The July 2024 Uprising constituted a watershed moment in the political history of Bangladesh, precipitating significant transformations in both leadership and governance structures. In the aftermath, established political parties, along with newly emergent entities, have asserted themselves actively as opposition forces, predominantly targeting the Awami League. This development has underscored the emergence of a “new Bangladesh,” characterised by its explicit recognition and promotion of individuals and groups that have vigorously opposed the previous ruling party and its associated legacy.
A salient illustration of this shift is observable in the interim government’s concerted efforts to reconfigure collective historical memory regarding the 1971 Liberation War. These initiatives have sought to reconstruct historical narratives in a manner that tends to marginalise or omit the contributions of the Awami League—most notably those of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, who is widely recognised as Bangladesh’s founding father and principal architect of its independence.
With respect to Sheikh Hasina, whose tenure concluded with her removal from office in August 2024, opposition rhetoric has advanced the prevailing assertion that her sustained electoral success was attributable to her close association with India. Immediately following the 2024 electoral outcome, a movement akin to the Maldives’ “India Out” campaign emerged within Bangladesh, advocating for a boycott of Indian commodities and alleging that India had exerted undue influence on Bangladesh’s domestic political processes to sustain Hasina’s prolonged incumbency. Her subsequent exile in New Delhi has further substantiated this discourse, lending greater credence to these claims among her critics.
In the run-up to the forthcoming 13th national election, Bangladesh’s political milieu appears increasingly permeated by anti-India sentiment. Notably, this disposition is manifest not only within opposition parties but is also discernible in the interim government’s policy orientations and public actions.
Following the collapse of Hasina’s administration, the dynamics of India-Bangladesh relations have undergone notable changes. The newly installed interim leadership has adopted a divergent foreign policy trajectory, deliberately creating distance from India. This realignment is exemplified by the imposition of trade restrictions on imports from India. Conversely, the interim administration has deepened its engagement with Pakistan, a state from which Bangladesh achieved independence through the violent conflict of 1971. While some Bangladeshi commentators characterise this rapprochement as a calculated diplomatic manoeuvre, they frequently overlook the fact that substantive shifts in foreign policy have largely been confined to relations with India.
Domestic foreign policy experts have critiqued India’s previous strategy, contending that it disproportionately prioritised relations with the Awami League, thereby “placing all its eggs in one basket.” However, this argument tends to neglect the profound historical and cultural ties between the two nations. India was the second country after Bhutan, to recognise Bangladesh’s sovereignty in 1971, and both states retain strong affinities rooted in common histories, languages, and cultures as former territories of British India. Although it is accurate that India maintained closer relations with the Awami League-led government relative to the BNP coalition—which adopted a more adversarial stance towards India—this does not imply that bilateral relations are determined solely by partisan considerations.
The two countries also share an extensive and porous frontier, which has historically given rise to challenges such as unauthorised migration, cross-border smuggling, and sporadic border disputes—issues that persist in the contemporary context. Following Sheikh Hasina’s departure from Dhaka, Bangladesh experienced significant upheaval, marked by violence against minority populations and a deterioration of law and order. Coverage of these events provoked concern in India, which recalled the influx of millions of refugees during the 1971 conflict. Nevertheless, attempts by Indian authorities to voice their apprehensions were routinely dismissed by the interim government as “fabrications” or “politically motivated narratives.”
Rather than accepting responsibility for shortcomings in maintaining law and order, the interim administration has persistently sought to attribute blame to India. For instance, when the historic Dhanmondi 32 residence of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was subjected to vandalism in February, the authorities, instead of acknowledging deficiencies in their security apparatus, alleged that India was enabling Sheikh Hasina to disseminate her messages from exile. India issued a strong diplomatic protest in response to these assertions, yet the interim leadership in Dhaka continued to evade accountability.
The chief advisor to the interim government has frequently alluded to “external actors” fomenting instability in Bangladesh—implicitly referring to India—while refraining from acknowledging his own administration’s role in the prevailing disorder. This narrative strategy serves to deflect scrutiny from the government’s administrative failures and simultaneously consolidates its anti-India credentials among certain domestic constituencies.
Simultaneously, various political parties, including Islamist factions, have adopted similar anti-India rhetoric in an effort to harness popular support. Islamist groups, some of which were previously marginalised or proscribed, are now openly advocating for the establishment of a Sharia-based constitution and mounting attacks on the country’s secular foundations. The interim government’s persistent silence regarding these developments has allowed such groups to consolidate their influence and propagate their ideological agenda largely unimpeded.
Among the most prominent actors in this landscape is Jamaat-e-Islami, which is currently attempting to present itself as a progressive entity. Nevertheless, it continues to evade responsibility for its contentious role during the 1971 war. This organisation, along with emerging groups such as the National Citizenry Party (NCP), is actively seeking to reinterpret the narrative of the Liberation War. They propagate the erroneous claim that India’s involvement constituted interference in what was an internal Pakistani matter, and suggest that Indian intervention was the primary catalyst for the partition in 1971. Such assertions are not only historically inaccurate but also deeply disrespectful to those who sacrificed their lives for Bangladesh’s independence.
Recently, the NCP attributed responsibility for the Gopalganj unrest to so-called “pro-India” factions with links to the Awami League. This incident exemplifies how anti-India rhetoric is being employed for political advantage. However, such narratives provoke a fundamental question: What incentive would India have to promote instability or disorder in Bangladesh? Given the significant security challenges India already confronts emanating from its western neighbour, Pakistan, it has little desire to see turmoil on its eastern frontier.
Rather than assigning culpability to India, Bangladeshi political leaders ought to address the internal issues that frequently stem from their own policies and decisions. Utilising India as a scapegoat for political expediency may offer short-term benefits in electoral terms, but ultimately proves detrimental to the nation’s long-term interests. The premise that India is behind every crisis in Bangladesh is not only unsubstantiated but also poses potential risks.
India, on its part, continues to express its aspiration for a peaceful, democratic, and secular Bangladesh, and remains prepared to engage with any administration that upholds mutual values and interests. However, substantive cooperation cannot occur if India is persistently perceived solely as an adversary or rival.
As the forthcoming election approaches, Bangladesh faces a decisive juncture. The nation must determine whether it wishes to forge a future founded on truth, collaboration, and democratic values, or remain encumbered by a cycle of scapegoating and historical distortion. A stable and prosperous Bangladesh is in the best interests not only of its own populace, but also of the entire region—including India.
