supporters, including political leaders, manufactured a new narrative—that India is an ‘ally’ of Sheikh Hasina and the Awami League. Through shameless misconstruing of Indo-Bangladesh diplomatic relations, anti-Hasina forces are now competing against each other to appear as the guardians safeguarding Bangladesh’s democracy, one that the country’s so long lacked due to Hasina’s pro-India foreign policy tilt. While political parties, especially opponents of the Awami League, have always used anti-India rhetoric as their election campaign, the same by the interim government reflects its ultimate defence mechanism when faced with accountability.
The Chief Advisor ventured to create a fearmongering attitude among Bangladeshis that India’s ‘hegemony’ is the reason behind its own present political crisis. Oftentimes, especially when the inefficiency of law enforcement forces has been questioned, as in the case of the February Bulldozer Procession of 32 Dhanmondi, the interim government put the blame on “external forces” for its internal crisis. His close associates, along with other advisors of the interim government, too, made provocative remarks targeting India’s border security. Communal attacks have witnessed a surge in Bangladesh since the fall of Hasina. When India raised concern about this worrying trend, the interim government quickly dismissed it as political attacks, and not communal, and even called the reports “exaggerated”. It echoed the same about reports of communal attacks by the Bangladesh Hindu Buddhist Christian Unity Council, calling it “misleading” and “false”.
In a recent interview with a US journalist, Yunus took yet another anti-India jibe, calling anti-Hindu violence in Bangladesh “fake news”, one that is a “speciality of India”, whereby Bangladesh remains a “beacon of religious harmony”. This is notwithstanding the US Religious Freedom report that revealed the state of minorities in Bangladesh to be concerning.
Given the collective failure in providing security to Hindus during the celebration of their biggest religious festival, Durga Puja, last year, the same concerns were raised when the media reported a few cases of idol vandalism days before the onset of Puja this year. This year, the home advisor warned to take tough action against those involved in 793 Durga Puja pavilions for allegedly “hurting religious sentiments” and blamed the “neighbouring country” for having a connection behind the falsehood surrounding Durga Puja. Such statements by an advisor were noted to encourage communal violence and persecution of minority populations, minority Hindus being always under the radar of proving their nationalism. This year, at least 49 untoward incidents have taken place at puja mandaps across Bangladesh has been reported during Durga Puja.
The recent ethnic violence in Khagrachhari in Chittagong Hill Tracts, another pressing issue in Bangladesh, showed the systemic nature of violence in the hills, whereby miscreants continue to enjoy a culture of impunity under the interim government. Here too, the government was quick to put the blame on ‘fascist groups’ sheltered in the neighbouring country, who are being allowed to create conditions to destabilise Bangladesh. New Delhi’s response was calling a spade a spade—dismissing the allegation as bizarre and pointing to the interim government’s tendency to shift blame elsewhere to camouflage its own inefficiency in maintaining law and order.
To cover up its failure, despite a year in power, the interim government has been shifting the blame game on India. This is not only an insult to the conscience of Bangladeshis but also to their very democratic aspiration. Through the manufactured narrative of “conspiracy of external force to destabilise Bangladesh”, the interim government is deliberately delaying the democratic transition that its people are desperately awaiting.
Even though India has made it clear that it awaits a smooth, inclusive, just democratic transition in Bangladesh, where New Delhi is willing to work with any government that comes to power (as bilateral relations should be), the interim government is repeatedly resorting to arrogant statements to hold onto the chair. One can only hope for the national election to resolve this deliberate deadlock by the interim government, so that bilateral ties reach new heights in the near future.
–IANS